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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses issues surrounding Chinese constitutional arrangement to 
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. It contends that in light of the Chinese State’s 
constitutional accommodation of, and integration with, the peripheral societies of 
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, a re-conceptualisation of Chinese constitutional law 
in on the verge of maturity, which, informed by realistic ideals, would be conductive 
to establishing a constitutional order of peace and stability that is embodied in a 
legal structure in which multiple societies, as self-governing people-s, could sustain 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In the last 30 years the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter PRC) has 
promulgated a series of parliamentary acts to accommodate the peripheral societies 
of Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. These acts include but are not limited to the 
Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984,1 the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (hereinafter Hong Kong Basic Law), and the Anti-Secession 
Act 2005,2 which aims at a political reunification between the Chinese mainland and 
Taiwan. The PRC government’s legislative agenda has been devised to 
constitutionalise the relationship between the PRC central government and these 
peripheral societies. This has naturally generated both positive and negative 
responses. Whereas after the 1997 sovereign handover, Hong Kong has been 
ostensibly stable and is arguably a successful case with respect to constitutional 
design, the PRC central government’s relationship with Taiwanese and Tibetan 
communities has not been as good as that with Hong Kong. In 1984 and 2008, 
ethnic unrest in Lhasa exposed the fact that China’s Tibet policy remains under 
challenge. The political tension across the Taiwan Strait intensified in 1996 and 
2004, but has been alleviating since the alleged “China/Mainland-friendly” Chinese 
Nationalist Party, otherwise known as the Kuomintang (hereinafter KMT), returned 
as the majority party in the territorial legislature and seized the territorial 
administration with an overwhelming majority of votes in 2008.  
In this context, there is an intellectual and practical need to ask: what are Chinese 
constitutional arrangements relating to Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan? Are they 
just? Are they satisfactory? If not, are there possibilities of further constitutional 
reform? I will devote this thesis to provide some answers to these questions. In 
                                                
1 This Chinese parliamentary act is also translated as the “The People's Republic of China Regional 
Ethnic Autonomy Law”.  
2 This Chinese parliamentary act is also translated as the “Anti-Secession Law”. 
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addressing these issues, this thesis contends that in light of the Chinese State’s 
constitutional accommodation of, and integration with, the peripheral societies of 
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan,3 a re-conceptualisation of Chinese constitutional 
law is on the verge of maturity. Being informed by realistic liberal ideals, this re-
conceptualisation would be probably conducive to establishing a constitutional 
order of peace and stability. Such an order would be embodied in an asymmetric 
legal structure in which multiple societies, as self-governing peoples, can sustain 
healthy constitutional relations and abstain from violent conflict. 
To my best knowledge, this is the first academic attempt to build a legal conception 
upon Chinese constitutional arrangements to Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan with a 
doctoral thesis in any language. The constitutionalisation of the relationships 
between the Chinese State and peripheral societies should have interested two 
academic traditions. These traditions have nevertheless so far both remained mostly 
silent. The discipline of Chinese Studies as an “area study” replaced classical 
Sinology in the West in the second half of the 20th century. This is because the 
establishment of the PRC motivated statespersons and scholars in the West to 
comprehend its new politics and economic growth.4 However, the base for Chinese 
                                                
3 Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are “peripheral” societies in the sense that they are far from the 
conventional centre of the Chinese heartland, comprised of the North China Plain and Yangtze 
River Delta. However, the reverse perspective could also view China proper as the periphery of 
each said society. Indeed, this is an emerging Taiwanese worldview that circulates China, Japan, 
South Asian nations around Taiwan, making the Chinese mainland a periphery of Taiwan. For 
Tibetans, a 15th century Tibetan classic recorded that most Tibetans then regarded India as the 
centre of the known continent because Buddhism was born there. Nevertheless, some Tibetans still 
deemed Tibet to be the centre, as they observed that rivers all derive from the Tibetan Plateau. See 
STAG-TSHANG-RDZONG-PA-DPAL-VBYOR-BZANG-PO, rgya-bod-kyi-yig-tshang-mkhas-pa-dgav-
byed-chen-mo-vdzm-gling-gsal-bavi-me-long-zhes-bya-ba-bzhung-so, pp. 11-12. 
4 For a seminal review of the discipline of Chinese Studies in the West see COHEN, PAUL A., 
Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (Columbia 
University Press. 1984). 
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Studies in the West lies with university social science departments, and Chinese 
constitutional law is not a field that Chinese Studies have cultivated enthusiastically. 
Moreover, the second academic tradition, comparative constitutional law, has not 
said much about China either. In the aftermath of Chinese “reform and opening” 
Chinese constitutional law has made several great leaps. The Constitution of the 
PRC of 1982 (hereinafter “1982 Constitution”),5 the 1999 constitutional amendment 
that adds a provision to promote the “rule of law”,6 and the 2004 constitutional 
provision promising “the State respects and protects human rights”7 all exemplify 
the dynamics of Chinese constitutional law. Western academics have gradually 
acknowledged these new characteristics of Chinese constitutional law.8 However, 
the constitutional relationship between the PRC central government and peripheral 
societies has not caught much attention.9 
                                                
5 The 1982 Constitution.  
6 The 1982 Constitution, art 5, s 1. 
7 The 1982 Constitution, art 33, s 3. 
8 MCCORMICK, BARRETT L., Political Reform in Post-Mao China : Democracy and Bureaucracy in a 
Leninist State (University of California Press. 1990). CHEN, HONGYI, An Introduction to the Legal 
System of the People's Republic of China (Butterworths Asia. 1992). LUBMAN, STANLEY B., Bird 
in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (Stanford University Press. 1999). TURNER-
GOTTSCHANG, KAREN, et al., The Limits of the Rule of Law in China (University of Washington 
Press. 2000). ZOU, KEYUAN, China's Legal Reform : towards the Rule of Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. 2006). LALIBERTÉ, ANDRÉ & LANTEIGNE, MARC, The Chinese Party-State in the 21st 
Century : Adaptation and the Reinvention of Legitimacy (Routledge. 2008). CLARKE, DONALD C., 
China's Legal System: New Developments, New Challenges (Cambridge University Press. 2008).  
9 There are nevertheless a number of works dedicated to studying Hong Kong’s constitutional law: 
see C. DAVIS, MICHAEL, Constitutional Confrontation in Hong Kong (St. Martin's Press. 1990). 
WESLEY-SMITH, PETER, An Introduction to the Hong Kong Legal System (1998). GHAI, YASH P., 
Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order: the Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the Basic 
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How the Chinese State’s constitutional progress relates to the peripheral societies of 
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan has been neglected for three reasons at least. First, it 
remains an ongoing academic argument that a constitutional structure should 
recognise and accommodate multiple societies with territorial self-governance. 
Stephen Tierney indicates: “these societies position themselves in a relational way 
to the state not as internal ‘minorities’, but rather as polities which are in fact 
comparable to the state in the way they offer, or have the potential to offer, an 
effective site for many if not all of those functional and indentificatory roles which 
the state plays in the life of the citizens”.10 Although “one index of regional 
authority in 42 mainly Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) states makes clear, between 1970 and 2005 only two states became more 
centralized while almost three-quarters saw regional powers increase”,11 a new 
conceptualisation based on this phenomenon is no substitute for traditional 
analytical frameworks unless pluralised constitutional structures neither re-
centralise nor disaggregate to a number of new constitutional units of societal 
singularity. The ongoing uncertainty reminds us the famous sentence of Hegel: “the 
owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk”. So it could be 
risky to overconfidently advocate a fledgling – an idea or a concept or a theory 
based on currently emerging factors – to fly in the dawn. 
Secondly, the inherited geographic partition of academic traditions also impeded 
China’s peripheral societies being depicted on one piece of map. Tibet, as a 
                                                                                                                                    
Law (Hong Kong University Press 2nd ed. 1999). FU, HUALING, et al., Interpreting Hong Kong's 
Basic Law: the struggle for coherence (Palgrave Macmillan. 2007). 
10 TIERNEY, STEPHEN, Consitutional Law and National Plualism (Oxford University Press 2004), pp. 
4-5. 
11 MARKS, G & HOOGH, L, Regional Authority in 42 Countries, 1950–2006: a Measure and Five 
Hypotheses, Regional and Federal Studies 111-307, (2008). Cited from HENDERSON, AILSA, Why 
Regions Matter: Sub-state Polities in Comparative Perspective, 20 Regional & Federal Studies 
439, (2010).  
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Himalayan region, has been for long studied as part of South Asia in the West, and 
this is probably because the region was “discovered” by Great Britain, the only 
Western state having substantial contact with pre-communist Tibet, from British 
India.12 It is still a new endeavour to put Tibet and ethnic “Chinese” societies (the 
Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) in one mosaic,13 but this academic drift 
is inevitable since these societies are now legally and politically connected by the 
presence of the PRC central government. 
Thirdly and probably most importantly, traditional preconceptions and prejudices of 
liberal constitutionalism are the major obstacle to theorise the Chinese 
constitutionalisation of the relationship between the PRC central government and 
the peripheral societies. It is the liberal hypothesis that non-liberal regimes, such as 
the PRC, are not genuinely implementing constitutional law. Many liberals would 
rebuke the Soviet-style PRC Constitution for being full of political declarations but 
of no effectiveness and efficiency in the real world. In the Chinese mainland the 
PRC Constitution indeed shall not be cited in adjudication, and in this sense no 
constitutional jurisdiction exists. Hence previous generations of scholarship found 
little necessity in studying the PRC’s constitutional law.  
Yet the sovereign handover of Hong Kong in 1997 has compelled the PRC central 
government to put Chinese constitutional law into practice, at least in a part of 
China’s territory. Since the second half of the 19th century Hong Kong has adopted 
and adapted British constitutionalism successfully, and the continuity of Hong 
                                                
12 An interesting story of the first British expedition to Tibet see TELTSCHER, KATE, The High Road 
to China: George Bogle, the Panchen Lama and the First British Expedition to Tibet (Bloomsbury. 
2006). The British-Tibetan contact in the 19th century see ALLEN, CHARLES & YOUNGHUSBAND, 
FRANCIS EDWARD, Duel in the Snows: the True Story of the Younghusband Mission to Lhasa 
(John Murray. 2004).  
13 TUTTLE, GRAY, Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China (Columbia University Press. 
2005).  
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Kong’s legal system is a condition of the handover committed by the PRC 
government to the United Kingdom. Since 1997 the Hong Kong Basic Law has 
provided the constitutional mechanisms for the PRC government to deal with Hong 
Kong affairs, and judicial courts in Hong Kong have also cited the PRC Constitution 
in judgements several times. In this sense, Chinese constitutional law has already 
been activated in constitutional jurisdiction. Secondly, comparative constitutional 
scholarship has already recognised a plurality of substate societies may co-exist in 
one constitutional structure, and several liberal democracies’ experience 
demonstrate a series of constitutional arrangements can be made for that.14 Non-
liberal regimes may not replicate the liberal model completely, but the similarities 
and dissimilarities between liberal and non-liberal regimes in accommodating 
substate societies are certainly of interest for those trying to draw a bigger picture. 
Thirdly, no matter what hypothesis is taken for granted ideologically, a politically 
stable and economically prosperous state of affairs is a shared ideal for most 
individuals and societies. Kantian liberals reckon that a reasonable legal institution 
can be the basis for the perpetual peace of humanity,15 while Marxists also attach 
importance to law as a part of the “superstructure” that facilitates the development 
of “economic basis”. So being liberal or otherwise, constitutional theory could give 
a hand to build a consensus towards a more peaceful future for both the struggling 
societies and the host state. 
Here a new conceptualisation of Chinese constitutional law, mapping the peripheral 
societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan as a whole, is expected to achieve two 
goals. First, it shall describe the concrete constitutional arrangements that the 
Chinese State has devised for each and every peripheral society, and forensically 
explain how Chinese constitutional law has evolved to a structure that assembles a 
plurality of societies practically or nominally. In fact, the asymmetry of 
                                                
14 TIERNEY, Consitutional Law and National Plualism.  
15 KANT, IMMANUEL, Perpetual Peace (U.S. Library Association. 1932).  
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constitutional status among Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan has in some measure 
defied the traditional constitutional dichotomy of unitary/federal state. In liberal 
democracies “union state” 16 and other terms are used to attend similar phenomena.17 
The PRC theoretically remains “unitary”, but Hong Kong’s new constitutional 
status has in almost all respects undermined traditional terms’ currency. Secondly, 
the new conceptualisation, to be a good one, should help to anticipate, or hopefully 
predict, future developments of the constitutional relationship between the PRC 
central government and the peripheral societies in line with it. For this, the 
conceptualisation shall promote a normative prescription. On the one hand, 
constitutional law as the “basic law” is expected to declare a list of values and 
principles endured by the state and the society. In this context a truly viable and 
vivid constitutional order must be able to coordinate the ideological differences 
among the peripheral societies and the Chinese mainland. On the other hand, a 
normative prescription is vital because a prospective perspective is needed. This 
thesis endorses an attitude of “realistic idealism”, which derives from John Rawls’s 
idea of “realistic utopia” in his The Law of Peoples.18 It quintessentially means that 
                                                
16 The term “union state” see WALKER, NEIL, Final Appellate Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal 
System, (Scottish Government. 2010), pp. 13-15. 
17 Many have constitutionally examined these phenomena. A comprehensive account see TIERNEY, 
Consitutional Law and National Plualism. For devolution in United Kingdom see Alan J. Ward, 
Devolution: Labour’s Strange Constitutional ‘Design’, in JOWELL, JEFFREY L. & OLIVER, DAWN, 
The Changing Constitution (Oxford University Press 4th ed. 2000), pp. 111-136. OLIVER, DAWN, 
Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom (Oxford University Press. 2003), chapters 13-15. 
TURPIN, COLIN & TOMKINS, ADAM, British Government and the Constitution (Cambridge 
University Press 6th ed. 2007), chapter 4. HIMSWORTH, CHRIS & O'NEILL, C. M., Scotland's 
Constitution: Law and Practice (Tottel Print on demand ed. 2006). For Canadian “asymmetrical 
federation” see Ferran Requejo, Political Liberalism in Multinational States, in GAGNON, ALAIN & 
TULLY, JAMES, Multinational Democracies (Cambridge University Press. 2001), pp. 113-130. 
18 RAWLS, JOHN, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (2001), pp. 11-22. 
BEITZ, CHARLES, Rawls's Law of Peoples, 110 Ethics, (2000) 669 at 677.  
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theoretical reconstruction must reconcile with political and social conditions, but we 
should bear in mind that political and social institutions are artificial and changeable 
to a greater or lesser extent. As Rawls says, we are entitled to envision a social 
world as best as we can, which is feasible and might actually exist at some future 
time under happier circumstances.19 
This thesis is organised into two parts. The first part contains three chapters, 
including this one, which addresses the political and normative foundations of the 
new conception. The second part then goes to the details of the PRC central 
government’s constitutional arrangements. In the following sections, this chapter 
will use an Olympic story to provide the reader a first sight of the relationship 
between the PRC central government and the peripheral societies and then render a 
critical review to past scholarship of Chinese Legal Studies in English. In a half-
century quest to comprehend Chinese law, scholars have divided between liberal 
and progressive groups roughly reflecting the right/left political tendency. 
Confronting media stereotypes, ideological prepositions, and political interests, it is 
necessary and inevitable indeed to clarify where is my start point and how this thesis 
is different from opinions of non-academic writers and senior scholars in the past. In 
fact the reason why past assessments of Chinese constitutional law are lacking is 
that senior scholars have been overlooking the role of peripheral societies in shaping 
Chinese constitutional law. Section 1.4 will emphasise the importance of studying 
Chinese peripheral societies, as to manage the relationship between the PRC central 
government and the peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan is an 
indispensable function of Chinese constitutional law. I will try to be objective in 
terms of expression, and for this a clarification of definition is needed. 
                                                
19 RAWLS, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, p. 12. 
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Issues of definition 
The English word “China” targets different identities. In influential English media 
“China” equates to the Chinese mainland, or territory under the PRC government’s 
political control. Yet the Mandarin word “zhongguo” (literally, the middle kingdom) 
refers to a vaster land, which consists of both China proper and the peripheral 
territories of Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.20 The Tibetan letter “bod” (literally, 
Tibet) is the self-expression of Tibetans, which differs from the PRC’s Tibet 
Autonomous Region (hereinafter TAR) – “bod rang skyong ljongs”. The 10th 
Panchen Lama once said he is a “bod mi” but not a “bod pa”, because he, as an 
ethnic Tibetan figure, was not born in the TAR. Tibetans used “rgya” (literally, 
great) to denote the Han Chinese, which word also refers to the Hindus. In history 
Han Chinese were called “rgya nag” (literally, the great people in black) while 
Hindus were “rgya gar” (literally, the great people in white). In Tibetan eyes Han 
Chinese residents in Hong Kong and Taiwan are all “rgya”. But if we link “China” 
with “rgya”, it matches neither meaning of “zhongguo”. After the 1950s takeover, 
however, a new Tibetan word “krung ko” that is the transliteration of “zhongguo” 
becomes popular. In the past both Tibet and China proper are “rgyal kha” (literally, 
kingdom), but now “rgyal kha” only refers to the PRC that is the host state for most 
ethnic Tibetans.21 
If we follow the English usage of “China” unconditionally, it is unavoidable to 
misinterpret or mislead somewhere and also to offend someone. Many pro-
independence Taiwanese always insist on that they are neither from “China”, nor 
“Chinese” even in ethnic terms. For a number of exile Tibetans, “China” is the 
                                                
20 In Taiwan, the Mandarin word may refer to an area that excludes Taiwanese isles.  
21 WANG, JIAWEI & NIMAJIANZAN, The Historical Status of China's Tibet (China Intercontinental 
Press 2nd ed. 2008), chapter 1. SCHWARTZ, RONALD D., Circle of Protest: Political Ritual in the 
Tibetan Uprising (Hurst. 1994), p. 220. DAWA, NORBU, China's Tibet Policy (Curzon. 2001), p. 
381. 
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monstrous force that is repressing their homeland; it is incredibly difficult to ask 
them to accept China as their host state, which in legal terms, is usually not 
indeed.22 But standing in the shoes of Chinese officials, the concatenation of “China 
and Taiwan” or “China and Tibet” is unacceptable either. Some suggest “the Great 
Chinese Economic Zone” or “liang’an sidi” (literally, four territories on two sides 
of the Taiwan Strait) is something proper for short, which would comfort the critics 
since the names have little political implication. However, these economic or 
geographic labels evidently could not highlight Tibet’s prominence in subsequent 
comparison. 
An expression from linguistic studies probably inspires: in the past people believed 
the Sino-Tibetan languages should be categorised into one Chinese branch of all 
Chinese dialects and another of all non-Chinese languages. Yet new research 
suggests some non-Chinese languages are more close to a plurality of Chinese 
language-s than to other non-Chinese ones, so there should be a Sinitic branch 
instead of the Chinese one. The de-politicised word “Sinitic” here refers to the 
historical and cultural region that includes not merely China proper but also Tibet, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Although not perfect, in this thesis it is used whenever 
possible.  
The word “people”, which is to be employed to define the peripheral societies of 
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in following chapters, is another controversy. In the 
West, pluralised constitutional structures can exist at sub-national, supra-national, 
and trans-national levels. But the word “nation” is hardly applicable to our 
territories because Hongkongers’ identity never meets this definition. In the Chinese 
context, an inspiring Chinese diction is “tongbao,” or “bao”. Hong Kong’s Chinese 
residents and Taiwanese are respectively referred as “xianggang tongbao” (literally, 
                                                
22 For most Tibetan refugees, India is their major “host state”. HESS, JULIA MEREDITH, Immigrant 
Ambassadors: Citizenship and Belonging in the Tibetan Diaspora (Stanford University Press. 
2009). 
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Hong Kong compatriots) and “taiwan tongbao” (literally, Taiwan compatriots) by 
the PRC government in Mandarin. The Taiwanese authorities used “dalu tongbao” 
(literally, mainland compatriots) to address Chinese mainlanders too before the 
democratisation. In fact the character “bao” implies a fraternal bond. In each and 
every Chinese presidential New Year message, the PRC president always begins 
with greetings to “people of all nationalities around the country”,23 “compatriots in 
the special administrative region of Hong Kong”, and “Taiwan compatriots”. 
Although the PRC government in ordinary situation does not need to opt for any 
single ethnic group from “people of all nationalities from around the country”, there 
is an exception for the Tibetans. Referring to overseas Tibetans, the Chinese 
characters “zang bao” (literally, Tibetan compatriots) appear in governmental 
statements; the website of the Tibetan branch of the Communist Party of China’s 
United Front Word Department sets up a column entitled “guowai zang bao” 
(literally, overseas Tibetan compatriots) too. The character “bao” shapes the 
Chinese understanding of a plurality of Sinitic “societies”; and it is better than other 
terms such as “guojia” (literally, state), “minzu” (literally, nation/nationality/ethnic 
group), “difang” (territory/locality), and “diqu (region)” to address the peripheral 
societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. 
The last one to be clarified here is “constitutional law”. Since Great Britain is the 
birthplace of modern constitutionalism, the English usage and understanding of 
“constitutional law” has decisively influenced other nations’ adoption of the term. 
But because there is a codified “Constitution” in China and most countries around 
the world, it is not redundant to say in this context “constitutional law” refers to a 
series of laws that constitute the relationship between the state and the societies as 
well as that among various authorities of the territorial societies. 
The pinyin system is used in this thesis to Romanise Chinese characters and the 
Wylie system to Tibetan letters except for a few names of people or places because 
                                                
23 The word of “nationality” roughly refers to ethnic group here. 
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readers may be familiar with them in other forms. Hong Kong statutes will retain 
their official English titles.  The English titles of Taiwanese statutes are adopted 
from the official translations of the Taiwanese authorities. The Taiwanese 
authorities use “act” to name their statutes, and it is how the English-speaking 
nations give a title to a parliamentary legislation. But the PRC government uses 
“law” in English titles of statutes. In this thesis I try to apply a consistent style in 
translating all the statutes and legislative documentations, so some names of PRC 
statutes will be different to the official translation of the PRC government. The table 
of English/Chinese equivalents has listed all important statutes and documentations 
to be referred. Non-English names of the legal texts may be easily found in that 
table. 
1.1 CASE STUDIES 
On 8 August, at 8.08 pm (GMT+8) in the Beijing National Stadium (colloquially 
known as the “Bird’s Nest”) the 2008 Summer Olympics was spectacularly opened 
after a controversial torch relay around the globe. On 14 March 2008 in Lhasa, the 
provincial capital of China’s Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), ethnic unrest 
erupted without any forecast. 18 people died, 58 were severely injured. Most 
recognised victims were Han Chinese, the majority ethnic group in China but a 
minority in Tibet. But the number of Tibetans arrested later is unbeknown to the 
public. The PRC central government accused emigrated Tibetan communities24 had 
manipulated behind the turbulence thus violated their promise that they would not 
challenge the PRC central government’s prestige in preparing a peaceful Olympics 
                                                
24 Since the Chinese communists took over Tibet, tens of thousands ethnic Tibetans crossed Sino-
Nepalese/Indian boundaries without legitimate passports or visas. These Tibetans have established 
settlements in India and few immigration communities in the West. It would be not appropriate to 
label all of them “exile Tibetans” due to a variety of identities and political attachments. The term 
“emigrated Tibetans” may hopefully avoid that confusion. See SAUTMAN, B, Is Tibet China's 
Colony: The Claim of Demographic Catastrophe, 15 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 81, (2001); 
SAUTMAN, B, Cultural genocide and Tibet, 38 Tex. Int'l LJ 173, (2003). 
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to fulfil the Chinese people’s centurial dream of national resurgence. The spiritual 
and political head of Tibetans in exile, the 14th Dalai Lama insists he had nothing 
related by way of remote “manipulation”, and remained supportive for a successful 
Olympics to be hosted by the Chinese people.25 The number of civilian deaths 
stimulated a national anger in China towards “Tibetan separatists”; on the other side, 
the Lhasa scene also catalysed Tibetan sympathisers to recall that “Tibet” remains a 
victim of Chinese communists. Western activists to “free Tibet” then were 
mobilised to stem the Olympics torch on its way to Beijing, while overseas Chinese 
also came to streets, to escort the torch.26  
The torch arrived and left Hong Kong, the 11-year-old special administrative region 
of the PRC, with scarcely any public humiliation as in the liberal world. However, 
Taiwan is another case. Taiwan had refused the torch before the relay because the 
PRC proposed a route from Ho Chi Minh city via Taipei to Hong Kong, but the 
Taiwanese authorities persisted in the demand that the torch must both arrive from 
and depart to cities in a third country. In accordance with precedents, Taiwan may 
not display its governmental symbols in Olympic events because its flag, emblem, 
and song are inherited from the Republic of China (ROC) that was the “ancient 
regime” in Chinese communist eyes and would cause an inappropriate impression of 
there being “two China-s” or “one China, one Taiwan”. Indeed this is the very 
reason that the Taiwanese authorities could not embrace the torch: to accept the 
Taipei-Hong Kong-Macau route would mean to kowtow before the world to the 
PRC. Since 2000 Mr Chen Shui-bian, a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
member standing for Taiwanese de jure independence from the Chinese mainland, 
had held the Taiwanese presidency. Mr Chen and his comrades including the DPP 
presidential candidate in 2008, Mr Frank Hsieh Chang-ting disseminated that 
Tibet’s past can be Taiwan’s future, and the DPP is the only “indigenous” political 
                                                
25 NORMAN, ALEXANDER, I Can's Wait to Be a Chinese Citizenn, The Sunday Times 18 May 2008. 
26 Tibet and the Beijing Olymics, The Economist 27 Mar 2008.  
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party on which the Taiwanese may rely to resist both the Olympic torch and the 
Chinese communists.  
The Chinese National Party or the Kuomintang (KMT), as the founder of the 
Republic of China, officially disregards the necessity of a declaration of Taiwanese 
independence. However, the KMT presidential candidate Mr Ma Ying-jeou shouted 
even louder than Mr Hsieh in impugning the PRC’s Tibet policy and threatened to 
withdraw the Taiwanese team from Beijing Olympics if the PRC government could 
not improve. By criticising the Chinese communist leadership, Mr Ma proved he is 
not a communist puppet and will not be. But other KMT patriarchs might have 
different positions. The honorary KMT chairman Mr Lien Chan, then KMT 
chairman Mr Wu Po-hsiung, and the ex-chairman of Taiwan province27 Mr James 
Soong Chu-yu all showed up in VIP seats in the opening ceremony of the Beijing 
Olympics. It is observed that the former Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR), Mr Tung Chee-Hwa and his successor also had 
those seats.  
It might be already sensed that the three cases are important in the Chinese context, 
while the importance of these three territories can also be seen in comparison with 
two other territories: Macau and Xinjiang. The relationship between the Chinese 
mainland and the peripheries cannot be explained with an enduring leftist centre-
periphery paradigm, which is the centre continues to exploit and marginalise the 
peripheries in both international and national levels.28  Although the Chinese 
                                                
27 The “Republic of China” in Taiwan nominally controls two provinces – Taiwan and Fujian. But 
the Taiwanese authorities have de-functioned the two provincial governments and make the 
“central government” responsive and responsible directly. Mr James Soong Chu-yu thus is the last 
provincial head elected by the Taiwanese residents, who is also the last one that had executed 
major administrative powers in the name of Taiwan province. 
28 WALLERSTEIN, IMMANUEL MAURICE, World-Systems Analysis: an Introduction (Duke University 
Press. 2004). The centre-periphery asymmetry within a state, see HECHTER, MICHAEL, Internal 
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mainland as an economy has been emerging in recent years, Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese residents are capitalist investors rather than employees. Taiwan ranks 
around the twenty-fourth largest in the gross domestic product (GDP) in comparison 
with major world economies between Saudi Arabia and Norway, while Hong Kong 
exceeds Egypt that is around the fortieth one. However, in that comparison Macau 
falls below Panama. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in the PRC, as another 
autonomous region designed for an ethnic minority, may rank similarly to Libya 
that is around the sixty-third largest economy. However, counting the PRC’s Uygur 
autonomous prefectures and counties, the “Uygur economy”, if at all, also performs 
badly. Hardly can anyone deny that in regard to its economy Tibet remains 
grievously backward. But Tibet’s enchantment has been rooted in its 
underdevelopment, and it never needs GDP numbers to raise visibility so long as 
there is the charismatic Dalai Lama. Moreover, in Xinjiang the Uygurs is only a half 
of the population, but in the Tibetan areas in the PRC the Tibetans are over 90% in 
demographic composition, which is another feature the Uygur case cannot compete 
with.29 The Uygur dissidents in the Chinese mainland in a sense are genuinely 
“separatists” because they insist in creating an independent country for their own, 
thus no “constitutional arrangements” of the PRC are needed anymore.30 On the 
contrary, the 14th Dalai Lama and emigrated Tibetans have made, or at least have 
been trying to make more compromises within the PRC constitutional framework. 
1.2 CHINESE LEGAL STUDIES IN ENGLISH 
The following section will provide a review of past literature of Chinese Legal 
Studies in English, upon which this thesis is built. Although these academic pieces 
                                                                                                                                    
Colonialism: the Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. 1975).  
29 GHAI, Autonomy and Ethnicity : Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States, pp 79-90.  
30 The ethnic unrest in Xinjiang on 5 July 2009 killed more than a hundred Han Chinese civilians 
including a large number of women and children. 
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were written in English and their readership generally is Western scholars and 
students, the correspondence between them and China’s legal developments is 
manifest. The academic interest in the West in a way had been stimulated by what 
the Chinese State already had or recently manufactured. This thesis follows this 
pattern too. If there is no new constitutional agenda in accommodating the 
peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan coming forth, it is unlikely 
that any sort of new conceptualisation of the PRC’s constitutional arrangements to 
the territories could be invented by theory.  
Under the impression that the PRC government regards law merely as an instrument 
to consolidate its regime rather than subordinating the regime to law,31 Western 
liberals’ perspective on Chinese law has been to a large degree negative and 
pessimistic. On the other side of the coin, non/anti-liberal scholars are fascinated by 
China’s “otherness” to Western liberal democracy, envisioning that China might 
find an alternative way. In light of the relationship between the PRC and the 
peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, liberals easily go to the 
conclusion that without a regime change in the Chinese mainland, the only way to 
construe the moral right of self-determination of the peripheral societies is that they 
shall become independent from the one party-state.32 The PRC officials nevertheless 
                                                
31 LI, JIEFEN, The Rule of Law or Rule by Law?: Legal Reform versus the Power of the Party-State in 
the People's Republic of China: 1978-2002, Edinburgh University Doctoral Thesis (2005). In 
explaining the PRC government’s attitude toward law, Li distinguishes “rule of law” and “rule by 
law”, and the latter means the regime uses legal rule to regulate the society, and sometimes the 
institutions of the state, but never scrutinises its reign. 
32 SLOANE, R., The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet, 16 
Emory International Law Review 107, (2002). BROUDER, ALAN, Self-determination for Tibet: 
Prospects in International Law, 5 Trinity College Law Review 172, (2002). EDWARDS, GEORGE E, 
Applicability of the "One Country, Two Systems" Hong Kong Model to Taiwan, 32 New England 
Law Review 751, (1998). CHEN, L & REISMAN, W. M., Who owns Taiwan: A search for 
international title, 81 Yale Law Journal 599, (1971). HUANG, ERIC TING-LUN, Taiwan's Status in 
A Changing World: United Nations Representation and Membership for Taiwan, 9 Annual Survey 
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defend their policies by referring to the non/anti-liberal theories despite few in the 
West wholeheartedly endorsing the PRC government’s rhetoric. This thesis won’t 
choose either side. The liberals have very limited options in their hands and thus are 
not ready to accept the PRC government may accommodate the peripheries 
constitutionally, while the other side does not convince a plurality of Western 
academia that there is already a perfect solution of “Chineseness” to the problems 
either. 
1.2.1 Oversimplified images of China and Tibet 
In 1812 Sir George Thomas Staunton for the first time translated the Great Qing 
Code as “the penal code of China” to English, 33 which is a precursor in the West to 
address post-1500s Chinese laws.34 Once in the 18th century European continent, 
Chinese laws were highly estimated based on the encounter experience and mutual 
appreciation between continental Jesuits and Chinese mandarins.35 In Voltaire’s 
                                                                                                                                    
of International and Comparative Law 55, (2003). HSIEH, P, An Unrecognized State in Foreign 
and International Courts: The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 26 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 765, (2007).  
33 CHINA. & STAUNTON, GEORGE THOMAS, Ta Tsing Leu Lee; Being the Fundamental Laws, and a 
Selection from the Supplementary Statutes, of the Penal Code of China ([s.n.]. 1810). 
34 I hesitate in using the word “modern” to describe the “post-1500s” China. This period of time 
comprises roughly regimes of Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), 
Republic of China (1912-1949), and the People’s Republic of China (1949-present). In the Chinese 
mainland historians typically start their “modern” chapters from 1840 when the late Qing 
government lost the first Opium War and conceded Hong Kong to the United Kingdom. Many in 
the West, needless to say, may not agree. It is helpful to point out that pre-1500s and post-1500s 
Chinese laws magnetise very different interest in academia: the former entreasures the “wisdom” 
and “system of beliefs” of the ancient Chinese civilisation yet scarcely affects contemporaries; the 
latter, on the other hand, more or less remains relevant to Chinese laws in our time. Few cut across 
the two scholar groups, and I will focus on the latter.  
35 ROWBOTHAM, ARNOLD HORREX, Missionary and Mandarin: the Jesuits at the Court of China 
(University of California press. 1942).  
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imagination, China is a Confucian utopia of more rationality and reasonableness 
than Europe. Yet the “High Qing” era36 had gone in the 19th century when newly 
industrialised Britain met China. At this time English academia found “like India 
and other Asian nations, China was a long way from being the advanced civilisation 
the Jesuits had described,” the more appropriate image of Chinese laws was “though 
the principles of law might have been formed in accordance with Chinese culture, 
they inevitably led to despotism and corruption and therefore could not simply be 
accepted as a cultural expression of the Chinese.”37 Since then the “cannibalistic” 
dystopia image of China and its laws has dominated English press and mass media. 
It should be admitted that contemporary Chinese nationalist pride cannot conceal 
despotism, corruption, arbitrariness, and torture are a large proportion of Chinese 
administrative and legal institution; however, this negative image of Chinese laws 
also plays a deliberate or accidental role in placing China in an evolutionist 
hierarchy of cultures and civilisations: at the bottom are “barbarians”; at the top are 
“industrial and commercial Europeans”; Asian empires rest in-between as semi-
civilisations contaminated by imperfect principles and praxis. 
                                                
36 The “High Qing” era, see WAKEMAN, FREDERIC, High Ch'ing, 1683-1839, in Modern East Asia: 
Essays in Interpretation, (James B. Crowley ed., 1970), pp. 1-28. 
37 HILLEMANN, ULRIKE, Asian Empire and British Knowledge : China and the Networks of British 
Imperial Expansion (Palgrave Macmillan. 2009), p. 167. This historical account tells how Britain 
built up her knowledge of Asian empires, especially China, during imperial expansion in the 19th 
century.  
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Table 1 The Oversimplified Images of China and Tibet 
 Utopia Dystopia 
China The Confucian Civilisation Despotism, Corruption 
Tibet The Buddhist Civilisation, “Shangri-la” Lamaist theocracy, Serfdom 
 
Interestingly, in English literature the image of Tibet differs from China’s. The 
Lamaist and “savage” Tibet spotted by the East India Company explorers later 
became the “Shangri-la”, which is the “lost horizon” of the industrial world.38 
Hollywood also helped to virtualise a Tibetan utopia in a series of films, especially 
the “Seven Years in Tibet” (1997) in which Brad Pitt acts as a friend of the young 
Dalai Lama.39 Rebecca Redwood French’s research on Tibetan customary laws also 
mirrors that image.40  The isolated but harmonious society was organised by 
compassionate Buddhists until invaders, say, Britons and Chinese communists, 
destroyed that. The Chinese literature on Tibet, however, goes to the other direction. 
Some Chinese writers were also fascinated by Tibet as well as Sino-Tibetan 
consanguinity, and use “Tibetan Buddhism” instead of “Lamaism” to imply Tibetan 
culture is part of East Asian Buddhist tradition that has been adopted and adapted by 
                                                
38 LOPEZ, DONALD S., Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West (University of 
Chicago Press Pbk. ed. 1999). DODIN, THIERRY & RÄTHER, HEINZ, Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, 
Projections, and Fantasies (Wisdom Publications. 1996).  
39 SCHELL, ORVILLE, Virtual Tibet : Searching for Shangri-la from the Himalayas to Hollywood 
(Metropolitan Books. 2000).  
40 FRENCH, REBECCA REDWOOD, The Golden Yoke: the Legal Cosmology of Buddhist Tibet (Cornell 
University Press. 1995). 
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Han Chinese for centuries.41 But another trend in Chinese literature is to stereotype 
the mystic elements of Tibetan Buddhism: weird rituals, creepy cremation, and 
serfdom. Just as the Orientalist did to China, the “Tibetan dystopia” also placed 
Tibetan society in a lower degree in the hierarchy of cultures and civilisations and 
thus tried to justify Chinese communist “emancipation” of Tibetan serfs.42  
However, in common sense it is hardly true that millions of Buddhist serfs all lived 
an idyllic life in theological Tibet, neither is the story that Chinese communists 
“emancipated” Tibetans only for the latter’s good. Broadly speaking, each and every 
human society has both advantages and disadvantages of its own, neither utopia nor 
dystopia exists in the real world. We do hope to set up a consistent thus “universal” 
criteria in reflecting and evaluating the justness of political institutions, which may 
help to explain why normative ideals are needed; on the other hand, scientifically 
and scholarly contested facts are also crucial in a context where literatures are full of 
utopian or dystopian fantasies serving the interests of ideological and political 
causes. (See Table 1) 
1.2.2 Liberal and progressive perceptions of Chinese laws 
In fact few in the Anglo-American world had taken Chinese Legal Studies as an 
academic career until the 1960s-70s. Derk Bodde as a sinologist and Clarence 
Morris as a legal scholar published one of the major works in this field in 1967 after 
six years of teaching ancient Chinese laws in the Pennsylvania Law School.43 Kung-
                                                
41 The process in which “Lamaism” became “Tibetan Buddhism” in Chinese discourse, see TUTTLE, 
GRAY, Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China (2007).  
42 POWERS, JOHN, History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People's Republic of China 
(Oxford University Press. 2004).  
43 BODDE, DERK, et al., Law in Imperial China (University of Pennsylvania Press 1st Pennsylvania 
pbk. ed. 1973).  
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chuan Hsiao’s exhaustive study of the imperial control in rural China44 and T’ung-
tsu Ch’u’s classic 45  are both written in English by Chinese scholars. They 
established the dominant understanding of imperial Chinese laws: they are 
administrative and penal regulations “Confucianised” both in principle and praxis. 
However, in Confucius’s land observers also saw a Soviet transplant having grown 
up in the 1960s. 46  Directed by Marx-Leninist ideology, Chinese communists 
blended law and politics to a new degree that continued the Chinese legal sector’s 
subordination to politics, which definitely failed a universal standard of “rule of 
law”.  
The liberal, in a broad sense, perception of Chinese laws had been summarised by 
Randall Peerenboom: 47 
The biggest obstacles to a law-based system in China are institutional and systemic in 
nature: a legislative system in disarray; a weak judiciary; poorly trained judges and 
lawyers; a low level of legal consciousness; a weak administrative law regime; the lack 
of a robust civil society; the enduring influence of paternalistic traditions and a 
culture of deference to government authority; rampant corruption; large regional 
variations; and the fallout from the unfinished transition from a centrally planned 
                                                
44 HSIAO, KUNG CHUAN, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (University of 
Washington Press. 1967). 
45 QU, TONGZU, Law and Society in Traditional China (Mouton. 1961). 
46 The Soviet source of Chinese law has been discussed by many authors in COHEN, JEROME ALAN & 
BERMAN, HAROLD JOSEPH, Contemporary Chinese law: Research Problems and Perspectives 
(Harvard University Press. 1970).  
47 PEERENBOOM, R. P., China's Long March toward Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press. 
2002), p. 72. Peerenboom himself does not belong to the “liberal” circle of Chinese legal studies, 
but he shares with liberals this perception, which is a ground for considering further 
improvements.  
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economy to a market economy, which has exacerbated central-local tensions and 
resulted in the fragmentation of authority.48 
The liberal perception connects Chinese laws with a linear view of world history 
towards a universal end, modernised as well as westernised. Despite not entirely 
echoing the hierarchy of cultures and civilisations, the liberal perception still 
describes Chinese law as a system of malformation, especially in administrative and 
criminal branches that trail behind the international expectation to improve human 
rights protection.49  
The re-appraisal of Chinese law has been shepherded by Philip Huang since the 
1990s. In disputing Max Weber’s four ideal-types of “substantial irrational, formal 
irrational, substantial rational, and formal rational law” that contestably categorised 
Chinese law as one of the “substantial irrational” legal systems implying neither a 
legal profession nor legal reasoning existed, Philip Huang’s work based on newly 
found legal cases demonstrates that in imperial and modern Chinese institutions, 
relatively independent “civil justice” in dealing with property, contract, marriage, 
and torts still survives. The supreme political authority – the Crown or the Party – 
may represent the substantial and irrational face of Chinese law, however, a giant 
mandarin bureaucracy forges another formal and rational face of the Janus. Hence 
                                                
48 This is the lasting theme of Chinese Legal Studies in the Anglo-American world, see LUBMAN, 
Bird in a Cage : Legal Reform in China after Mao. See also COHEN, JEROME ALAN & HSU, C. 
STEPHEN, Understanding China's Legal System: Essays in Honor of Jerome A. Cohen (New York 
University. 2003). POTTER, PITMAN B., From Leninist Discipline to Socialist Legalism: Peng Zhen 
on Law and Political Authority in the PRC (Stanford University Press. 2003). DIAMANT, NEIL 
JEFFREY, et al., Engaging the Law in China: State, Society, and Possibilities for Justice (Stanford 
University Press. 2005). ZOU, China's Legal Reform : towards the Rule of Law. CLARKE, China's 
Legal System: New Developments, New Challenges.   
49  POTTER, PITMAN B, The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture 
(Routledge. 2001).  
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the Chinese legal system is more fitting for the ideal type of “substantial rational 
law”, which even involves the common law system in Weberian eyes.50  
Philip Huang encapsulates his academic thoughts as: 
Coming from a long and complex historical tradition, China defies any simple 
constructions of "irrational," "traditional," or "pre-modern," juxtaposed against 
modern Western civilization. Coming from a semi-colonial past of subjugation, it 
defies any simple equation with the West, which was the dominator and not the 
dominated. With a modern revolutionary tradition powered by an alternative socialist 
vision, it cannot be simply boxed into a capitalist and liberal-democratic Western 
model. "Transitioning" from a socialist past and not from a simple "pre-industrial" 
society into the market economy of the present, it cannot be understood simply by 
theories of market-driven capitalist development.  It is, in short, a past and a present 
of great and continuing paradoxes from the point of view of Western theoretical 
expectations. Properly studied and conceptualized, Chinese experience/practice can 
form the basis for unique contributions to human knowledge.51 
Philip Huang concludes if we look into the praxis of Chinese law, many provisions 
and procedures are for the weaker party in litigation against the elites or the state; 
hence we can preposition a more progressive perception of Chinese laws. The 
progressive perception does not hide Chinese institution’s imperfectness, yet denies 
there shall be a linear history of all cultures and civilisations towards the same end. 
The progressive perception of the end of Chinese legal reform is being modernised 
                                                
50 HUANG, PHILIP C., Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing (Stanford 
University Press. 1996). HUANG, PHILIP C., Code, Custom, and Legal Practice in China: the Qing 
and the Republic Compared (Stanford University Press. 2001). The Weberian ideal-types see 
WEBER, MAX, et al., Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Bedminster 
Press. 1968). See also KUHN, PHILIP A., Soulstealers: the Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 (Harvard 
University Press. 1990). Philip Kuhn insightfully introduces the antinomy between the absolutist 
monarchy and his bureaucracy in a story about some “soulstealers” in Qing China. 
51 Philip Huang, Why an Advanced Institute for Historical and Social Research?, available at 
 http://en.lishiyushehui.cn/modules/extendpage/index.php?cat_id=1&page_url=Academic-Principles. 
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but not westernised. Philip Huang thus predicts a mixture of Chinese and Western 
ingredients, which liberals disagree and dislike.52 
Chinese constitutional law, however, fits any of these perceptions? In the Anglo-
American world, many define a “civilised” state by the appearance of a constitution. 
The PRC state does have a codified Constitution, but it very likely cannot count in 
the liberal perception due to its socialist nature. Speaking of constitutional and 
administrative statutes, the liberal perception stands steadily in addressing these 
materials, no matter one may have an optimistic or pessimistic vision for the future. 
The progressive perception, on the other hand, has just started dealing with the 
dynamics of Chinese constitutional law.53 It should be a surprise for Western 
readers that in a late communist state, the Chinese legal academia is 
overwhelmingly dominated by the liberal perception of its own laws. Holding on 
Marx-Leninist orthodoxy, statist scholars, sometimes as communist cadres, are only 
a small proportion in the Chinese mainland. The larger proportion adores one or 
another Western legal model and prepares to transplant them, partially or as a whole, 
to China.54 The PRC’s 2007 property law scarcely accepts any ancient or modern 
Chinese innovations, and completely copies the German code. If the progressive 
perception loses the battle over what it is good at (i.e. the civil law), hardly can it 
win in constitutional and administrative areas where the liberal perception has 
accumulated cogent argumentations for centuries long.  
                                                
52 HUANG, PHILIP C., Chinese Civil Justice, Past and Present (Rowman & Littlefield. 2010). Also see 
BERNHARDT, KATHRYN, Women and Property in China: 960-1949 (Stanford University Press. 
1999). SOMMER, MATTHEW HARVEY, Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China (Stanford 
University Press. 2000). HUTCHINGS, P, Freedom of Speech in Hong Kong & the Problem of" 
China", Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 267,  (1996).  
53 JIANG, Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of Constitutional 
Government in China, 36 Modern China 12,  (2010). 
54 A general introduction of contemporary Chinese intellectual thoughts see LEONARD, MARK, What 
does China think? (Fourth Estate. 2008).  
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The real vulnerability of the progressive perception is the retrospective and 
empirical approach, which does not generate predictive and periscopic ideas. Philip 
Huang himself advocates a list of values inherited by modern Chinese laws, e.g. the 
compassion to the weaker party in litigation, the pursuit of social harmony, and 
expectation for virtuous and disciplinary judges; but even if these values are true 
and genuine, few of them are measurable in quantity and universal in quality. One 
could never accept that the economically or socially “weaker” party should be 
favoured in each and every case; “social harmony” not only encourages compromise 
but also helps to justify authoritarian governance. The constitutional law, as the 
basic agreement and common identity of the entire nation, always demands a strong 
normative foundation of which the progressive perception seems still short.  
1.3 MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
The liberal perception of Chinese constitutional laws takes an upper hand because it 
has been endorsed by the dominant modern constitutionalist tradition in legal 
studies and alternative theories so far have failed to excogitate a constructivist 
account that could transcend liberal ideals. Modern constitutionalism, as James 
Tully illustrates, forged contemporary institutions and our understanding about 
them, thus reduces objective plurality and subjective flexibility to a limited degree.55 
The radical ideas of modern constitutionalism might be encapsulated to a dictum, 
such as “one nation, one people, one state, and one constitution” that stems from the 
self-appreciation of Atlantic nation-states, especially the United States and French 
republic in the aftermath of revolutions. Some human associations had taken an 
advantage in worldwide competition because of a relative preponderance of social 
communication or military and capital expansion, and to build a new form of 
government upon a “nation” – a larger and more homogenous human association – 
                                                
55 TULLY, JAMES, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge 
University Press. 1995). 
 
 Kai Tu 
- 26 - 
was the best way to sustain this advantage.56 After the French revolution, the 
material evolution of nation-state further converges with the normative development 
of liberal democracy thus “everyone becomes the ‘third estate”. The national 
community turns out to a self-determining political unit, a “demos” or the electorate. 
The government has to be organised by a democratically elected group of 
representatives of the “people” whose liberal rights are declared and protected by a 
written document – the constitution.57 The singularity of a codified “Constitution” 
symbolifies both national unity and popular sovereignty in the aftermath of 
revolutions, so James Tully can summarise modern constitutionalism has seven 
features: 58  
a. popular sovereignty;  
b. in contrast to an ancient or historically earlier constitution [that has been a 
mere recognition of existing laws, institutions, and customs]; 
c. in contrast with the irregularity of an ancient constitution;  
d. the recognition of custom within the theory of progress;  
e. identified with a specific set of European institutions;  
                                                
56 Karl Deutsch focuses on the social communication aspect of modern state-building, while Charles 
Tilly emphasises force and economy. A discussion on theories on state building see KEATING, 
MICHAEL, The Independence of Scotland: Self-government and the Shifting Politics of Union 
(Oxford University Press. 2009), pp. 11-12. Also see DEUTSCH, KARL W., Nationalism and Social 
Communication: an Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (M.I.T. Press 2nd ed. 1966). 
TILLY, CHARLES, et al., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton University 
Press. 1975). TILLY, CHARLES, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Basil 
Blackwell. 1990).   
57  The convergence between nation-state and liberal democracy, see KEATING, MICHAEL, 
Plurinational Democracy Stateless Nations in a Post-sovereignty Era (Oxford University Press  
2001), pp. 29-32.  
58  TULLY, JAMES, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge 
University Press. 1995), pp. 62-70.  
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f. a constitutional state possesses an individual identity as a ‘nation’, an 
imaginary community to which all nationals belong and in which they enjoy 
equal dignity as citizens;  
g. a modern constitution comes into being at some founding moment and 
stands behind – and provides the rules for – democratic politics”.  
However, early- and post-modern ideas and institutions are challenging modern 
constitutionalism. Hapsburg Spain as the first “sun-never-sets” empire had 
established governance across the oceans long before the American and French 
revolutions. Based on the emperor’s enterprises Spanish Catholic theologists both 
converges and diverges with post-revolution Protestant followers on the idea of 
authority, legality, and unity, but this imperial Spanish world never attracts genuine 
appreciation in the English world.59 The Spanish School of Salamanca tried to 
coordinate a “New World” with Christendom under a monarchy pairing the papacy, 
which is unsurprisingly a discursive macro-project yet did not have some successes. 
This macro-project does not need a “nation” since it transcended cultures and 
civilisations; nor a “people” since there was no “popular sovereignty” but merely a 
sort of social consent to divine/historical reign; the singularity of “state” seemed 
ambiguous, because Castile and Aragon separated “Cortes”; and at last, it was more 
safe to indicate that there was no “Constitution” with a capital letter “C”.60 Michael 
Keating presumes that the Hapsburg enterprise, as a prominent European 
multinational state, might have provided different experience in contrast to the 
modern constitutionalism only if it had survived to our times.61  
                                                
59 HOWARTH, DAVID, The Invention of Spain: Cultural Relations between Britain and Spain, 1770-
1870  (Manchester University Press. 2007), esp. pp. 3-4.   
60 HAMILTON, BERNICE, Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain: a Study of the Political Ideas   
(Clarendon Press. 1963). 
61  KEATING, MICHAEL, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era 
(Oxford University Press. 2001).  
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For postmodernists, moreover, the “common law system” contains an alternative 
Atlantic tradition in accommodating sub-state societies and indigenous cultures. 
James Tully concludes: “A modern constitution is an act whereby a people frees 
itself (or themselves) from custom and imposes a new form of association on itself 
by an act of will, reason, and agreement. An ancient constitution, in contrast, is the 
recognition of how the people are already constituted by their assemblage of 
fundamental laws, institutions, and customs.”62 The common law system and the 
(British) Commonwealth enjoy a long tradition of so-called “ancient constitution” 
that had been more flexible and open to diverse interpretations. The relationship 
between the United Kingdom and her constituent nations, Canada and Quebec, New 
Zealand and Maori all embrace such arguments. Some modern constitutionalists, e.g. 
John Locke and John Stuart Mill, supported assimilative interpretations and thus 
stood on the opposite side to sub-state societies and indigenous cultures; but there 
are scholars and jurists standing on the other side who constitutionally recognise the 
multiplicity of nations, peoples, forms of state, as well as “constitutionalism-s”.63  
The early- and post-modern ideas and institutions do inspire in some respects. In the 
Chinese context, scholars are interested in following a Confucian way, if at all, to 
harmonise the relationship between the Chinese State and the peripheral societies 
neighbouring on China proper. Daniel A. Bell draws a picture like that: 
So here’s the situation as Confucians see it. The dragon is sick and can’t survive in its 
current state. Liberal democrats want to slay it and build a foreign-looking political 
animal out of the wreckage—an animal that looks like either Scandinavia (left-
liberals) or the United States (right-liberals). And we shouldn’t worry too much about 
differences in population, culture, history, education, and levels of economic 
development. In contrast, Confucians want to feed the sick animal traditional 
medicine, gently admonish it when it strays from morality, and stroke it when it 
                                                
62 TULLY, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, p. 60. 
63 A detailed study of constitutional plurinationality of the United Kingdom and Canada see 
TIERNEY, Consitutional Law and National Plualism.  
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behaves properly, with the aim of restoring the dragon to what it used to be—an 
auspicious and awe-inspiring creature that rarely pulls out its claws and won’t bother 
too much with the lives of the smaller animals. 
It could be a happy ending of the story in which the dragon and the snow lion get 
along with the other successfully in accordance with Confucian principles. Given 
there is a Confucian tradition in Hong Kong and Taiwan, there is no wonder that 
Daniel A. Bell, as other Chinese and Western Confucians, are “still betting on the 
Confucians” for the success of Chinese political reform.64  
But problems remain. First, it could be a wrong argument that imperial China in 
praxis truly implemented Confucian principles in binding multiple societies together. 
A number of works reveal imperial China’s realistic motivation to conquer 
peripheral territories and set up direct and indirect rule there was to retain a strategic 
space for security,65 while the ideological endorsement for this derived mainly from 
the ruling class’s Manchu tradition rather than Confucian classics. 66  More 
importantly, the prerequisite that the PRC and the peripheral societies may co-exist 
peacefully and successfully in accordance with Confucian principles is all the 
societies recognise Confucianism as the source of values. In other words, 
Confucianism is what John Rawls calls a “comprehensive doctrine” that is 
incompatible with other doctrines of reasonableness. Hong Kong and Taiwanese 
societies have moved into political pluralism and converted to liberal values. Tibet 
                                                
64 Daniel A. Bell, “A Visit to a Confucian Academy”, available at 
 http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=146. Retrieved on 19 May 2011. 
65 PERDUE, PETER C., China Marches West : the Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 2005).  
66 HEVIA, JAMES LOUIS, Cherishing Men from Afar : Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy 
of 1793 (Duke University Press. 1995). SAKAKIDA RAWSKI, EVELYN, The Last Emperors: a Social 
History of Qing Imperial Institutions (University of California Press. 1998). C. ELLIOTT, MARK, 
The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford 
University Press. 2001). 
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never adopts Confucianism. The Chinese mainland has demolished Confucian 
values in the Cultural Revolution. Therefore it is extensively dubious that 
Confucianism is a “comprehensive doctrine” in either society and will be one in the 
near future. 
To establish a normative foundation for constitutional accommodation to national 
pluralism in Western liberal democracies as well as refute the exclusive correctness 
of traditional liberal constitutionalism, a school of liberal nationalism has emerged 
in recent years. Liberal nationalists endorse rule of law and the basic individual civil 
and political rights, such as freedom of press, freedom of conscience, habeas corpus, 
and universal adult suffrage. Liberty prioritises when conflicting with values 
deriving from other doctrines. But liberal nationalists, as Yael Tamir says, take a 
point of view that “grant prominence to several dimensions that liberal theory has 
tended to overlook: social attachments, cultural affiliations, the communal aspect of 
individual identity, and particular moral commitments that grow out of membership 
in associative communities.” Tamir contends: “Once the importance of these 
dimensions is recognised, they could shed light on the liberal argument itself.”67 In 
essence, liberal nationalists are defending a great number of choices that individuals 
as members of cultural communities should possess, which a “neutral” state is not 
supposed to offer. Different from traditional liberals, liberal nationalists support 
governmental assistance to keep the choices alive and accessible.68 But liberal 
nationalists persevere with the claim that their reshuffle of governance remains 
liberal in nature, as they are committed to liberal rights without hesitation. 
                                                
67 TAMIR, YAEL, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton University Press. 1995), p. 10. 
68 KYMLICKA, WILL, Multicultural Citizenship : a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon 
Press. 1995). Others see MILLER, DAVID, On nationality (Clarendon Press. 1995). MACCORMICK, 
NEIL, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford 
University Press. 1999). 
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The liberal nationalist theory does have its advantage in reinforcing the normative 
framework of the constitutional structure of Western liberal democracies in facing 
the reality of national pluralism.69 In the aftermath of regime change in Central and 
Eastern Europe where national pluralism has been an enduring phenomenon, Will 
Kymlicka contends it is possible to export their theory to ex-communist countries 
converted to liberal values too.70 They might be right, and this thesis will not argue 
with that. But in the Chinese context, the problem is that in the Chinese mainland 
the authoritarian regime has ruled in a relatively confident manner with a stunning 
record of economic growth and military expansion. Additionally, the degree of 
democratisation also varies in the territories. Taiwanese residents now are holding 
universal suffrage regularly, Hong Kong has been extremely liberal in economic and 
political terms but no universal suffrage normally exists there. The Dalai Lama’s 
administration that is in charge of some emigrated Tibetan communities is trying to 
democratise. Although the 14th Dalai Lama has repeatedly declared his wish to retire 
from politics, but he is still the absolutist authority for that administration. In the 
complex circumstances the solution to import liberal nationalism is hardly realistic, 
and liberal nationalists would have never believed it possible.71  
This thesis, finally, attempts to build a normative framework for our cases in a 
dialogue with John Rawls’s late work The Law of Peoples. John Rawls’s early 
works make him a figure of “traditional liberal constitutionalists” in people’s eyes, 
as John Rawls’s theoretical designs of “original position” and “veil of ignorance” 
                                                
69 TIERNEY, Constitutional Law and National Plualism. 
70 KYMLICKA, WILL & OPALSKI, MAGDALENA, Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?: Western 
Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe (Oxford University Press. 2001).  
71 In analysing the Soviet Union’s constitutional arrangements of federation to grant territorial 
autonomy to several national minorities, Will Kymlicka reckons it remained pseudo-federalism, 
because in procedures it lacks “any tradition of partnership, negotiated cooperation and open 
bargaining concerning the accommodation of ethnic diversity.” KYMLICKA, Multicultural 
Citizenship : a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, pp. 62-64. 
 
 Kai Tu 
- 32 - 
are holding back communitarian values, hampering sub-state societies to justify 
their demand for state-like institutions to foster these values. But in The Law of 
Peoples this thesis finds an interlocutor who is fully prepared to face a situation 
where liberal democracies and non-liberal regimes have to co-exist in peace. 
Traditional liberals do not agree with this compromise and accuse John Rawls of 
having betrayed his own theory, which should have led to individualist 
cosmopolitanism as they once thought.72 However, the merit of The Law of Peoples 
is the very idea of “realistic utopianism” –theoretical construction shall reconcile 
with the historical and political situation and go beyond reality. It is somehow 
utopian that philosophers are dreaming about the perpetual peace, while it is 
realistic that we do not ignore the world order consists of hundreds of states not 
individuals. In the Chinese context, the order now consists of multiple societies of 
conflicting ideologies and, it seems to me, this is the starting point to construct a 
constitutional theory. This thesis, of course, does not agree with John Rawls in 
everything. The Law of Peoples is especially an account of symmetrical units in the 
international community while the Chinese cases are extremely asymmetrical and 
bound by constitutional provisions. 
1.4 WHY DO PERIPHERIES MATTER? 
The last question is “why do peripheries matter”? There has been little attention 
paid to peripheral societies in both liberal and progressive perceptions on Chinese 
law, yet the periphery-inclusive approach may accumulate more consensuses 
between the liberal and the progressive for the future. The liberal perception of 
Chinese law sees the late communist Chinese State as an authoritarian regime 
concerned more with the survival of the regime than anything else. Future Chinese 
laws will not make any significant progress unless the “fragile superpower” of the 
                                                
72 BUCHANAN, ALLEN E, Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World, 110 
Ethics 697 at 701, (2000). CABRERA, L, Toleration and Tyranny in Rawls's "Law of Peoples", 34 
Polity 163, (2001).  
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PRC makes a change in political reform alongside its embrace of the market 
economy.73 The progressive and relatively positive perception of Chinese laws 
envisages some forms of “rule of law” without a democratic foundation. 74 
Peerenboom contests that under the condition of granting a Lon Fuller type “rule of 
law”, a gradual democratisation would sustain Chinese economic boom in a stable 
environment.75  
Aside the nature of the Chinese State, in peripheral societies, however, both rule of 
law and democracy run faster than in the centre. Under British rule, Hong Kong has 
established a mature system of rule of law; Taiwan’s rule of law and democracy 
developed in recent decades, and so far the multiparty election system is the most 
westernised among ethnic Chinese societies; the Tibet Autonomous Region as a part 
of the PRC shares common features with the centre, yet emigrated Tibetan 
communities have experimented in bridging Tibetan traditions with liberal values. If 
we deal with these peripheral societies and the centre together, the liberal elements 
as well as progressive confidence will increase. In admitting that the liberal 
perception endorsed by modern constitutionalism retains an upper hand in assessing 
Chinese law, especially constitutional law that demands credible normative 
underpinning, the progressive perception of Chinese law reminds us that the liberal 
framework is able to tolerate existing provisions and procedures of positive effect 
and efficiency.  
Hong Kong plays a crucial role in re-constructing a new constitutional discourse. 
Before the 1997 handover, mainstream opinion towards PRC-territory relationship 
had been dominated by a unification/separation dichotomy in both Chinese and 
English literatures. However, the PRC’s relatively successful management of Hong 
                                                
73 SHIRK, SUSAN L., China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford University Press. 2007).  
74 HUANG, Chinese Civil Justice, Past and Present. 
75 PEERENBOOM, China's Long March toward Rule of Law. PEERENBOOM, R. P., China Modernizes: 
Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? (Oxford University Press. 2007).  
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Kong demonstrates that Chinese communists would not overthrow territorial rule of 
law and threaten liberal rights of individuals under certain conditions; this history, 
though not long enough, does liberalise minds. A new generation of scholarship, 
mostly based on Hong Kong, has started to talk about a Hong Kong model that is 
possibly and probably applicable to Taiwan or Tibet; this is the first interesting shift 
in the academia.76 
The second shift happens when Hong Kong constitutionalism affects the centre. It is 
undeniable that the PRC central government and communist cadres are severely 
lacking of legal professions. But the Hong Kong Basic Law forces them to learn a 
“constitutional” way to resolve conflicts between the centre and the territory and 
silence arbitrary interference from irrelevant departments to the legal realm. This 
may be a process of discipline and training for the regime, which it voluntarily 
accepts with less pressure and more pleasure. When Hong Kong’s fruit turns mature, 
one could even expect a third shift in the centre. Hualing Fu and others say:  
The international community has watched the relationship between Hong Kong and 
China with interest, as it is a measure of China’s ability to interact with Western-style 
constitutional values. The “one country, two systems” formula, which is the 
foundation of Hong Kong’s autonomy, was intended to serve as a model for Taiwan’s 
reintegration into the Mainland. The formula also has broader implications: China’s 
responses to constitutional debates in Hong Kong are increasingly viewed as 
indicative of China’s plans for the constitutional structures and process in the 
Mainland. Legal and constitutional reform on the Mainland may even have been 
accelerated by the need to deal constructively with the issue arising from the 
contrasting legal systems.77 
                                                
76 ALLEN, STEPHEN, Recreating 'One China': Internal Self-Determination, Autonomy and the Future 
of Taiwan, 4 Asia-Pacific Journal on Hunman Rights and the Law 21, (2003). DAVIS, MICHAEL C, 
Establishing a Workable Autonomy in Tibet, 30 Human Rights Quarterly 227, (2008).  
77 FU, et al., Interpreting Hong Kong's Basic Law: the Struggle for Coherence, p. 2. Similar points 
see HANDERS, SUSAN, The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Implications for World 
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Finally, to constitutionalise the relationship between the centre and the peripheral 
societies will reduce the tension of the past and enhance possibilities of the future. 
Robert Scalopira indicates some of them: (i) the continuation of status quo – to 
maintain the Party-State but embrace decentralisation; (ii) a China divided into parts; 
(iii) the emergence of a new nation (in Western style); or (iv) “authoritarian 
pluralism”, which tolerates a reforming authoritarian regime but encourages liberal 
pluralism in lowers levels.78 The conservative paradigm of modern constitutionalism 
appreciates the polarised options, while this thesis contends infinite permutations 
exist in a continuum.  
Needless to say, in a methodological sense a low number of comparative cases have 
both merits and demerits. Donatella della Porta contrasts variable-based research 
with a case-based one. The former uses anonymous cases as variables to test the 
concepts that are predetermined and operationalised, while the latter constructs 
concepts during the research and attempts to increase the number of variables in 
order to make the description thicker. This echoes the difference between 
Durkheim’s and Weber’s research approaches. The former prioritises statistical 
correlation analysis in social sciences, while the latter relies on narratives to deepen 
our understanding of historical and social diversity.79 This thesis is close to the latter 
approach. So it is very reluctant at this moment to conceptualise a Yin to the Yang 
of modern constitutionalism, and at best there is a “family resemblance” among 
non-liberal or quasi-liberal regimes in Wittgenstein’s sense. Further case studies are 
needed to determine whether a new paradigm in constitutional scholarship has 
arrived. 
                                                                                                                                    
Order, in The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century: Adaptation and the Reinvention of 
Legitimacy, (André Laliberté & Marc Lanteigne eds., 2008), pp. 106-107. 
78 SCALOPIRA, ROBERT, China in the late Leninist era, in Engaging the law in China: State, Society, 
and Possibilities for Justice, (Neil Jeffrey Diamant, et al. eds., 2005), p. 16. 
79 DELLA PORTA, DONATELLA & KEATING, MICHAEL, Approaches and Methodologies in the Social 
Sciences : a Pluralist Perspective (Cambridge University Press. 2008), pp. 203-208. 
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1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE 
Five chapters will follow this one. Chapter 2 will explore how the territorial 
authorities forge neither a vertical hierarchy nor a horizontal symmetry in the 
Chinese context. The peripheral authorities have grasped different titles to elevate 
their positions in relationships with the PRC central government. However, in 
relationships with the people(s) the territorial units function like states to different 
degrees. These territorial units may also seek to secure some unique status in 
international eyes. This proposes a multiple understanding of Chinese constitutional 
units – people-s.  
Chapter 3 delivers the normative reflection and revaluation to constitutional 
institutions. Constitutional law in some sense is written ideals, which means 
constitutional law cannot be morally irrelevant or ideologically neutral. Hence a 
more realistic question to be asked is what moral philosophy or ideology the 
constitutional law should endorse. Here the periphery-inclusive approach brings an 
in-between normative framework that is neither totalitarian nor liberal in traditional 
terms. In the aftermath of “reform and opening” the PRC state has no longer been a 
totalitarian regime, especially when it has tolerated Hong Kong constitutionally and 
tried to replicate this model to Taiwan. But the liberal perception has also indicated 
the PRC state is far from any liberal democratic varieties; at best it is a late 
communist regime waiting for the next move. I therefore advocate John Rawls’s 
“law of peoples” as the best idea in the context. The most crucial reason 
underpinning this choice is Rawls’s idea tolerates different ideological attachments 
under the same “liberal” umbrella, and as it seems to me, it is what China needs at 
this moment.     
Chapter 4 examines China’s constitutional accommodation of, and integration with, 
these peripheries respectively: “one country, two systems” to Hong Kong and 
Taiwan; “ethnic regional autonomy” to Tibet. In the 1950s when the PRC still held 
faith in political unification under the communist rule, the central government had 
already had to negotiate reserved privileges with the Dalai Lama’s representatives to 
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win Tibetan minds and hearts. In the aftermath of Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping 
decided to make pragmatic substitutes to regain Hong Kong and Taiwan. Deng 
promised to allow Taiwanese authorities to remain autonomous in exchange for a 
formal unification under the title of China. A slimmed version was put into practice 
in Hong Kong, which turns out to be the special administrative region. Modern 
constitutionalism shadows the arrangement with a unitary pre-occupation in the 
PRC. However, in constitutional praxis the “one nation, one people, one state, and 
one constitution” system has never been achieved in the Chinese context. 
Chapter 5 will focus on constitutional praxis on the territorial scale. In chapter 4, the 
centre has made a number of vertical arrangements to accommodate the territories, 
while this chapter explores the horizontal arrangements in each territory. The PRC 
state does not have a “check-and-balance” system, but territorial units more or less 
accept a sort of separation of powers. This chapter thus addresses the administrative, 
legislative, and judicial branches respectively. The Taiwanese authorities enjoy a de 
facto independence from the PRC government, so in all branches their autonomy 
stands on top of the three. The Taiwanese authorities are restrained merely in the 
power of changing their “constitution”, i.e. the de jure independence is prohibited 
by the PRC and will cause military interference in accordance with the Anti-
Secession Act 2005. The territorial constitutional convention of Hong Kong is the 
administrative branch of government being most powerful. However, in praxis 
Hong Kong judicial courts are more active to stand against the centre, sometimes 
the Chief Executive as well, to defend autonomy. Whereas Hong Kong is planning a 
further reform of its election system, the Hong Kong legislature may become a 
second agonistic branch to the centre in the future. Obviously, Tibet is the weakest 
autonomy among the three, but the Tibetan legislature will still probably make a 
difference. 
Chapter 6 then addresses constitutional future(s). Once we get out of the circle 
drawn by modern constitutionalism, there are so many possibilities in front of us. 
The core issue in Tibetan discourse is to reserve the culture and to make as much as 
possible improvement in human rights protection as standing inside the red line. 
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Stemming from normative discourse in chapter 3, one may suggest a sort of 
“cultural autonomy” about which Austrian Marxists once talked. It is scarcely 
workable to establish a “Great Tibet” incorporating all ethnic Tibetans in a single 
administrative entity as emigrated Tibetans claim, but there can be some 
coordinating institutions to encourage ethnic Tibetans to raise literacy and protect 
customs. A majority of Taiwanese prefer the status quo, but what is the current state 
of affairs? Nevertheless, cross-Strait authorities must keep on moving towards the 
peaceful agreement that ends the civil war. Can politicians finally resolve the 
problems based on normative ideals? In the past the answer is “no”, but now that 
would be a “maybe”. The 10th Panchen Lama once prayed for constitutional law to 
enlighten all individuals as the Sun does; for peace and for the good, his words 
might be listened to. 
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Chapter 2 Sinitic People-s 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses the historical and political situation with which the 
constitutional conceptualisation and theoretical construction must reconcile. Chapter 
1 has sketched in the relationship between the central government of the People’s 
Republic of China (hereinafter PRC) and the peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan with a story of the torch relay before the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 
in which the resuscitative Chinese State, compliant Hong Kong, antagonistic 
Taiwanese authorities, hundreds of emigrated Tibetans and their sympathisers all 
played their parts impressively. This chapter will continue to thicken the narrative in 
the province of jurisprudence. The situation, in a nutshell, is that the peripheral 
societies to a greater or lesser extent have evolved to become self-governing 
political units, distinctive as administrative regions.  
In addressing this, this thesis shares John Rawls’s three features of a people to 
define these political units. John Rawls conceives that a liberal people should have 
“a reasonably just constitutional democratic government; … citizens united by what 
Mill called ‘common sympathies’; and, finally a moral nature. The first is 
institutional, the second is cultural, and the third requires a firm attachment to a 
political (moral) conception of right and justice”.80 Chapter 3 will return to this, but 
at this stage it is helpful to point out that the three features of institution, culture, and 
morality are also applicable to non-liberal people-s. A Rawlsian people is no longer 
a “society” as its self-governing institutions possess the coercive power of 
enforcement, and they are not ordinary administrative divisions either. Charles R. 
Beitz reminds us that John Rawls’s understanding of the second feature of a people 
derives from Mill’s notion of “nationality”, which makes individuals “cooperate 
                                                
80 RAWLS, The Law of Peoples: with, The idea of public reason revisited, pp. 23-24. 
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with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same 
government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of 
themselves, exclusively”.81 And the third feature of a people, the “moral nature”, 
constrains the people as a political unit to act with reasonableness in accordance 
with what its public culture prescribes.82 An ordinary administrative division often 
lacks these features. 
Chapter 1 has clarified in advance that in this thesis the Chinese equivalent of 
“people” is tong-bao – a term that refers to, inter alia, Chinese nationals in Hong 
Kong, Taiwanese residents, and ethnic Tibetans of Sinitic originality83 – not ren-min, 
which appears in the Chinese texts of Article 1 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of equal authenticity to the English texts. But the usage of 
“people” still leads to the question: as qualified people-s, do the peripheral societies 
have the right to self-determination according to international law? The peripheral 
societies, as political units, should be granted the moral right of self-determination 
to freely determine their political status and freely pursue economic, social, and 
cultural development, and this is a stance rarely challenged by any theorists. But 
many liberals’ deduction from the moral stance is that in positive international law 
the societies are also entitled to establish their own sovereign state with a liberal 
                                                
81 MILL, JOHN STUART, Considerations on Representative Government (Parker and Bourn. 1861), 
chapter 16. Cited from BEITZ, Rawls's Law of Peoples, p. 679. 
82 BEITZ, Rawls's Law of Peoples, p. 679. 
83 The “Sinitic originality” means a Tibetan individual’s parent or at least, in this situation, 
grandparent shall be from Tibetan areas now under the PRC government’s control. There are 
thousands of ethnic Tibetan families living in Nepal and Bhutan, and their legal and political status 
is foundamentally different from Tibetans emigrating from modern Tibet.  
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democratic form of government, which, as they see it, is the only authentic form to 
implement the legal right of self-determination.84 
It is not coincidental that the usage of “people” would open the sluices for 
international legal scholarship. The logic underneath is that international law has 
been an arena where institutionally, culturally, and morally diverse states can play 
and compete based on a series of rules, and international lawyers are understandably 
keen to apply those rules to regulate the political units whose institutions, cultures, 
and political attachments are showing a great deal of variety too. In comparison with 
ordinary administrative divisions, the peripheral societies have indeed moved into a 
stage of high-level political pluralism that enables and urges corresponding legal 
rules. The situation of high-level political pluralism has increased the cost of 
enforcement and decreased the chance to foster consensus among ideologies. This 
thesis thus appreciates international lawyers’ efforts, as it will also observe the huge 
similarities between the legal order of Sinitic people-s and the international legal 
order. 
Yet international legal scholarship informed by liberal dogmas lacks a sensitive and 
meticulous understanding of the contextualised people-s, which, in the final analysis, 
are not states. Donald G. Palmer’s words about Taiwan’s status under international 
law are illustrative. He says: “Because I have concluded that there can be only two 
                                                
84 For the applicability of the right to self-determination in positive international law to Taiwan see, 
CHEN & REISMAN, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title at 656-657. The opposite 
side see SHEN, J, Sovereignty, Statehood, Self-Determination, and the Issue of Taiwan, 15 
American University International Law Review 1101, (1999). For the applicability of that right to 
Tibet see, VAN PRAAG, M, Tibet and the Right to Self-Determination, 26 Wayne L. Rev. 279, 
(1979). JOSEPHS, H. K., et al., Independence for Tibet: An International Law Analysis, 8 China 
Law Reporter 21, (1994). CLARK, R. M., China's Unlawful Control Over Tibet: The Tibetan 
People's Entitlement To Self-Determination, 12 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 293, (2001). BROUDER, 
Self-Determination for Tibet: Prospects in International Law. SLOANE, The Changing Face of 
Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet.  
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alternatives to the question of Taiwan’s legal status, whether one characterizes the 
relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as being ‘one country, two 
systems,’ ‘one country, two governments,’ ‘one country, two territorial entities,’ 
‘multi-system nation,’ ‘dual-system nation’, or ‘divided states,’ to name just a few, 
the conclusion must still be the same: either Taiwan is an independent State under 
international law or it is not.”85 Donald Palmer might be right that there shall be an 
either-or answer from an international legal point of view, but the problem is this 
either-or answer will seriously oversimplify the situation. It is easy to give a 
scholarly either-or answer based on doctrinal studies. But to reach such an answer 
means little for persons and people-s pursuing peace and prosperity in this region. If 
the international community cannot militarily force the PRC government to respect 
a scholarly answer like that, why should we abandon so many probably feasible 
solutions as Palmer suggests?   
As a matter of scope, this chapter will explore only three phenomena that set the 
peoples apart from ordinary administrative divisions. The first section addresses the 
heterarchy of authorities in the Chinese context. The PRC central government and 
the peripheral societies are neither of equal authority, nor do they form a hierarchy 
of authorities with the PRC central government standing on top of it. Ordinary 
administrative divisions should subordinate themselves to a central government, but 
the peripheral societies may vary in intuitions, cultures, and political attachments. 
The second section goes to the relationship between the authorities and 
citizens/nationals. The PRC, as a theoretically unitary state, still does not offer 
homogenous citizenship to all Chinese nationals. In fact Chinese nationals 
registering residentship in different jurisdictions are entitled to various rights and 
legal treatments; in many occasions, Chinese nationals are neither one hundred 
percent citizen nor alien in a Sinitic territory. This nevertheless has much 
                                                
85 PALMER JR, D, Taiwan: De Jure or Not De Jure-That Is the Question-An Analysis of Taiwan's 
Legal Status within the International Community, 7 John F. Kennedy University Law Review 65 at 
80, (1996). 
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outstripped what ordinary administrative divisions are supposed to do. In the third 
section, we address the peripheral societies’ relationship to the international 
community. The structure of this chapter may be understood as a trio covering the 
relationship between the territorial authorities and the PRC central government, that 
between it and individuals, and that between it and foreign states. Hypothetically, a 
unitary state’s relationship, legal or political, with its citizens/nationals shall be 
simple and direct. As modernist constitutionalism presumes, the constituent power 
shall vest in a singular “people” as the demos of a liberal democracy and the 
constituted power ought to be primarily provided by a singular Constitution. 
However, as following sections will illustrate, the Sinitic cases obviously are 
different to this presumption. 
2.2 HETERARCHY OF AUTHORITIES 
2.2.1 China and Taiwan 
In Sinitic territory, there are two main opposition political stances on each side of 
the Taiwan Strait – the PRC and the “Republic of China” (Taiwan). Because the 
Communist Party of China (hereinafter CPC) does not seek democratic legitimacy 
for the regime, the narrative of historical triumphs against “national enemies” is 
possibly the only legitimisation of its reign. The Preamble of the 1982 PRC 
Constitution provides: 86 
“The people of all nationalities in China have jointly created a splendid culture and 
have a glorious revolutionary tradition. Feudal China was gradually reduced after 
1840 to a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The Chinese people waged wave 
upon wave of heroic struggles for national independence and liberation and for 
democracy and freedom. Great and earth-shaking historical changes have taken place 
in China in the 20th century. The Revolution of 1911, led by Dr Sun Yat-sen, abolished 
the feudal monarchy and gave birth to the Republic of China. But the Chinese people 
had yet to fulfil their historical task of overthrowing imperialism and feudalism. After 
                                                
86 The 1982 PRC Constitution, Preamble.  
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waging hard, protracted and tortuous struggles, armed and otherwise, the Chinese 
people of all nationalities led by the Communist Party of China with Chairman Mao 
Zedong as its leader ultimately, in 1949, overthrew the rule of imperialism, feudalism 
and bureaucrat capitalism, won the great victory of the new-democratic revolution 
and founded the People's Republic of China. Thereupon the Chinese people took state 
power into their own hands and became masters of the country.” 
Yet the CPC never fully accomplishes the triumph over the Chinese Nationalist 
Party or the Kuomintang (hereinafter KMT). In 1949 the CPC had overthrown the 
KMT regime in the Chinese mainland, but at that time it had no capacity to destroy 
the KMT remainders in Taiwan of which the KMT had taken over control after the 
Second World War.  
On the north side of the Taiwan Strait, the PRC central government declared 
unilateral ceasefire across the Strait in 1979, 87 but never admits the Chinese civil 
war has ended.88 According to its rhetoric, the 1982 PRC Constitution regards 
Taiwan as a breakaway province to be politically reunified with the Chinese 
mainland: “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China. 
It is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in 
Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.”89 Since the 
1980s the PRC government has enacted a series of “judicial interpretations” to de-
criminalise Taiwanese residents who were involved in anti-communist activities 
during the civil war thus facing possible prosecution in the Chinese mainland. 
Against this background, millions of Taiwanese travel across the Strait each and 
                                                
87 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renda changweihui gao taiwan tongbao shu  (Standing 
Committe of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China ed.,   1979).  
88 Article 3(1) of the PRC Anti-Secession Act 2005 reads: “The Taiwan question is one that is left 
over from China's civil war of the late 1940s.” 
89 The 1982 Constitution, Preamble.   
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every year and contribute greatly to Chinese economic recovery after the Cultural 
Revolution.90 
On the south side of the Strait, Article 4 of the Constitution of Republic of China 
(hereinafter ROC), which was promulgated in the Chinese mainland in 1946, says: 
“The territory of the Republic of China within its existing national boundaries shall 
not be altered except by a resolution of the National Assembly.”91 What are 
“existing national boundaries”? The direct interpretation should be the international 
boundary of China in 1946 when the Constitution was made, whose territory 
includes both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. Yet the reality is the Taiwanese 
authorities only control Taiwan (or Formosa) and some tiny islands, which makes 
the claim rather bizarre. But the Taiwanese authorities cannot recklessly alter the 
provision either, as it is arguably the most important symbol of Chinese unity.  
So the Taiwanese authorities attempt to lay this question aside. In facing challenges 
from pro-independence Taiwanese politicians, the “ROC” Judicial Yuan, which is 
the constitutional court in Taiwan, made a judicial interpretation on 26 November 
1993 indicating the meaning of “existing national boundaries” is a political question 
and ought to be answered by a political organ.92 As a result, politicians can interpret 
the constitutional provision with great liberality. The President Mr Chen from the 
                                                
90 The PRC central government actually enacted a law to protect Taiwanese residents’ investment in 
the Chinese mainland, see the PRC Protection Act for Investment of Taiwanese Residents 1994. 
The PRC parliamentary act is also translated as “Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Protection of Investment by Compatriots From Taiwan”. 
91 The Constitution of the Republic of China of 1946 (hereafter “1946 Constitution”), art 4.  
92 The ROC Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 328, which holds: “Instead of enumerating the 
components, Article 4 of the Constitution provides that the national territory of the Republic of 
China is determined “according to its existing national boundaries.” Based on political and 
historical reasons, a special procedure is also required for any change of territory. The delimitation 
of national territory according to its history is a significant political question and thus it is beyond 
the reach of judicial review.” 
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Democratic Progressive Party (hereinafter DPP) regards Taiwan and China as two 
sovereign countries; but the incumbent President from the KMT reversed the 
position. The KMT President’s understanding arguably has the judiciary’s support. 
The “ROC” Supreme Court’s binding precedence of the No. 8129 case in 1982 is 
precise and clear: crime in the Chinese mainland shall still be regarded as having 
been made in the “national territory” of the “ROC”.93 
The “ROC” National Assembly in 1991 finally repealed the Temporary Provisions 
Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion (hereinafter TPEDPCR) that 
was a martial law to suppress anti-KMT movements in Taiwan. In 1992 Taiwan set 
down a constitutional act to regulate the relationship between residents in Taiwan 
and those in the Chinese mainland, in which Chinese nationals with different 
household registration (in Taiwan or the Chinese mainland) are entitled to separate 
treatments in the territory.94 Not until 2005 did the PRC make its own constitutional 
act to do a similar job. The PRC Anti-Secession Act 2005 recognises that the 
Chinese mainland and Taiwan have not been re-united politically and hence it 
admits there is a difference between Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders.  So far 
both sides of the Strait have occupied a position in the other’s constitutional rhetoric 
despite the languages not being compatible. 
As a result of cross-Strait conflicts and long-term political pluralism in the aftermath 
of Taiwanese democratisation, the political attachments of Taiwanese residents have 
been diversifying. It is not important whether politicians portray Taiwanese 
residents as ethnically distinct people from Chinese mainlanders – the Taiwanese 
population consists of at least four constituent groups: Hoklo (70%), Hakka (15%), 
post-war migrants from the mainland (13%) and around 2% Taiwanese aboriginals. 
The ethnic similarities between Taiwanese Han groups (Hoklo, Hakka, and 
mainland migrants) and Han Chinese in the mainland are manifest. The crucial point 
                                                
93 The ROC Supreme Court Case No. 8129 in 1982. 
94 See section 2. 
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is individuals from the same ethnic people may have very different political 
attachments and they probably and possibly can inhabit in separate states or 
establish those for their own. As in Taiwan, arguably the most reliable opinion poll 
on Taiwanese attitudes towards political reunification with the Chinese mainland, 
which is made by the ROC Mainland Affairs Council, illustrates that the PRC 
central government should not be too optimistic about the prospect: although more 
than 80% of Taiwanese adults in the poll agree with a status quo, 24% pollees prefer 
independence to re-unification, and another 30% would join them in some 
circumstances – uncertainties about the Chinese economic miracle and the survival 
of CPC regime would both determine how they think about the future. (Figure 1) 
Moreover, the distinctiveness of Taiwanese institutions and maintenance of liberal 
democracy in Taiwan also lie in the shade of the possibility of United States (US) 
military interference whenever the PRC central government would have resumed 
the Chinese civil war to pursue political reunification. The pro-independence 
Taiwanese activists always assume Taiwan behave like as an ordinary state in each 
and every respect, except for some minor political shortages that will be overcome 
soon, but the reality has been rather complicated. The United States Congress took 
Taiwan as a preserved territory of its own. The US Taiwan Relations Act compels 
the US administration to formulate a sufficient policy on the issue of Taiwan: 
(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and 
other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as 
well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific 
area; 
(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and 
economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;  
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with 
the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan 
will be determined by peaceful means;  
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful 
means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the 
Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;  
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(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; an  
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other 
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic 
system, of the people on Taiwan.95 
The US government has been cutting both ways to sustain a balance. 96 Yet Article 8 
of the PRC Anti-Secession Act 2005 has cleared the way for the PRC central 
government to pursue political reunification by military means.97 There is a danger 
of real war, which hardly exists in a relationship between a host state government 
and ordinary administrative divisions – even states in disagreement would not go 
there. 
2.2.2 Hong Kong  
Taiwan and the PRC may be on an arguably equal footing in political terms, but 
Hong Kong as a special administrative region of the PRC stands doubtlessly lower 
in a hierarchy than the PRC central government, especially the omnipotent Chinese 
parliament. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(hereinafter HKSAR) was promulgated by the PRC National People’s Congress 
                                                
95 The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, United States Public Law 96-8.  
96 For the US role in PRC-Taiwan relations, see KONKOLY-THEGE, K. S. W., The Taiwan Question: 
Why the United States Must Not Enact the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, 5 Holy Cross JL & 
Pub. Pol'y 107, (2000). HAMILTON, J. X., Overview of the Legal and Security Questions 
concerning Taiwanese Independence, An, 1 Int'l L. Rev. 91, (2003). LEE, S, American Policy 
Toward Taiwan: The Issue of the De Facto and De Jure Status of Taiwan and Sovereignty, 2 Buff. 
J. Int'l L. 323, (1995). 
97 The PRC Anti-Secession Act 2005, art 8. Article 8 reads: “In the event that the "Taiwan 
independence" secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of 
Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China 
should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the 
state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 
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(hereinafter NPC), and the special administrative region is organised in accordance 
with a “unitary state” preposition of the PRC central government.98 The NPC can 
make whatever law for Hong Kong, despite it will be politically unwise to breach 
the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
Yet in terms of political attachments, the PRC central government lacks of the 
capability and competence to homogenise Hong Kong residents’ allegiance. As an 
international metropolis and financial centre, there are numerous Hong Kong 
residents holding non-Chinese passport and from non-Chinese families. They are 
not requested to defer to the PRC central government but only to the HKSAR if 
necessary. In fact the only obligation that the HKSAR asks its residents for is they 
shall obey the law,99 and the territorial administration is not yearning for any sort of 
emotional attachment or patriotism from its residents. Hong Kong’s political 
pluralism actually encourages Hong Kong residents to confront the CPC’s reign 
within the scope of Hong Kong’s constitutionalism. Article 23 of the Hong Kong 
Basic Law prescribes the HKSAR shall enact territorial law to prohibit treason, 
secession, sedition, subversion against the PRC central government.100 But when the 
HKSAR administration tried to make an ordinance to fulfill the article’s 
requirement, Hong Kong residents seriously opposed its proposal that was later 
                                                
98 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 12. Article 12 reads: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region shall be a local administrative region of the People's Republic of China, which shall enjoy 
a high degree of autonomy and come directly under the Central People's Government.” 
99 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 42. Article 42 of the Hong Kong Basic Law reads: “Hong Kong 
residents and other persons in Hong Kong shall have the obligation to abide by the laws in force in 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.” 
100 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 23. Article 23 reads: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion 
against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political 
organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political 
organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or 
bodies.” 
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shelved after a number of demonstrations. Hong Kong residents are wary that a new 
ordinance would force them to succumb to criminal prosecution for disobedience to 
the government (of the HKSAR or the PRC). The HKSAR proposal attempted to 
demand allegiance from all residents in the territory based on case law – Lord 
Jowitt, L.C. said allegiance “is owed to their Sovereign Lord the King by … those 
who, being aliens, reside within the King's realm”.101 But this is not the reality in the 
circumstances.  
Hong Kong is also allowed to use territorial symbols to express its difference from 
the Chinese mainland. Appendix 3 of the Basic Law prescribes the PRC national 
anthem, national flag, national anniversary, and national emblem shall be respected 
in Hong Kong.102 At the same time, the HKSAR is entitled to use a territorial flag 
and a territorial emblem. The HKSAR flag is a “red flag with a bauhinia highlighted 
by five star-tipped stamens.” The HKSAR emblem is “a bauhinia in the centre 
highlighted by five star-tipped stamens and encircled by the words ‘Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China’ in Chinese and 
‘HONG KONG’ in English.” The Regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance 
provides: “In the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, whenever the national 
flag is flown together with the regional flag, or the national emblem is displayed 
together with the regional emblem, the national flag or the national emblem is to 
occupy a more prominent position. When both the national flag and the regional flag 
are raised in procession, the national flag is to precede the regional flag. When the 
national flag is flown alongside the regional flag, the national flag is to be on the 
right and the regional flag on the left.”103 In Chinese culture this is an explicit way 
                                                
101 The case is Joyce v DPP [1946] 1 All ER 186 at 189. See Proposals to Implement Article 23 of 
the Basic Law: Consultation Document (The Security Bureau of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China ed.,   2002), p. 12. 
102 The Hong Kong Basic Law, Appendix 3. 
103 The Hong Kong Regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance, Instrument A602 available at 
the Bilingual Laws Information System operated by the HKSAR Department of Justice 
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to show which is exalted, which scene is different from the fact that the Union Jack, 
the Saint Andrew’s Cross, and the European Union flag may fly side by side. Even 
so, the HKSAR still surpasses ordinary Chinese administrative divisions, since they 
have nothing at all.104  
2.2.3 Tibetan communities 
Tibet nevertheless is an ambiguous case. In the sense of ethnicity, the Tibetans may 
qualify as a “people” without redundant contestation; but a Rawlsian people features 
distinctive institution, public culture, and political attachment. So far Tibetans being 
entitled to PRC nationality/passport have inhabited two separate communitarian 
environments: one is in Tibet, and the other is under administration of the 14th Dalai 
Lama’s chamberlains “in exile”. Tibetan communities within and outside the PRC 
have highly different intuitional and ideological surroundings, so this section uses a 
plural form of title in addressing the Tibetans. 
There is even no agreement on what Tibet is. The traditional ethnic Tibet covers 
Tibetan areas in the PRC, Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan, and South Tibet, which is the 
Arunachal Pradesh state under Indian actual control but claimed by the PRC. The 
ethnic Tibet now is governed by three sovereign states: China, India, and Bhutan; it 
is the largest geographic concept of Tibet. In the PRC, Tibetan areas consist of the 
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), and several autonomous Tibetan prefectures and 
counties in other provinces. Yet the Dalai Lama’s “Central Tibetan Administration” 
in exile insists of a “Great Tibet”: 
Tibet here means … Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo). It includes the 
present-day Chinese administrative areas of the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region, 
                                                                                                                                    
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm. Retrieved on 19 May 2011. 
104 The symbols are protected in Hong Kong from desecration even in sake of “freedom of speech 
and freedom of expression”. See HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu and Another [1999] 3 HKLRD 907; 
(1999) 2 HKCFAR 442. 
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Qinghai Province, two Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures and one Tibetan 
Autonomous County in Sichuan Province, one Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and 
one Tibetan Autonomous County in Gansu Province and one Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture in Yunnan Province.105  
The crucial difference between the abovementioned “Tibetan areas” in the PRC and 
“Great Tibet” is: the provincial capital of Qinghai, Xining City is included in “Great 
Tibet” but excluded from “Tibetan areas” in the PRC. As a crossroad in the ancient 
Silk Road encompassed by ethnic Tibetans to the South West, Muslims to the North 
West, and Han Chinese to the East, Xining City was and is a multiethnic habitation 
with a Han Chinese majority, which played an important role in Tibetan history. 
However, in the latest official memorandum submitted by representatives of the 14th 
Dalai Lama to the PRC central government “Tibet” has been restricted to “all 
autonomous Tibetan areas in the PRC”, which matches the PRC’s notion now.106 
In speaking of Tibetan institutions, we have to skim through some historical 
pages.107 In the 18th century, the Manchu Crown in China and the Gelug sect of 
Tibetan Buddhism developed a politico-religious bond. Tibetans regard this as a 
“patron-priest” relationship, but Chinese literature emphasises the secular side of the 
                                                
105 The map of Tibet in this version available at the website of the “Central Tibetan Administration” 
 http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=13&rmenuid=8. Retrieved on 19 May 2011. 
106 Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People  (Central Tibetan Administration ed.,   
2009).  
107 The history has been interpreted from different perspectives. One side see, SMITH, WARREN W., 
Tibetan Nation: a History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (Westview Press. 
1996). SHAKYA, TSERING, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: a History of Modern Tibet since 
1947 (Columbia University press. 1999). DAWA, China's Tibet policy. The other side see, GONG, 
WEIYANG & LING, NAIMIN, Tibet, 1950-1967 (Union Research Institute. 1968). GOLDSTEIN, 
MELVYN C., The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (University of 
California Press. 1997). GOLDSTEIN, MELVYN C. & RIMPOCHE, GELEK, A History of Modern 
Tibet, 1913-1951: the Demise of the Lamaist State (University of California Press. 1989). 
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coin. The Crown re-shaped the entire governance of Tibet and empowered the Dalai 
Lama with a theocracy that combined both the religious and the secular. The 
Tibetan local government (Kashag) was set up, which was in composition of four 
ministers (Kalön) under the Dalai Lama and supervised by two commissioners 
(amban) appointed to represent the Crown in Tibet.108 In counties neighbouring 
Shigatse, the Panchen Lama was also empowered with a series of secular powers; 
the Kashag did not levy tax in the Panchen Lama’s domain, neither in Amdo and 
Kham where local feudatories were in subjection of provincial direct rule of the 
Crown. 
The last Manchu emperor abdicated in 1911, which led to the establishment of the 
Republic of China. The Republic of China declared a “five-face republic” policy 
towards ethnic groups once under the Manchu Crown, i.e. Han Chinese, Manchu, 
Mongol, Tibetan, and Hui Muslim.109 The 13th Dalai Lama did not accept that. 
When the British army invaded Tibet, the 13th Dalai Lama fled to Outer Mongolia 
and visited Beijing following a call from the Manchu Crown. The imperial court 
cherished him well but changed the manner of encounter between the Emperor and 
the Dalai Lama: when previous Emperors embraced the Dalai Lama, the Emperor 
should step down from the throne and welcome the religious figure warmly, then sit 
the Dalai Lama next to himself slightly lower. But the Crown at this time asked the 
Dalai Lama to kowtow, maybe because his exile was not agreed and the Crown had 
already prepared to start its modern state-making process regardless of ancient 
rituals. The Dalai Lama was not satisfied. When the Crown decided to re-shape 
Tibet’s governance and establish direct rule, the Dalai Lama fled to British India. 
Then the empire collapsed and the 13th Dalai Lama returned. He forced Chinese 
                                                
108 The appointment of the commissioners in late Qing era see, HO, D. D, The Men Who Would Not 
Be Amban and the One Who Would: Four Frontline Officials and Qing Tibet Policy, 1905--1911, 
34 Modern China 210, (2008). Initially the Manchu Crown only appointed Manchu and Mongol 
amban, but in late Qing era there were Han Chinese appointments being made.  
109 TUTTLE, Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China!.  
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commissioners and troops to leave and for the first time took control of Tibet’s 
affairs in his own hands. The era of the 13th Dalai Lama was the only chance Tibet 
had to modernise without external interference, but the overwhelming majority of 
conservative lords and lamas opposed it. The 13th Dalai Lama died in 1933. 
In 1949 the Chinese communist revolution replaced the Republic with the PRC, and 
the CPC decided to reintegrate Tibet in its direct control. After the People’s 
Liberation Army (hereinafter PLA) had occupied Eastern Tibet, the 14th Dalai Lama, 
who just took over from a regent lama, sent an envoy to Beijing to make a deal. The 
“17-point Agreement” is a milestone for Tibetans, which remarks the CPC’s taking 
over of Tibet;110 another milestone should be the Tibetans’ 1959 revolt, after which 
the CPC demolished the Kashag and emancipated all Tibetan serfs. The PRC 
established the Tibet Autonomous Region (hereinafter TAR) as an administrative 
division but promised autonomous powers to Tibetans. The 10th Panchen Lama was 
appointed in high posts along with many tulkus 111and lords who decided not to flee 
with the 14th Dalai Lama. When the 13th Dalai Lama tried to launch his state-
making project, he forced the 9th Panchen to flee to China proper to take over the 
Panchen domain. Since then the Dalai and the Panchen Lamas have not had good 
relations. 
The 14th Dalai Lama restored his Kashag in Dharamsala, India. In the early days, the 
Kashag still wanted to fight back. Emigrated Tibetans set up an army in Nepal with 
US supplies, which later was demilitarised by the Nepalese government for security 
                                                
110 For the legality and legitimacy of the “17-Point Agreement” see INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF 
JURISTS., The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law (The International Commission of Jurists. 
1959). INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS. Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic 
(International Commission of Jurists. 1960).  
111 The Karmapa is the first important post to be succeeded by the tulku system, whose idea is when 
the late Karmapa temporarily “goes out of this world,” he returns as a baby child, or reincarnation, 
followers must find this tulku and restore him to the post, so this tulku may live long in this world 
and enlighten others. Other sects of Tibetan Buddhism have adopted the system. 
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reasons.112 Emigrated Tibetans reformed the Kashag, and the Dalai Lama became 
the head of it. Although there is no scientific method to investigate Tibetans’ 
political attachments, it is acknowledged that not all emigrated Tibetans are loyal to 
the Kashag. The Sakya, the Kagyu, and other sects of Tibetan Buddhism all make 
stunning development in the West. After the 1959 revolt that was led mostly by 
Eastern Tibetans, the revolt organisation survives. The revolt organisation does not 
kneel to the Kashag, and made an agreement with the “Republic of China” in 
Taiwan that it shall accept the ROC’s claim over Tibet in exchange of a high level 
autonomy after the ROC would have re-unified China.113 
To summarise, the Tibetan Autonomous Region sitting in Lhasa is barely distinct 
from other administrative divisions in the PRC, although it is an “ethnic 
autonomous region” with a series of autonomous powers in theory. It was 
established by the PRC central government and can be demolished unitarily by the 
PRC central government. Under the government’s tight control, the political 
attachments of Tibetans in the PRC are unknown to the public. So it is the Dalai 
Lama and his Dharamsala office that distinguishes Tibetans from other ethnic 
groups in the PRC. The Dalai Lama, who in legal terms is an international refugee, 
keeps disseminating that he and his followers still hope to resume the citizenship of 
the PRC one day, but they will not surrender to the PRC central government without 
appropriate conditions. Although it is contestable whether Tibetan refugees may 
represent millions of Tibetans in the PRC, their presence, in some sense, indeed 
underpins the argument that the Tibetans shall be recognised as a Rawlsian people 
of institutional and ideological distinctiveness. 
                                                
112 CONBOY, K.J. & MORRISON, J., The CIA's Secret War in Tibet (University Press of Kansas. 
2002).  
113 WANG & NIMAJIANZAN, The Historical Status of China's Tibet. 
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Figure 1 Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in Taiwan  
Source: (ROC) Mainland Affairs Council
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2.3 CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY 
Section 1 has explained that the peripheral societies have become people-s in 
Rawlsian terms and formed a heterarchy of authorities. This section goes on to 
investigate the political situation based on a differentiation between citizenship and 
nationality. The basic idea is individuals in peripheral societies and the Chinese 
mainland/China proper are entitled to a variety of political rights, residentship, and 
protection of territorial administration in accordance with their legal statutes. They 
are mostly recognised as Chinese nationals, but this does affect in certain 
circumstances the fact that they are even inferior to legal aliens in Sinitic territory. 
This section contends that the three cases of Sinitic peripheral societies may disturb 
the classic notion that citizenship and alienhood are mutually exclusive and 
exclusionary terms of membership, identity, and legal treatment. As a result, some 
are neither “others” nor hundred-percent “we”. 
Even immigrants in the European Union “typically came to enjoy a full set of 
negative freedoms, including free access to the labour market, and they also 
gradually acquired a reasonable level of positive social security rights, limited 
political participation rights, and protection against sudden expulsion from the 
country”.114 Chinese nationals, however, in Sinitic territory can be barred from free 
movement, holding public office, or protection against expatriation because they 
have no membership of a peripheral society. Rainer Bauböck indicates “Free 
movement within state territories and the right to readmission to this territory has 
become a hallmark of modern citizenship. Yet, in the international arena citizenship 
serves as a control device that strictly limits state obligations towards foreigners and 
                                                
114 WALKER, N, et al., Denizenship and the Deterritorialization in the EU, available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com.  
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permits government to keep them out or remove them, from their jurisdiction”.115 In 
this sense, the relationship between peripheral societies and their members has much 
outstripped that between ordinary administrative divisions and citizens, yet 
resembles that between states and residents to some extent. 
It is probably useful to remind that the term “nationality” refers to two different 
categories of individuals. The first is a group of individuals (possibly and 
potentially) entitled to citizenship of a state; the second is an ethnic group, in the 
Chinese context, officially recognised and identified by the state. Both will be used 
in this section. 
2.3.1 China and Taiwan 
At first we will attend the Taiwan case. Section 1 has briefly mentioned the cross-
Strait mutual de-criminalisation process in which residents on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait have been relieved the threat of prosecution if they were inevitably 
involved in political activities against the regime on the other side of the Strait. This 
section will reveal in more detail how the regimes regard residents under control of 
the other side. 
The PRC Nationality Act 1980 prescribes: 
Article 4 Any person born in China whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one 
of whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality. 
Article 5 Any person born abroad whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one of 
whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality… 
Article 6 Any person born in China whose parents are stateless or of uncertain 
nationality and have settled in China shall have Chinese nationality. 116 
                                                
115 BAUBÖCK, RAINER, Citizenship and Migration – Concepts and Controversies, in Migration and 
Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights and Political Participation, (Rainer Bauböck ed., 2006), p. 16. 
116 The PRC Nationality Act 1980. 
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The PRC Nationality Act 1980 combines jus sanguinis and jus soli, but the former 
weighs more. If an infant’s parent or parents are Chinese nationals, she can be a 
Chinese national; or, if an infant would be born in China, she can be a Chinese 
national too. Besides birth, there are other ways of acquisition of the PRC 
nationality, e.g. adoption, legitimation, naturalisation, etc; but birth is the primary 
way of “becoming Chinese”.  
The PRC Nationality Act 1980 does not recognise dual nationality: 
Article 3 The People's Republic of China does not recognize dual nationality for any 
Chinese national. 
Article 5 … But a person whose parents are both Chinese nationals and have both 
settled abroad, or one of whose parents is a Chinese national and has settled abroad, 
and who has acquired foreign nationality at birth shall not have Chinese nationality. 
Article 9 Any Chinese national who has settled abroad and who has been naturalized 
as a foreign national or has acquired foreign nationality of his own free will shall 
automatically lose Chinese nationality. 
Two consequences of the PRC’s non-recognition to dual nationality are: on the one 
hand, the PRC has abandoned overseas Chinese holding other nationalities (as 
Article 5 and 9 indicate); on the other hand, the PRC government insists that 
Chinese nationals with dual nationality are not entitled to foreign consular 
protection in the Chinese mainland. If any Chinese nationals hope to apply for 
foreign consular protection in the Chinese mainland, they should renounce their 
Chinese nationality in the first place through certain official procedures; otherwise 
their application will not succeed.117  
The latest Chinese nationality law before the PRC Nationality Act 1980 was that 
promulgated on 5 February 1929 by the Republic of China. The ROC Nationality 
                                                
117 Article 14 of the PRC Nationality Act 1980 reads: “Persons who wish to acquire, renounce or 
restore Chinese nationality, with the exception of cases provided for in Article 9, shall go through 
the formalities of application.” 
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Act 1929 did not refuse dual nationality. Secondly, the ROC Nationality Act 1929 
primarily counted an infant’s nationality by her father’s Chinese nationality; the 
mother’s Chinese nationality would not count unless the father is unknown or 
stateless. In other words, the 1929 law is overwhelmingly jus sanguinis based on 
patrilineal descent and it did not consider whether an infant is born in China or not. 
Thirdly, the ROC Nationality Act 1929 was stricter than the PRC Nationality Act 
1980 in naturalisation. It requested any people applying for naturalisation to “have 
basic linguistic ability of the national language.” In that decade this read as who 
wished to naturalise to the Republic of China must be able to speak Mandarin. 
The ROC Nationality Act 1929 is comparatively significant because: on the one 
hand, it is a former version of the contemporary one applying in Taiwan; on the 
other hand, although “the 1929 law was never formally in force on the territory of 
the PRC, … a number of its provisions were still tacitly applied by the PRC 
authorities on assorted occasions [until the 1980s].”118  
As things stands, the PRC Nationality Act 1980 raised a question: in 1949-1980, 
who were Chinese nationals? Article 17 of the PRC Nationality Act 1980 does say: 
“The nationality status of persons who have acquired or lost Chinese nationality 
before the promulgation of this Law shall remain valid.” However, because there are 
many abovementioned differences between the 1929 and the 1980 act and the 1980 
act provides “retrospectively” automatic forfeiture of Chinese nationality, the 
situation turned complicated. Many individuals’ Chinese nationality does not 
“remain valid” after 1980, but others who were not entitled to have Chinese 
nationality now may have. Since the “ROC nationality” is still valid in Taiwan, we 
may briefly conclude that the number of Chinese nationals recognised by the PRC 
and by the ROC in Taiwan should not be the same in theory.  
                                                
118 GINSBURGS, G, The 1980 Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 459, (1982).  
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Furthermore, although the ROC Nationality Act 1929 was adopted by Taiwan, 
Taiwan has also amended it many times. Taiwan’s contemporary Nationality Act 
accepts the combination of jus sanguinis and jus soli, and both parents’ Chinese 
nationality counts in deciding that of an infant. The linguistic ability condition for 
naturalisation maintains. Besides, Taiwan restricts naturalised nationals’ opportunity 
to hold public office. Unless they have fulfilled a 10-year residency, naturalised 
nationals could not be elected as “President, leaders of five Yuan-s, local officers, 
legislative representatives, etc.” 119  Although dual nationality is acceptable to 
Taiwan, foreign nationality holders are not entitled to hold public office. 
Comparatively, The PRC Nationality Act 1980 accepts people who are relatives of 
Chinese nationals or who have settled in China to naturalise with no condition of 
linguistic ability or restriction to public office.  
The clash between the PRC nationality law and Taiwanese nationality law – in 
theory – results: on the one hand, the PRC authorities shall recognise an 
overwhelmingly majority of Taiwan residents as “Chinese nationals”, if not all; on 
the other hand, the Taiwanese authorities do not exclude an overwhelmingly 
majority of Chinese mainlanders from being “nationals” either. However, in 
practice both sides lack efficient mechanisms to identify the nationality of 
individuals who contemporarily inhabit under control of the other side. If an 
individual would travel across the strait, she should bear some travel documents. 
This side although in the past did not “know” this individual, her nationality will be 
recognised when she crosses the border. If the individual does not show, she is 
always “unknown” to the other side. 
To identify the status of “Chinese nationals”, it seems the PRC central government’s 
attitude is all individuals bearing Taiwan’s official travel documents are so 
recognised. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC indexes: 
                                                
119 The ROC Nationality Act 1929, art. 10. 
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All who have Chinese nationality in accordance with the Nationality Law of the 
People's Republic of China are entitled to have our consular protection. In other 
words, as long as you are Chinese citizens – regardless of settling abroad or 
temporarily travelling abroad; regardless of the mainland residents, or Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan compatriots – you are our target of providing consular 
protection.120 
Here the PRC foreign ministry directly matches “Taiwan compatriots” with 
“Chinese citizens”. However, its application in legal practice is vague. Naturalised 
nationals in Taiwan of course do not naturalise to the PRC “through the formalities 
of application” with the PRC’s approval. It is also a question whether certain 
Taiwanese residents who have dual nationality have automatically lost their 
nationality in accordance with the PRC Nationality Act. 
On the other side, Taiwan’s attitude is also controversial. Taiwanese law defines: 
“national: means nationals living with the household registration in Taiwan, and 
nationals living abroad.” 121  The Legislative Grounds of that article reads: 
“‘nationals’ includes nationals living in Taiwan, the mainland, abroad, and Hong 
Kong and Macau.”122 There are two interpretations: (1) Chinese nationals living in 
the mainland are recognised by the Taiwan authorities as its “nationals”, as well as 
those in Hong Kong, Macau and abroad; (2) there are some “nationals” of Taiwan 
who have settled in the mainland. They have lost their Taiwan household, but they 
are still recognised as Taiwan’s “nationals”. Because: (a) they have not yet 
renounced their “ROC” nationality in accordance with Taiwan’s law; (b) even if 
they have acquired/restored their PRC nationality, this could be in some sense 
                                                
120 Zhongguo lingshi baohu yu xiezhu zhinan  (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic 
of China ed., 2010). 
121 The ROC Immigration Act 1998, art. 3(3). 
122 See the official website of National Immigration Agency of the ROC (Taiwan) available in 
Chinese at http://www.immigration.gov.tw/aspcode/Show_Law.asp?DocumentID=4544. Retrieved 
on 10 October 2009. 
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tolerated as Taiwan accepts duality nationality. Interestingly, their “ROC 
nationality” does not count in the PRC. So they are not holding duality nationality, 
which would have offended the PRC law. 
If we agree finally there are mainland residents who are Chinese nationals in 
accordance with the PRC law but not in accordance with Taiwanese law, the second 
interpretation prevails. The standard Taiwanese categorisation of peoples is: (1-a) 
nationals with household registration in Taiwan; (1-b) nationals without household 
registration, e.g. nationals living abroad or those yet have Taiwan household by 
acquisition/restoration of their nationality; (2) aliens; (3) mainland people; (4) 
residents of Hong Kong and Macau. Category (1-b) and (3) thus are not overlapping. 
It is understandable that this standard categorisation is applied by a series of 
immigration and national security laws, for which Chinese mainlanders are to be 
kept out.  
However, on the other hand, Taiwan has not yet disposed of the possibility that 
mainland residents could also be “Chinese nationals”. This attitude is applied by a 
series of cross-Strait relationship laws, for which Chinese mainlanders are to keep 
in. The ROC Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and 
the Mainland Area (hereinafter “the ROC Cross-Strait Relations Act”) provides:123   
Article 1  
This Act is specially enacted for the purposes of ensuring the security and public 
welfare in the Taiwan Area, regulating dealings between the peoples of the Taiwan 
Area and the Mainland Area, and handling legal matters arising therefrom before 
national unification... 
Article 2  
The following terms as used in this Act are defined below. 
1. "Taiwan Area" refers to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and any other area under 
the effective control of the Government. 
                                                
123 The ROC Cross-Strait Relations Act.  
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2. "Mainland Area" refers to the territory of the Republic of China outside the Taiwan 
Area. 
3. "People of the Taiwan Area" refers to the people who have household registrations 
in the Taiwan Area. 
4. "People of the Mainland Area" refers to the people who have household 
registrations in the Mainland Area. 
The new categorisation turns to: (a) people of the Taiwan Area, and (b) people of 
the Mainland Area. Abovementioned category (1-b) and (3) overlap in category (b).  
That is to say, the “Republic of China” in Taiwan has not yet abandoned “Chinese 
nationals” left in the mainland, regardless of whether they were born in Taiwan but 
settling in the mainland or they were born in the mainland but hoping to immigrate 
to Taiwan.  
Taiwan does beg the nationality question, but “before national unification” to beg 
the question would be feasible. It is politically efficient that the ROC Cross-Strait 
Relations Act uses “household registration” to differentiate “people of the Taiwan 
Area” from “people of the Mainland Area”. Actually, in the Act for Exchanges 
between Chinese Nationals in the Mainland and in Taiwan of the PRC 1992 
(hereinafter “the PRC Cross-Strait Exchanges Act”)  “household registration” is also 
involved.124 The PRC central government provides that if mainland residents would 
like to travel to Taiwan, the household registration in the mainland is necessary for 
the authorities to grant travel permission.125 Taiwanese residents who would like to 
travel to the mainland could acquire the permission from the PRC by their 
household registration in Taiwan, but other travel documents were also acceptable. 
Even though the PRC imagines all “Taiwan compatriots” are “Chinese nationals”, at 
                                                
124 Article 2 of the PRC Cross-Strait Exchanges Act reads: “The law is enacted to regulate exchanges 
between the mainland and Taiwan of Chinese citizens, including Chinese citizens residing in the 
mainland (hereinafter referred to as “mainland residents”) and Chinese citizens residing in Taiwan 
(hereinafter referred to as “Taiwan residents”)”. 
125 The PRC Cross-Strait Exchange Act.  
 
 Kai Tu 
- 65 - 
the end it has to politically and legally differentiate “Taiwanese residents” from 
“mainland residents”. That is inevitable. 
2.3.2 Hong Kong 
After the 1997 handover of Hong Kong, the PRC Nationality Act 1980 applies in 
the special administrative region. However, for Hong Kong, the “permanent 
resident” is a more meaningful term than “Chinese national”, because in Hong Kong 
civic and political rights are granted in accordance with the former status instead of 
the latter. Article 24 of the Hong Kong Basic Law states:126 
The permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be: 
(1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region; 
(2) Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous 
period of not less than seven years before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region; 
(3) Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those residents listed in 
categories (1) and (2). 
This article also states which non-Chinese Hong Kong residents are eligible to 
become “permanent residents” of the HKSAR, but the crucial case is about ethnic 
Chinese. The first question is that there are a great number of Chinese residents in 
Hong Kong holding “British Dependent Territories Citizens passport” or “British 
Nationals (Overseas) passport”, but the PRC Nationality Act refuses “dual 
nationality”. When the PRC Nationality Act 1980 applies in Hong Kong, shall these 
people lose their Chinese nationality automatically or not? These people are 
estimated to be around 3.4 million that is around a half of Hong Kong’s total 
population. If they were not “Chinese nationals” after the handover, the HKSAR’s 
political participation would be much undermined. The PRC then realised that their 
                                                
126 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 24.  
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Chinese nationality should be maintained. On 15 May 1996 the PRC Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress issued an “explanation” saying: 
1. Where a Hong Kong resident is of Chinese descent and was born in the Chinese 
territories (including Hong Kong), or where a person satisfies the criteria laid down 
in the Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China for having Chinese 
nationality, he is a Chinese national. 
2. All Hong Kong Chinese compatriots are Chinese nationals, whether or not they are 
holders of the "British Dependent Territories Citizens passport" or "British Nationals 
(Overseas) passport". With effect from 1 July 1997, Chinese nationals mentioned 
above may, for the purpose of travelling to other countries and territories, continue to 
use the valid travel documents issued by the Government of the United Kingdom. 
However, they shall not be entitled to British consular protection in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region and other parts of the People's Republic of China on 
account of their holding the abovementioned British travel documents.127 
Since the new Hong Kong passport issued by the HKSAR has become more and 
more convenient for Hong Kong residents, “British Nationals (Overseas) passport” 
holders have decreased to less than 0.8 million. The question would disappear in 
decades.  
The second and more crucial question is about the interpretation of the third section 
of Article 24.The issue is: if the parent who has resided in Hong Kong for the period 
of seven years but has not yet been a Hong Kong permanent resident, is her/his child 
a Hong Kong permanent resident according to the category (3)? The Director of the 
Immigration of the HKSAR gave negative answers, but judges of the Court of Final 
Appeal of the HKSAR (HKSFA) adjudicated that the immigration office was 
                                                
127 The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 22(4) 
and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China, 26 June 1999, available at the Bilingual Laws Information System operated by 
the HKSAR Department of Justice. 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm. Retrieved on 19 May 2011. 
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wrong. The judgement brought the first constitutional crisis after 1997, which I will 
discuss in chapter 4. Here the point is: since the Chief Executive of the HKSAR was 
scared – he suspected that there would be over one and a half million Chinese 
mainlanders able to enter into Hong Kong according to the judgement – he 
requested the Standing Committee of the NPC, via the State Council of the PRC, to 
interpret the Basic Law. Later, the Standing Committee states: “… the provisions of 
art 24(2)(3) means that, to qualify as a permanent resident within it, both parents or 
either parent of the person concerned must be a permanent resident within arts 
24(2)(1) or 24(2)(2) at the time of birth of the person concerned.”128  
The category of “Hong Kong permanent residents” is special for Taiwanese 
authorities too. In the past Chinese residents in Hong Kong were regarded as 
Chinese nationals by the “Republic of China” in Taiwan, but since the 1997 
handover Taiwan has to review its Hong Kong policy in accordance with the current 
situation. Taiwan thus promulgated a series of laws to attend Hong Kong and Macau 
affairs. Interesting points are (a) Hong Kong residents who in the past had 
contributed to Taiwan should be admitted as Taiwan residents after the handover; 
(b) Hong Kong students could continue to study in Taiwan, though ordinary 
mainland Chinese nationals could not; (c) to enter in Taiwan Hong Kong residents 
could use their own HKSAR passports, though ordinary PRC passports could not be 
used in Taiwan, etc.129 
2.3.3 Tibetans 
Who are Tibetans? The “Tibetan” status in the PRC is legally identified. The PRC 
authorities register an infant born to “Tibetan” parents as a “Tibetan”, and this status 
guarantees the infant a number of civic and political rights, which ordinary Han 
Chinese lack in certain time and place. For instance, an ethnic minority is entitled to 
                                                
128 The Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen [2001] 2 HKLRD 533; [2001] 4 HKCFAR 211.  
129 The ROC Act Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macau 2006.  
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priority in college admission, privileges in taking public office, and irregularity of 
the birth planning. 130  This encourages many Han Chinese to change their 
nationality/ethnicity status. In the 1980s many did so, but since the 1990s alleged 
“restoration” of minority status has been prohibited.131 The authorities now request 
individuals who wish to change nationality status should have their parents’ status 
changed first. Besides, no one is allowed to register as a non-recognised 
“nationality”. Only 56 officially recognised nationalities are accepted, including 
Han Chinese, Tibetan, and Hui Muslim, Uygur, Mongol, Zhuang, etc; Hui Muslim 
and the other three mentioned minority nationalities have also established 
autonomous regions. Han Chinese minors’ nationality status may change by 
adoption or their parent’s remarriage, but adults’ status shall remain. Minority 
individuals usually could not change their status to another minority nationality.132 
Hence, if a Zhuang female is married with a Tibetan male, the female’s children 
born in her previous marriage with a Han male are able to change their Han status to 
Tibetan, but the female herself could not change. The female should be offered an 
admission by a PRC college easier than a Han student, but in the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region she is not eligible to be elected to be the President.  
The major PRC criteria to identify or register nationality status are objective 
(descent, language, parents’ legal nationality status registered by law), but there are 
still some subjective criteria applying.133 The eminent Chinese anthropologist Fei 
Xiaotong’s “Yi-Tibetan aisle” theory highlights the complexity. Alongside the 
                                                
130 In rural areas ethnic Tibetans have been untouched by the policy of birth planning, see FISCHER, 
A. M., "Population Invasion" versus Urban Exclusion in the Tibetan Areas of Western China, 34 
Population and Development Review 631, (2008).  
131 The Joint Notice of the National Commission for Ethnic Affairs and Ministry for Public Security 
on Suspension of Change of Ethnic Status 1989. 
132 The National Commission for Ethnic Affairs Regulation for Ethnic Identification 1990. 
133 BROWN, MELISSA J., Local Government Agency: Manipulating Tujia Identity, 26 Modern China. 
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border between the Tibetan Autonomous Region and China proper, where different 
nationalities live together, people speak a great number of languages, including 
various dialects of Tibetan, Chinese, Yi, Qiang (another Chinese minority), etc. This 
area also belongs to “Great Tibet”, where during the past centuries Tibetan-speaking 
people’s ancestors were coming from the west, Hans the east, Yi the south, and 
Qiang the north. In accordance with objective “scientific” criteria of the PRC’s 
“nationality identification”, in this area people ought to be identified and registered 
by languages and descent, but in fact several Yi-speaking and Qiang-speaking 
groups have been recognised as “Tibetans” based on their manners and identity.134 
Secondly, although parents register child’s nationality after birth, one could change 
it after the age of 18 years old. Then one may select either a matrilineal or 
patrilineal nationality so the decision is subjective. Another case is naturalised 
people. Naturalised people in China could register with an identical or similar 
nationality within the scope of 56 recognised nationalities.135 
The Tibetan status is also identified or registered by Dharamsala and Taiwan. The 
Charter of Tibetans in Dharamsala reads: 
Article 8.  
(1) All Tibetans born within the territory of Tibet and those born in other countries 
shall be eligible to be citizens of Tibet. Any person whose biological mother or 
biological father is of Tibetan descent has the right to become a citizen of Tibet; or 
(2) any Tibetan refugee who has had to adopt citizenship of another country under 
compelling circumstances may retain Tibetan citizenship provided he or she fulfils 
the provisions prescribed in Article 13 of this Charter; or 
(3) any person, although formally a citizen of another country, who has been legally 
married to a Tibetan national for more than three years, who desires to become a 
                                                
134 This is similar to the “dense central belt from northern Italy through the Rhineland to the Low 
Countries” that Michael Keating described. See KEATING, MICHAEL, The New Regionalism in 
Western Europe (E. Elgar. 1998), p. 10. 
135 The National Commission for Ethnic Affairs Regulation for Ethnic Identification 1990. 
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citizen of Tibet, may do so in accordance with the law passed by the Tibetan 
Assembly.136 
This provision obviously adopts jus sanguinis rather than jus soli. If in the English 
texts “born within the territory of Tibet” is misleading, in Tibetan and Chinese texts 
“all Tibetans” are all emphasised. That is to say, non-Tibetan descendants, though 
born in Tibet, are not eligible to become “Tibetans”.137 There is a door reserved for 
marriage, but the measure for “naturalisation” is not clear.  
When the “Republic of China” fled to Taiwan, it brought a governmental organ of 
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Committee together. This committee was 
established for the ROC to exercise sovereignty over Tibet and several Mongolias. 
In Taiwan this committee is also in charge of identifying and registering “Tibetan 
status”. The majority of recognised nationalities in the PRC are not recognised by 
Taiwan, so the “Tibetan status” is special there. However, the “Tibetan status” 
counts little in Taiwan. This status is helpful for some emigrated Tibetans to abstain 
the right of abode; but since the Committee itself is waiting for “appendectomy” by 
the Taiwanese authorities, it seems the “Tibetan status” will not exist for long.138  
                                                
136  The Tibetan Charter available at http://www.tibet.com/govt/charter.html. Retrieved on 1 
September 2009.  
137 The Tibetan charter in Chinese version available at  
http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/ex/liuwangfagui/index.html. Retrieved on 19 May 2011. 
138  For emigrated Tibetans’ nationality and citizenship see HESS, Immigrant Ambassadors: 
Citizenship and Belonging in the Tibetan Diaspora. FRECHETTE, ANN, Tibetans in Nepal : the 
Dynamics of International Assistance among a Community in Exile (Berghahn Books. 2002). 
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2.4 AUTHORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL EYES 
2.4.1 Taiwan 
On the legal status of Taiwan, three arguments contest each other severely in 
international legal scholarship. First, the People’s Republic of China argues that as 
the only legitimate representative of the sovereign Chinese State, the government of 
the People’s Republic of China owns the entire territory now under the control of 
the Taiwanese authorities in name of the “Republic of China”.  This argument is 
based on the documental chain starting from the Cairo Declaration. In the White 
paper of “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue”, the PRC government 
states:  
Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. All the facts and laws about Taiwan prove that 
Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. In April 1895, through a war of 
aggression against China, Japan forced the Qing government to sign the unequal 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, and forcibly occupied Taiwan. In July 1937, Japan launched 
an all-out war of aggression against China. In December 1941, the Chinese 
government issued the Proclamation of China's Declaration of War Against Japan, 
announcing to the world that all treaties, agreements and contracts concerning Sino-
Japanese relations, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had been abrogated, and 
that China would recover Taiwan. In December 1943, the Cairo Declaration was 
issued by the Chinese, U.S. and British governments, stipulating that Japan should 
return to China all the territories it had stolen from the Chinese, including Northeast 
China, Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago. The Potsdam Proclamation signed by 
China, the United States and Britain in 1945 (later adhered to by the Soviet Union) 
stipulated that "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." In August of 
that year, Japan declared surrender and promised in its instrument of surrender that 
it would faithfully fulfil the obligations laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation. On 
October 25, 1945, the Chinese government recovered Taiwan and the Penghu 
Archipelago, resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan.139 
                                                
139  White Paper: the One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue (Taiwan Affairs Office & 
Information Office of the State Council eds., 2000).  
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The PRC government reckons that since it has replaced the “Republic of China” to 
become the legitimate representative of the sovereign Chinese State in the 
international community, especially in the United Nations, the PRC’s sovereignty 
now shall cover Taiwan and Penghu despite the fact that the Taiwanese authorities 
actually do not consider the territory subordinate to the PRC government.  
Secondly, the “Republic of China” in Taiwan also founds its argument partially on 
the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, but here one piece missed in 
the PRC argument is the “Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and 
Japan”. On 28 April 1952, the Japanese government and then “Republic of China” 
in Taiwan signed a “peace treaty” to formally end the war. The Chinese State did 
not enter the “Treaty of Peace with Japan” signed in San Francisco on 8 September 
1952 because of the variance over who is the legitimate representative of China 
since 1949. The ROC government as the recognised one in Japanese eyes thus made 
another treaty with Japan that repeats the notion that Japan has renounced all rights, 
titles, and claims to Formosa and the Pescadores (i.e. Taiwan and Penghu); the 
treaty also recognises all treaties between China and Japan signed before 1941 have 
been annulled because of the war, which means the Treaty of Shimonoseki is 
included and thus abolished by the two parties too; in the treaty, the Japanese 
government also reckons that ROC nationals shall include those of Taiwanese 
connections who have resumed Chinese nationality. The “Republic of China” in 
Taiwan relies on this treaty as one of the footstones of its legitimate rule on the 
island. But the tricky points are: (i) the entire territory controlled by the Taiwanese 
authorities composites not only those islands renounced by Japan after the war but 
also some close to the mainland never occupied by Japan, which belong to the 
Chinese State without dispute, yet an independent Taiwanese state would not be 
entitled to own based on any treaties; (ii) whereas the Japanese government shifted 
the recognition of the Chinese government from the “ROC” in Taipei to the PRC in 
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Beijing, the validity of the 1952 Sino-Japanese treaty become  ambiguous since 
1979.140  
Thirdly, the argument that “the legal status of Taiwan has not been decided” is held 
by a group of political activists for Taiwanese independence. The last argument 
contests that Japan did renounce its rights, titles, and claims, but there is no point 
suggesting the Chinese State shall resume to exercise the sovereignty over Taiwan; 
Chiang Kai-shek did send an army to recover Taiwan, yet he represented the allies 
not the Chinese State at that moment; Taiwan shall be a trusteeship of the allies, or 
the United Nations as the successor of the allies, or the United States as the leader of 
the allies, and eventually the legal status of Taiwan will be determined by a 
Taiwanese referendum. Nevertheless, the last argument is every theoretic. The PRC 
government is hardly challenged in the United Nations for most countries have 
accepted the so-called “one China principle/policy” in setting up diplomatic 
relations with the PRC; while even the United States does not see the Taiwanese 
authorities as a civilian administration under US military supervision!  
So much has been said about the theories. The praxis is that in international eyes, 
the Taiwanese authorities have to be granted a sui generis status to facilitate the 
international participation of twenty million Taiwanese residents. There has been a 
divergence in governments or governmental branches in attending the legal status of 
Taiwanese authorities. The first group of around twenty states recognises the 
statehood of the “Republic of China” and thus does not have diplomatic relations 
with the PRC. Secondly, in many countries the Taiwanese authorities maintain a 
representative for the sake of addressing cultural and economic affairs of Taiwanese 
interests, while many also send a representative to Taiwan in exchange. Although 
defence and foreign affairs are reserved powers for the president in the United 
States, the US Congress has taken a rare position on Taiwan’s legal status, which 
                                                
140 CHIU, HUNGDAH, The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (University of 
Maryland.1992). 
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was embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act on the eve of derecognising the ROC. In 
the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition, the core of the US Taiwan 
Relations Act is the application of US laws with respect to Taiwan shall be not 
affected. As a result the US domestic law creates an independent jurisdiction for the 
Taiwanese authorities in US eyes. The US courts thus note: Taiwanese regulations 
shall be considered “foreign laws”; governmental acts shall fall under the “Act of 
State Doctrine”; the US Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act shall also apply to 
Taiwanese public enterprises, governmental agencies, and officials.141 The United 
Kingdom as the first Western state that shifted recognition from the ROC to the 
PRC does not issue an act as the US did; but Pasha L. Hsieh argues: “Instead, by 
basing judicial interpretations of the Taiwan’s status on the common law, British 
courts have granted Taiwan State status, thus achieving the same result as the US 
courts achieved through interpreting the [Taiwan Relations Act]”.142 In challenging 
the exclusive province of the executive branch of the government, the common law 
courts offer a pragmatic way to deal with separate jurisdictions and their regulations, 
persons, and property, among them Taiwan has been typical. This seems the only 
feasible option at this moment, otherwise two parties claiming the Chinese title and 
the international community would be trapped in endless confusions around the 
issue.  
The Taiwanese authorities have been trying to secure an international space in 
international organisations. The worst performance of the Taiwanese authorities is 
their endeavour to “re/join” the United Nations. The People’s Republic of China has 
replaced the “Republic of China” in the United Nations for more than three decades, 
since then Taiwan’s participation in the UN is always a major concern for people on 
the island. The “ROC” employs the rhetoric that the ROC itself quitted the UN 
                                                
141 HSIEH, An Unrecognized State in Foreign and International Courts: The Case of the Republic of 
China on Taiwan at 779. 
142 Id. at 782. 
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before the UN would expel “representatives of Chiang Kai-shek”.  To “rejoin” the 
most important international organisation around the world, since 1993 the “ROC” 
in Taiwan has yearly raised the issue through states maintaining diplomatic relation 
with the “ROC”. Yet the proposal of “ROC rejoining the UN” is hardly accepted in 
confrontation to the PRC pressure. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on the 
other side prefers to “join” the United Nations with the name of Taiwan rather than 
the “Republic of China”. Although not challenging the PRC’s seat in the UN, the 
DPP proposal as a potential means to realise “de jure Taiwanese independence” 
never reconciles the PRC side either. In 2008 two referenda took place along with 
the Taiwanese presidential election, but the KMT’s “ROC” proposal and the DPP’s 
“Taiwan” one both failed because of low turnout.  
The newly elected KMT president has shifted to focus on peripheral UN 
organisations rather than the UN Assembly or the Security Council. The most 
significant one is the World Health Organisation. However, being in favour of the 
new KMT authorities’ reconciliation policy, the PRC has lowered the bar for 
Taiwanese international participation. The Taiwanese authorities were granted an 
observer status in the World Health Assembly in 2009, which exemplifies the 
“meaningful international participation” endorsed by both the new KMT 
government in Taiwan and the provision of Article 7(2)-5 of the PRC Anti-
Secession Act 2005. In international organisations that do not request sovereign 
qualification, the Taiwanese authorities have performed considerably better. The 
Taiwanese authorities have joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in name 
of Chinese Taipei represented by a ministerial level official. The head of the 
Taiwanese authorities never takes part in the leadership summit because of 
international realpolitik. But since 2008, the Taiwanese authorities may send a 
former “ROC Deputy President” to the summit who himself reopened the KMT-
CCP communication in 2005, and thus in some sense a trustworthy figure in CPC 
eyes. The most successful performance of Taiwanese international participation is in 
the World Trade Organisation. In the WTO, the Taiwanese authorities are called the 
“The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” and truly 
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achieve a parallel status with the Chinese mainland as another “separate customs 
territory”.143  
2.4.2 Hong Kong and Tibet 
As a full-member or member, the HKSAR joins in a number of international 
organisations, e.g. the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In ADB, APEC, 
and WTO, the PRC is also a “member”.144 This is rare. The Soviet Union once 
allowed communist Ukraine and Belarus to join the United Nations as “sovereign” 
states, but the Soviet Union had a dual sovereignty doctrine. A traditional unitary 
state is unlikely to copy that model theoretically, but the reality speaks for itself. 
Although being excluded from “sovereign” organisations on the international stage, 
territorial units in changing “unitary” states may find a place in non-sovereign 
organisations or regional co-operations since the downgraded controversy and 
upgraded relevance and necessity, in the sense that these territories are more usually 
influential entities in concerned regions. 
Hong Kong’s international status is rather clear, but the case of Tibet is also worth 
considering. Considering Tibet’s status under positive international law, the first 
                                                
143 CHEN, A, Taiwan's International Personality: Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones, Loyola of 
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 223, (1997). WILLIAMS, PAUL R, Creating 
International Space for Taiwan: The Law and Politics of Recognition, 32 New England Law 
Review 801, (1998). MO, J, Settlement of Trade Disputes between Mainland China and the 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 145, (2003). 
CHARNOVITZ, S, Taiwan's WTO Membership and its International Implications, 1 Asian Journal of 
WTO & International Health Law and Policy 401, (2006). WINKLER, S., Can Trade Make a 
Sovereign? Taiwan-China-EU Relations in the WTO, 6 Asia Europe Journal 467, (2008). For 
Taiwan’s participation in the UN see HUANG, Taiwan's Status in A Changing World: United 
Nations Representation and Membership for Taiwan. 
144 GHAI, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order: the Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the 
Basic Law, chapter 11.  
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answer was it has been a suzerainty of imperial China or the Manchu Crown. The 
Oriental praxis had been that the Manchu Crown supported Tibet’s theocracy in 
political, military, and financial matters and the Dalai and Panchen Lamas would 
reciprocate the Crown in religious matters. Even if the term “suzerainty” could 
apply to the Tibet case, it is still an anomaly in 20th century international law.145 
Then the second answer, after the human rights covenants’ promulgation, was 
“Tibet is a Chinese colony”, which attempted to grant the territory the right to de-
colonise in accordance with the covenants. However, this argument misapprehends 
the complex relation between Tibet’s modernisation and China’s century-long 
revolution, as well as their participation to the process of globalisation.146 Barry 
Sautman concludes: “None of the main contours of classic colonialism are found in 
the Tibet case”.147 Now some, mostly emigrated Tibetans, are starting to use the 
discourse of “minority rights” and “internal secession” to find a third answer. For 
that, they have to describe the PRC state as a totalitarian regime executing a 
“cultural genocide” project to annihilate the Tibetan people.148  
Article 31(1) of The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984 provides that “in 
accordance with state provisions, autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas 
may pursue foreign economic and trade activities and may, with the approval of the 
State Council, open foreign trade ports.”149 But the article is rather vague in 
practice. On the other side, the 14th Dalai Lama develops strong international 
contacts around the world, which have been severely criticised by the PRC central 
                                                
145 ALEXANDROWICZ-ALEXANDER, C. H., The Legal Position of Tibet, 48 American Journal of 
International Law 265, (1954).  
146 WANG, HUI, The Politics of Imagining Asia   (Harvard University Press. 2011).  
147 SAUTMAN, Is Tibet China's Colony: The Claim of Demographic Catastrophe at 89. 
148 SAUTMAN, Cultural genocide and Tibet at 196-197. Sautman himself refutes the emigrated 
Tibetans’ claim that China has been executing a “cultural genocide” project in Tibet.  
149 The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984, art 31(1).  
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government. Yet no state recognises Dharamsala in international legal terms, and 
the 14th Dalai Lama’s activities are widely deemed as his personal campaign.  
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As we have seen, the peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan to a 
larger or lesser degree have evolved into political units that are questioning the 
unitary preposition of the PRC central government. In a heterarchy of authorities, 
the peripheral societies are fostering different political attachments from the PRC 
central government’s: political pluralism and liberal values are respected in Taiwan 
and Hong Kong; whereas the Tibet Autonomous Region is ideologically coherent 
with the PRC central government, the Dalai Lama and his followers in Dharamsala 
have distinctive ideals. Moreover, in institutional terms, the peripheral societies root 
in the variety of legal status of Chinese nationals whose citizenships are not 
identical in Sinitic territories. The territorial authorities are sustaining a unique bond 
with citizens of relatively exclusive membership in a territorial jurisdiction; hence 
there is no wonder why political attachments may vary in accordance with territorial 
boundaries rather than international boundaries between Sinitic territory and foreign 
land. At the last, the peripheral societies are also special in international eyes, which 
means the international community distinguishes the societies from ordinary 
administrative divisions of the PRC. Accordingly, the peripheral societies may 
climb a ladder towards the international stage faster or slower.  
In this sense, the Rawlsian term of people, which was invented to label members of 
the international community, may also be appropriately applied to define the 
peripheral societies in context. Originally, the term is conceived to imagine 
international participants who may behave in accordance with a series of principles 
of reasonableness thus sustain a peaceful international order. Since peace is also one 
of the most important ends of an order of Sinitic people-s in this context, this thesis 
hopes a new conceptualisation based on the situation may also do justice to it. For 
this, chapter 3 will discuss whether John Rawls’s theory may help to engineer a 
normative project for Sinitic people-s, and if at all, what it shall be. 
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Chapter 3 Constitutional Law of Peoples 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter attempts to build a normative framework to assess the political 
situation and constitutional arrangements. Chapter 1 has introduced the idea that in 
assessing Sinitic peoples and Chinese law, liberals’ perception is negative and 
pessimistic: the PRC government in the Chinese mainland continues violating 
human rights thus it has been very fragile as a one party-state struggling to survive. 
On the other side, the PRC government and its officials are too optimistic about the 
chosen road, which in some measure has led to stunning economic growth, troubled 
but still stable reign, and immunity from international interference. In comparison 
with them, the third-way or progressive perception is relatively objective because it 
mostly derives from empirical research rather than theoretic hypothesis or 
propaganda. But chapter 1 has explained a retrospective perspective based on 
experience usually lacks desirable ideals or justification for the desirability of the 
ideals, which, however, is indispensable to coordinate interests and foster consensus 
in an order of complexity and conflicts.150 
Hence it is crucial to lodge a number of ideals that may transcend the debate 
between the right and the left, and possibly be appreciated by either side. For this, 
this chapter is built to outline a series of normative principles that can be pursued 
and materialised in future constitutional reform. Nevertheless, political scientists 
and moral philosophers on both the right and the left sides have contributed greatly 
in designing a project that can bring justice to hostile societies. But this chapter has 
chosen to use John Rawls’s theory in unfolding its arguments. This is not only 
because of Rawls’s prominence but also because his theory may reconcile with the 
Sinitic political situation better than any theoretical rivalries. John Rawls’s theory of 
                                                
150 See chapter 1. 
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“law of peoples” (LoP) aims to provide “a particular political conception of right 
and justice that applies to principles and norms of international law and practice”.151 
In the international community, there are liberal and non-liberal peoples. They may 
or may not obey international law, and endanger the international order with war. 
Chapter 2 has discussed that the Sinitic order of peoples resembles the international 
order in many respects. Being liberal or not, the Sinitic peoples are self-governing 
political units that may probably fall into violent conflicts too.  
However, chapter 2 also explained that Sinitic peoples are not states in the final 
analysis. They are not on an equal footing in a heterarchy of authorities. The 
individual bearing Chinese nationality is entitled to various rights, protection, and 
treatments in different Sinitic jurisdictions. In international eyes, the Sinitic peoples 
are not widely recognised but to a larger or lesser extent have taken a sui generis 
place on the international stage. For two reasons, John Rawls’s theory of LoP 
cannot be pasted seamlessly to the order of Sinitic peoples. First, John Rawls’s 
peoples in the international community, although varying in ideologies, are equal 
and symmetrical in legal terms. On the contrary, Sinitic peoples are not. Rawls’s 
critics in fact have repeatedly raised the question that Rawls’s LoP is maladaptive to 
plurinational states and multilevel polities.152 This chapter has to agree with them in 
this regard. Secondly, John Rawls’s LoP is not custom-made for anyone. Rawls in 
the LoP tries to persuade “statesmen” in liberal democracies to act in accordance 
with a political conception of right and justice in deciding whether to engage a war 
with non-liberal regimes. In the Chinese context, however, it is unlikely Hong Kong 
or Taiwan is willingly to confront the PRC force by any means other than the 
peaceful means. If at all, this chapter is rather to persuade the non-liberal regime not 
to use military means in the future, at the same time it would appreciate if non-
                                                
151 RAWLS, The Law of Peoples: with, The idea of public reason revisited, p. 3. 
152 KUPER, A, Rawlsian Global Justice: beyond the Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law of 
Persons, Political theory 640 at 656, (2000). BEITZ, Rawls's Law of Peoples, p. 680. 
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violent social and political causes in the peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan could stay on that track.  
There are four issues and four principles to be addressed. Section one will introduce 
John Rawls’s categorisation of peoples in the international community, which 
distributes “liberal”, “decent”, “outlaw”, “burden” labels to peoples and in this way 
determines their treatments from liberal democracies. This leads to the second issue 
of toleration. In Rawls’s opinion, decent peoples should be tolerated despite the fact 
that they do not yet satisfy a high standard of human rights protection. The third 
issue is just war. Outlaw regimes deserve international interference, but liberal and 
decent peoples should keep an eye on the righteousness of their conducts in military 
actions. The issue of assistance is prepared for burden societies. Liberal and decent 
peoples have the political obligation to aid burden societies and lift them out of the 
situation in which they have no choice but to wage wars.  
In the second section of this chapter I will draw four principles from the LoP, which 
then in the normative dimension can frame a conception applying to Sinitic peoples. 
The principle of recognition contends a plurality of “peoples” can and should be 
recognised in a constitutional order so long as they are significant as their 
equivalents in the LoP. In this order, peoples may be both liberal and non-liberal 
and the political attachment of a people shall not solely determine the necessity of 
external interference. The principle of representation for liberal peoples in most 
cases means democratic representative government, and for non-liberal peoples 
representation is also needed in order to make populous voices heard. Instead of war, 
even just ones, the principle of reconciliation encourages non-violence. A legal 
nationality in common means individuals from different peoples are not enemies 
eventually, and there are other ways to resolve the disagreements among peoples. 
The principle of reciprocity, finally, is reserved for burdened societies. A just order 
is always in need of social and economic equilibrium. 
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3.2 LAW OF PEOPLES 
John Rawls is one of the most prominent political philosophers who led an 
unexpected resurgence of political philosophy in our times. The theory of LoP is 
Rawls’s political philosophical reflection to the international order and international 
law, which is the final part of his deep and broad thinking on politics informing 
right and justice. His thinking has two phrases: the first is conceived in A Theory of 
Justice, and the second results Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples. A 
Theory of Justice is an egalitarian account in liberal theories, which has earned John 
Rawls a worldwide reputation. However, John Rawls then realised there was a need 
to distinguish moral doctrines and political philosophies. In an era of “reasonable 
pluralism” when individuals no longer adhere to any sort of comprehensive moral 
doctrine in attending to political issues, Rawls’s early endeavour to build liberal 
politics upon the acceptance by individuals of his moral principles has been called 
to question. John Rawls wrote Political Liberalism to strengthen his theory, in 
which he contends there is no need of a shared moral doctrine to sustain liberal 
politics that can now be retrieved based on liberal procedure and rule of law. John 
Rawls also extended his theory from a domestic order to the international 
community where a fortiori reasonable pluralism has made any sort of “universal 
moral doctrine” being out of the question. The theory of LoP sees peoples in the 
international order as comparable to individuals in a domestic one, who may merely 
agree to a minimised international rule of law. In this order, peoples may exchange 
their commitments to international stability and human rights protection for moral 
autonomy and immunity from interference. Since the LoP is an international version 
of Rawls’s early theory, this section has to sketch in A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism first. 
3.2.1 John Rawls 
3.2.1.1 A Theory of Justice 
John Rawls dedicated his early life to a moral theory, which is “the best 
approximation to our considered convictions of justice and constituted the most 
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appropriate basis for the institutions of a democratic society” organised by and for 
individuals of liberty and equality – “as an alternative systematic account of justice 
that is superior to utilitarianism” that has dominated the English-speaking academia 
for centuries.153 John Rawls understands the principle of utility as “society is rightly 
ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve 
the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to 
it.”154 To be fair to utilitarianism, it should be recognized that utilitarian theorists 
also support liberal democracy because only a democratic process can justify the 
calculation of social happiness; otherwise no one is entitled to claim her decision 
will lead to the greatest profit of the society as a whole. But utilitarianism conceives 
a danger that in accordance with the principle of utility individual liberties and 
minority interest are subordinate to those of a majority, and totalitarian regimes can 
justify their violation to human rights for the sake of “maximised social interest”.  
John Rawls is aware that “a problem of rational decision has a definite answer only 
if we know the beliefs and interests of the parties, their relations with respect to one 
another, the alternative between which they are to choose, the procedure whereby 
they make up their minds, and so on.”155 But this omniscient genius is unlikely to 
exist. We cannot count upon ordinary people either. If individuals know some of 
their natural and social advantages and disadvantages, they may be opportunists. 
John Rawls’s innovation is he reverses the know-all approach and suggests if 
individuals do not know their advantages and disadvantages at all, a decision 
“equally good for all persons” results. If individuals decide behind a “veil of 
ignorance” in “the original position”, in which moment they, as genuinely equal and 
liberal human beings, cannot know whether they are the bottommost groups in a 
society, the best choice for them is to create a truly just institution for all fellow 
                                                
153 RAWLS, JOHN, Political Liberalism   (Columbia University Press. 1996), p. xv. 
154 RAWLS, JOHN, A Theory of Justice,  (Oxford University Press. 1972). p. 22. 
155 Id. at 18. 
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persons in order to exclude themselves from a potentially worse off situation. John 
Rawls thus rebuilt the social contract hypothesis and replaced the historical fiction 
with a brain experiment, which has given his moral theory a theoretical grounding. 
John Rawls outlines a couple of principles of justice, or “justice as fairness”. Rex 
Martin and David Reidy paraphrase the principles:  
(i) The principle of equal basic rights and liberties; and (ii) a principle of economic 
justice, which stresses (a) equality of opportunity and (b) mutual benefit and 
egalitarianism. This latter principle – of mutual benefit constrained by egalitarianism 
– Rawls calls the difference principle, it indicates when differences (inequalities) are 
acceptable. The difference principle, assuming continuing conscientious efforts at 
achieving equality of opportunity as backdrop, is designed to reach an optimum goal 
point at which no further mutually improving moves are possible; at this point the 
difference in income and wealth between the topmost and bottommost groups would 
be minimized, and those least well off would here have their greatest benefit (without 
making any group worse off in the process).156  
However, “the original position” never comes true in the real world. When people 
walk out of the “veil of ignorance”, can “justice as fairness” really prevent 
opportunist behaviour? John Rawls accepts there is an “uncertainty” flaw in “justice 
as fairness”: even though a liberal democracy is established in accordance with his 
principles of justice, none can predict the society will forever stay on the right track. 
In A Theory of Justice John Rawls relies on all citizens in a “well-ordered society” 
endorsing “justice as fairness” as a comprehensive moral doctrine to sustain liberal 
politics. But soon John Rawls began to acknowledge that in out times “the fact of 
reasonable pluralism” is “characterised not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but a pluralism of incompatible yet 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by 
citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, 
                                                
156 MARTIN, REX & REIDY, DAVID A., Rawls's Law of peoples: a Realistic Utopia? (Blackwell. 
2006), p. 4. 
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or some other reasonable doctrines, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, 
citizens.”157 Hence “the account of the stability of a well-ordered society in part III 
[of A Theory of Justice] is therefore also unrealistic and must be recast.”158  
3.2.1.2 Political Liberalism 
John Rawls’s Political Liberalism was published in the early 1990s when the 
ideological Cold War had ended and liberal democracy had stepped into a new age 
in which “the fact of reasonable pluralism” was strengthened more than ever before. 
Against this background, John Rawls reveals the necessity of distinguishing moral 
and political philosophy, which means “a contrast between comprehensive 
philosophical and moral doctrines and conceptions limited to the domain of the 
political.”159 This contrast is fundamental in Political Liberalism, which is dedicated 
merely to offer a “political” concept of justice rather than a comprehensive doctrine 
as A Theory of Justice. According to John Rawls, the political concept is “shared by 
everyone while the reasonable [moral/comprehensive] doctrines are not, we must 
distinguish between a public basis of justification generally acceptable to citizens on 
fundamental political questions and the many non-public bases of justification 
belonging to the many comprehensive doctrines and acceptable only to those who 
affirm them.”160 By the conventional Kantian separation between the public and the 
private, or the political and the non-political, John Rawls’s retreat from a well-
ordered society in commitment to “justice as fairness” helps “justice as fairness” 
become the basis of all liberal democracies in modern times.161  
                                                
157 RAWLS, Political Liberalism, p. xvi.  
158 Id. at xvii.  
159 Id. at xv.  
160 Id. at xix.  
161 Rawls says: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and 
equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and 
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What about the opportunist? John Rawls now prefers to leave the opportunist alone 
in moral enquiry. For that, there is need of another idea of “the overlapping 
consensus” to ensure the unity and stability of a liberal politics not being corrupted 
by opportunist behaviour. Because no comprehensive doctrine can now play a 
strong currency, there is a danger that a polity would be unsteady and extremely 
divided. John Rawls attempts to unite citizens in a liberal democracy with an 
overlapping consensus: “In such a consensus, the reasonable doctrines endorse the 
political conception, each from its own point of view. Social unity is based on a 
consensus on the political conception; and stability is possible when the doctrines 
making up the consensus are affirmed by society’s politically active citizens and the 
requirements of justice are not too much in conflict with citizens’ essential interests 
as formed and encouraged by that social arrangement.”162 In addition to this, Rawls 
also distinguishes an overlapping consensus from a modus vivendi that is a 
temporary equilibrium of competing interests. When the equilibrium does not 
continue, all parties are preparing to extend their interests by violating the modus 
vivendi and sacrificing others. But an overlapping consensus is beyond interests 
bargaining, based on which consensus liberal democracies will be better able to 
maintain political stability and societal unity.163  
3.2.2 Law of Peoples 
Rex Martin and David A. Reidy in their reading of The Law of Peoples even date 
the origin of the LoP in 1969 when John Rawls taught a group of Harvard students 
                                                                                                                                    
moral doctrines? Put another way: How is it possible that deeply opposed though reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm the political conception of a 
constitutional regime? What is the structure and content of a political conception that can gain the 
support of such an overlapping consensus? These are among the questions that political liberalism 
tries to answer.” Id. at xviii.  
162 RAWLS, Political liberalism, p. 134.  
163 Id. at 144-50.  
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about “problems of war,” and they also found a section in A Theory of Justice that 
addresses principles of “law of nations.”164 Given just war theory and “law of 
nations” are main themes of the LoP, to find out a connection between the 
conception and Rawls’s early works is helpful for us to consider Rawls’s theoretical 
contributions together.165 The Law of Peoples was first published as an essay in On 
Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures in 1993,166 and then as a monograph 
in 1999 together with the “Idea of Public Reason Revised”. The basic theoretical 
framework of The Law of Peoples is not much different from Political Liberalism, 
and it is almost an international version of the latter. In The Law of Peoples, John 
Rawls reckons it is necessary to use a second “veil of ignorance” to reach the 
“original position” of international relationship. In this position, because each and 
every participant does not know its advantages and disadvantages just like those in 
the domestic original position, it will rationally and reasonably choose to be adhere 
to an international rule of law, or the LoP, which is in accordance with “justice as 
fairness”. John Rawls contends the LoP is needed because contemporary positivist 
international law might be misled by some utilitarian principle that does not care 
enough about human rights; on the other hand, in the international arena, “the fact of 
reasonable pluralism” would be much more complex than that in a domestic 
order,167 and hence it is also not realistic to re-organise international relations 
merely based on any comprehensive doctrine. We thus need a political conception 
based on an international overlapping consensus. The consensus underpins 
ideological dominance of liberal theories in international politics, and at the same 
                                                
164 MARTIN & REIDY, Rawls's Law of peoples : a Realistic Utopia? 
165 The LoP is considered by a list of theorists to be inconsistent with Rawls’s early works. See 
MARTIN, REX & A. REIDY, DAVID, Rawls's law of peoples: a Realistic Utopia? (2006), p. 7. 
166 SHUTE, STEPHEN & L. HURLEY, SUSAN, On Human Rights,  (BasicBooks. 1993). 
167 BEITZ, Rawls's Law of Peoples, p. 671. MACEDO, S, The Law of Peoples: What Self-Governing 
Peoples Owe to One Another: Universalism, Diversity, and the Law of Peoples, 72 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1721, (2004).  
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time does not oppose that each and every international participant may retain its 
own belief and interests in domestic affairs corresponding whichever 
comprehensive moral doctrine. 
In The Law of Peoples John Rawls outlines eight principles by which positive 
international law must be informed: 168  
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be 
respected by other peoples.  
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.  
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.  
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.  
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other 
than self-defence.  
6. Peoples are to honour human rights.  
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.  
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions 
that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime. 
The first, second, third, fourth, and sixth principles are pre-conditions of toleration 
among peoples. The fifth and seventh principles are about just war. The eighth 
principle is about mutual assistance among peoples. However, the first question 
about the LoP will be what is a “people” in the Rawlsian context? This section will 
discuses in the following pages the issues of “people”, “toleration”, “just war”, and 
“assistance” in the LoP, and explain how they are relevant to the Sinitic peoples. 
3.2.2.1 Peoples 
What is a “people”? This should be the starting question for the LoP. The concept of 
“people” defines and describes a compact of social phenomena, i.e. a cooperative 
                                                
168 RAWLS, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited!, p. 37. 
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body of individuals sharing something significant that is recognised not merely by 
themselves but also observers and outsiders. What is that? How significant is it? 
John Rawls reckons three features are arguably significant: institution, culture, and 
morality. Andrew Kuper’s understanding is: (a) in institutional respect “each people 
has an [interest of] protecting their territory; preserving their political institutions, 
culture, independence, and self-respect as a corporate body; and guaranteeing the 
safety, security, and well-being of their citizens;” (b) in cultural aspect the corporate 
body of individuals are united by a “common language and shared historical 
memories”; (c) in moral aspect “each people has “a moral nature” in that each is 
firmly attached to a moral conception of right and justice that is at least not 
unreasonable”.169 This can be the first step to understand “peoples”.  
As Andrew Kuper endorses, a Rawlsian “people” signifies itself with territorial and 
political institutions, and the most significant institution embodying a “people” is a 
government. John Rawls repeatedly says that peoples need to be “acting through 
their governments”; otherwise they can hardly be identified.170  
Although John Rawls hopes governments should be established upon the basis of 
“constitutional democracy” that prevents them only serving for the interests of 
bureaucratic agencies or cooperative sectors, the institutional feature of a “people” 
still brings the LoP a label of “thin statism”. John Rawls’s theoretical reconstruction 
is a “thinner” statism because he emphasises that a people is a subject of 
reasonableness, yet a state is one of rationality:  
“If rationality excludes the reasonable (that is, if a state is moved by the aims it has 
and ignores the criterion of reciprocity in dealing with other societies); if a state’s 
concern with power is predominant; and if its interests include such things as 
                                                
169 KUPER, Rawlsian global justice: beyond The Law of Peoples to a cosmopolitan law of persons at 
642. RAWLS, JOHN, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, pp. 23-5. See 
also BEITZ, Rawls's Law of Peoples, pp. 678-9. 
170 RAWLS, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited!, p. 23. 
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converting other societies to the state’s religion, enlarging its empire and winning 
territory, gaining dynastic or imperial or national prestige and glory, and increasing 
its relative economic strength – then the difference between states and peoples is 
enormous.”171  
A thick statism embraces the traditional sovereignty that allows a state to do 
whatever it wants in accordance with a Westphalia-style positive international law. 
In comparison with that, the LoP is “thinner” since it constrains the power of state 
with due respect to the interests of other peoples. A la Andrew Kuper, the LoP 
pierces or removes the “shell” of a state if the state would have disastrously violated 
human rights, and in that tragic moment we will appeal to the reasonableness of a 
“people” to hold its unreasonable government in contempt. But on the other hand 
the LoP remains a theory of “statism”. Most of the times a “people” is safely and 
stably preserved within the state shell, even though the host state is not a hundred-
percent constitutional democracy. 
The cultural feature of a “people” associates with John Stuart Mill’s conception of 
“nationality”: a cooperative body of individuals constitutes a “nationality” if they 
have a “common sympathy” that makes “them cooperate with each other more 
willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire 
that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, 
exclusively”.172 Such a “common sympathy” in most societies relies on “a common 
language, history, and political culture, with a shared historical consciousness”,173 
which implies individuals in the cooperative body may have ethnic similarities. 
However, (a) shared historical memories contain not merely good but also bad 
implications for those being conquered and discriminated, some individuals did not 
                                                
171 Id. at 28. 
172 RAWLS, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited!, p. 23. BEITZ, Rawls's 
Law of Peoples, p. 679.  
173 RAWLS, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited!, p. 24. 
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join in the cooperative body willingly so will not stay inside if they can; (b) 
although most immigrants join in an existing cooperative body willingly, they may 
not share any historical memories at all. Ernest Renan once said to make up a 
solitarily cooperative body of individuals we need: “Two things, which are really 
only one … One of these things lies in the past, the other in the present. The one is 
the possession in common of a rich heritage of memories; and the other is actual 
agreement, the desire to live together, and the will to continue to make the most of 
the joint inheritance”.174 The cultural feature of a “people” may be a combination of 
both, “which are really only one”. By “an everyday plebiscite” individuals in those 
cooperative bodies decide how the two mix together, and whither they are going. 
The third crucial feature requires a Rawlsian “people” to make independent moral 
decisions. They need to decide whether things are right or wrong in relation with 
other peoples. In modern constitutional democracy, the morality of a people is 
usually reflected by decisions made by representatives taking institutional offices or 
positions, who are political party members. We thus can acknowledge the moral 
nature, more or less, of a “people” by its political agent for convenience. However, 
“if the representatives of a company or corporation act ultra vires or without 
authority, then they do not act or speak for the company and the company cannot be 
held responsible for what they do”, so Philip Pettit says: “Rawls holds in parallel 
fashion that if the government acts ultra vires, then the people are no longer present, 
no longer represented, in what is said or done. A usurper has taken its place.”175 So 
representatives of a “people” are not that people per se.  
Chapter 2 has introduced the peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan 
to a larger or lesser extent have become Sinitic people-s in Rawlsian terms. Taiwan 
                                                
174 RENAN, ERNEST, What is a Nation, in Nationality and Nationalism, (Athena S. Leoussi & Steven 
Elliott eds., 2004), p. 37. 
175 PETTIT, PHILIP, Rawls's Peoples, in Rawls's law of peoples: a realistic utopia, (Rex Martin & 
David A. Reidy eds., 2006), p. 43. 
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and Hong Kong are both entitled to genuinely autonomous government. Tibet 
deserves one too. The Dalai Lama and his followers did establish a civil 
administration in Dharamsala functioning in cultural, educational, and 
communitarian affairs. Taiwan and Hong Kong both have mature electorates, but 
varying in degree of participation and extent of power. The Tibet Autonomous 
Region has a people’s congress that represents millions of Tibetans, although it is 
not a liberal democratic organ. In Dharamsala, emigrated Tibetans now elect their 
administrative officers and rule-making representatives regularly, but the Dalai 
Lama’s status, which is the head of the administration, has never been challenged. 
This chapter will soon set out these points in detail.  
However, there are some characteristics that Sinitic peoples do not exactly fall into 
Rawls’s imagination. First, although these political units imitate the state in many 
respects, they are not fully recognised under international law and hence are not 
equal and qualified participants in the international community. Secondly, although 
peripheral societies’ respective memories may lend themselves to build a “common 
sympathy” in each and every society, the societies are still living in the same 
community of fate. If one goes to conflict with another, the rest will be obsessed at 
least. The brighter side is that individuals in all the societies have been pooling a 
positive feeling towards others under the same umbrella. In recent years several 
catastrophic landslides in the border between Tibetan areas and China proper killed 
tens of thousands. The societies were all mobilised to rescue and aid the 
“compatriots” and indeed contributed far more than foreign sources. Thirdly, it is 
not redundant to repeat that the political agencies of a people do not equate to the 
people. Although the peripheral societies all have multiple political forces in 
competing to represent the society, we should not think that the political agencies 
have monopolised politics, let alone morality.  
3.2.2.2 Toleration 
The most crucial idea of the LoP is “toleration”, which means liberal peoples should 
tolerate non-liberal but reasonable peoples in the international order as liberals 
tolerate comprehensive moral doctrines in a domestic order. John Rawls named 
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these non-liberal but reasonable peoples as “decent peoples”, which could be a 
starting point for our discussion. A decent people, says Rawls, is also a “well-
ordered people” as are liberal ones. But decent peoples do not possess liberal 
democratic constitutionalism that regards each and every citizen as liberal and equal 
individuals. They have a system of consultation that divides members into several 
groups with representatives sitting in the government, which could also form 
reasonable decisions in spite of being based on a comprehensive doctrine. A la 
Charles R. Beitz:  
A decent people satisfies two conditions. First, the society does not have aggressive 
aims in foreign policy and respects the independence of other societies. Second, the 
society has a ‘common good conception of justice,’ in which each person’s interests 
are taken into account (though not necessarily on an equal basis) in public decisions 
and basic human rights (including subsistence rights) are secured for all; all persons 
are treated as subjects of legal rights and duties; and judges and other officials accept 
and apply the common good conception of justice in carrying out their public 
responsibilities. 176  
In other words, in a decent people members “must subscribe as a matter of common 
awareness to certain ideas about how their affairs should be ordered. They must 
treat the ideas as common reasons that constitute the only currency in which it is 
ultimately legitimate to justify the way things are done in the collective organizing 
of their affairs.”177 Andrew Kuper tells why decent peoples are entitled to toleration 
by liberal ones:  
Rawls reminds us that decent peoples are not unreasonable and so do not engage in 
aggressive wars or pursue expansionist ends or fail to respect the civic order and 
integrity of other peoples; thus, the delegates of decent peoples would accept the 
symmetrical (equal) situation of the original position as fair. He also reminds us of 
                                                
176 BEITZ, Rawls's Law of Peoples, p. 674 
177 PETTIT, Rawls's Peoples, in Rawls's law of peoples: a realistic utopia, (Rex Martin & David A. 
Reidy eds., 2006), p. 44.  
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the common good conception of justice, which takes account of persons’ important 
interests, ensuring that decent peoples would accept principles honouring human 
rights. Finally, a decent people’s fundamental interests – in security, independence, 
the benefits of trade, and so on – would lead it to accept and adopt the law of peace 
(non-intervention, war only in self-defence, restrictions on conduct in war) and duties 
of contract (observing treaties and undertakings, mutual assistance in times of 
need).178 
This idea surprisingly makes even the leading liberal philosopher a heretic among 
liberals, and there are many criticisms to John Rawls’s toleration to decent peoples. 
First, many reckon an anti-cosmopolitan theory of international order betrays the 
individualist orthodoxy of liberalism and they assert “principles for individuals as 
individuals are necessary.”179 Why does John Rawls not endorse “principles for 
individuals as individuals” in the LoP? Why is he not a cosmopolitan as many 
predicted?180 The answer is in “the fact of reasonable pluralism”, which is more 
complex in international order. If in a domestic order not everyone is convinced by 
atomic individualism, how can we expect all peoples to do so in the international 
order with a “problem of greater diversity”?181 Besides, universalism once and again 
                                                
178 KUPER, Rawlsian Global Justice: beyond the Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law of Persons 
at 643. 
179 BUCHANAN, A, Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World, 110 Ethics,  
(2000). p. 698. 
180 See BEITZ, CHARLES, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton University Press. 
1999). POGGE, T.W.M., World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms (Polity. 2008).  
181 The “problem” of greater diversity” is coined by Stephen Macedo, see MACEDO, The Law of 
Peoples: What Self-Governing Peoples Owe to One Another: Universalism, Diversity, and the Law 
of Peoples. 
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coincides with imperialism in human history, and supplies justification for legally 
controversial wars that contrasts with our morality.182  
However, the second criticism to John Rawls stands well. Allen Buchanan argues: 
“Rawls gives short shrift to dissenting individuals and minorities. There is, in fact, 
an additional reason why a moral theory of international law that only reflects the 
perspective of ‘peoples’ must be inadequate.”183 Dissenters and minorities are 
indeed flaws in the LoP. In liberal democracies there are dissenters and minorities 
who cannot collaborate with the system too, but liberal democratic constitutionalism 
still well “represents” their voices notionally, although they are not loud enough to 
be heard. But non-liberal decent peoples do not allow dissenters and ideological 
minorities to be heard. “Justice as fairness” endorses toleration in the moral arena, 
but dissenters and minorities are suffering in the political arena.184  
The third criticism is what John Tasioulas called “human rights minimalism.”185 
John Rawls says decent peoples should protect at least “the right to life (to the 
means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, 
and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure 
freedom of religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to formal 
equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be 
treated similarly).”186 John Tasioulas argues: “The first way of bringing out the 
                                                
182 The argument on cultural imperialism see AUDARD, CATHERINE, Cultural Imperialism and 
'Democratic Peace', in Rawls's law of peoples: a realistic utopia, (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy 
eds., 2006). Also see MACEDO, The Law of Peoples: What Self-Governing Peoples Owe to One 
Another: Universalism, Diversity, and the Law of Peoples. 
183 BUCHANAN, Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World, p. 698. 
184 TAN, K. C., Liberal Toleration in Rawls's Law of Peoples, 108 Ethics 276, (1998). 
185 TASIOULAS, J, From Utopia to Kazanistan: John Rawls and the Law of Peoples, Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, (2002).  
186 RAWLS, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited!, p. 79. 
 
 Kai Tu 
- 96 - 
unacceptable minimalism of Rawls’s human rights doctrine is by comparison with 
the far more generous schedule of rights extractable from the leading human rights 
covenants. Among the rights included in them, but excluded from Rawls’ list, are to 
be numbered: the freedom of opinion, expression and the press, the freedom of 
assembly and association, and the rights to political participation, education, and 
health care and social services.”187 This argument leads to another that is non-
democratic counties have no raison d'état to enhance the standard of human rights 
protection.188 I assume John Rawls’s response would be it will be better off that 
decent peoples may protect human rights the same as liberal peoples, but what the 
LoP concerns is the international rather than the domestic order. The perpetual 
peace among peoples in the international order is the top moral priority, and the 
well-being of persons is relatively secondary. On the other hand, John Rawls did not 
say liberal peoples have to be quiet while facing human rights violations. Liberal 
peoples still can use persuasion and pressure to urge non-liberal peoples to change, 
but there are many reasons for not going to economic sanction or military 
invasion.189 In a continuum of peoples from the most decent one to the worst 
tyranny, is there a concrete coordinate separating the to-be-invaded from the not-to-
be-invaded?190 A potential military failure would be a tremendous disaster, and even 
a victory is neither morally perfect. So “human rights minimalism” sometimes in 
fact is “maximised discretion”.  
Upon this analysis, this chapter argues it is the time for the PRC central government 
to wholeheartedly tolerate Sinitic peoples, and vice versa. The cross-Strait tension 
between the PRC government and Taiwan so far has been reduced to a minimised 
level since the Nationalist Party of China or the Kuomintang (KMT) took the 
                                                
187 TASIOULAS, From Utopia to Kazanistan: John Rawls and the Law of Peoples, p. 382. 
188 KUPER, Rawlsian Global Justice: beyond the Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law of Persons. 
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territorial presidency in 2008. Although both sides did not end the Chinese civil war 
with a written agreement of peace, they have stayed in truce for almost half a 
century. The PRC central government will not resume the war unless Taiwan 
declares de jure independence. Although no one is sure about what a de jure 
independence of Taiwan actually means, the PRC central government did tolerate 
Taiwan’s diplomatic contacts, presidential elections, and failed referenda aiming at 
UN membership. For Tibet, emigrated Tibetans have for long discontinued their 
military attack in Himalayas. The Dalai Lama has been adhering to a non-violent 
campaign and was awarded a Nobel Prize for that. So long as Sinitic peoples have 
all went on a train running on peaceful tracks, they are entitled to be tolerated.  
Sinitic peoples should in some measure tolerate the PRC government representing 
the Chinese mainland too. Liberals within and outside these societies cannot easily 
accept that. We can go though the criticisms again. Yes, this argument certainly 
does not ask atomic individuals to decide so it is not “for individuals as individuals”. 
But the complex relationship between the authorities in a heterarchy and individuals 
in their jurisdictions has apparently caused “reasonable pluralism” in the Sinitic 
order of peoples. In this situation, it is not realistic and necessary to construct a 
theory “for individuals as individuals”. However, I stand with the second criticism 
to the LoP, which does lack an account for internal dissenters and minorities. The 
existence of dissent and minorities defies the assumption that members of a people 
are adhering to a comprehensive moral doctrine. The LoP could only advise the 
dissenters and minorities to seek a position in decent peoples’ consultation system, 
and the second “veil of ignorance” blocks off external interference for supporting 
them. The paradox is in the Chinese context Sinitic peoples are not only political 
units but also political dissenters and minorities. They are not only dissenters and 
minorities for the PRC central government, but also for each other in certain 
circumstances. Thirdly, I have explained that to maintain peace is the justification of 
a sort of “human rights minimalism” in the LoP. This is also right in the Chinese 
context. In addition to this, the peripheral societies are unlikely capable to interfere 
the Chinese mainland in humanitarian crisis anyway.  
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3.2.2.3 Just war 
The third sort of peoples is “outlaw regimes” that deserves to be interfered with by 
well-ordered peoples. Outlaw regimes are aggressive, and “any society that follows 
and honours a reasonably just Law of Peoples [have] the right to war in self-
defence.” Though not explicitly, it seems John Rawls supports that in response to 
serious human rights violation, collective defence is also acceptable for the LoP.191 
There is no doubt that liberal and decent peoples have the right to defend 
themselves, since they are well-ordered in accordance with liberal democracy or 
comprehensive moral doctrines that protect basic human rights. “Well-ordered 
peoples, both liberal and decent, do not initiate war against one another; they go to 
war only when they sincerely and reasonably believe that their safety and security 
are seriously endangered by the expansionist policies of outlaw state.” 192 Even a 
“benevolent absolutism” has a right to defend itself, because it honours human 
rights and it is nonaggressive, even though a benevolent absolutism does not allow 
members meaningfully to participate in the policy making process.193 But for outlaw 
regimes, “well-ordered peoples may pressure the outlaw ones to change their ways 
… [the pressure] may need to be backed up by the firm denial of economic and 
other assistance, or the refusal to admit outlaw regimes as members in good 
standing in mutually beneficial cooperative practices.”194  
                                                
191 See a comparison between Rawls and Michael Walzer in MARTIN & REIDY, Rawls's Law of 
peoples : a realistic utopia?, p. 12.  
192 RAWLS, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited!, pp. 90-91.  
193 Id. at 92.  
194 Id. at 93.  
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But there are restrictions for liberal and decent peoples to interfere outlaw regimes. 
In “conduct of war” part, John Rawls sets up a list of limits for military interference: 
195 
(i) The aim of a just war waged by a just well-ordered people is a just and lasting 
peace among peoples, and especially with the people’s present enemy. 
(ii) Well-ordered peoples do not wage war against each other, but only against non-
well-ordered states whose expansionist aims threaten the security and free 
institutions of well-ordered regimes and bring about the war. 
(iii) In the conduct of war, well-ordered peoples must carefully distinguish three 
groups: the outlaw state’s leaders and officials, its soldiers, and its civilian population. 
The reason why a well-ordered people must distinguish between an outlaw state’s 
leaders and officials and its civilian population is as follows: since the outlaw state is 
not well-ordered, the civilian members of the society cannot be those who organized 
and brought on the war.  
John Rawls admits he does not depart significantly from Michael Walzer’s just war 
theory. In Just and Unjust War, however, Michael Walzer reminds us that we have 
to be cautious in an intervention to make distinctions between secessionists who 
attack governmental targets and terrorists who attack civilians in secessionist 
movements; legitimate and illegitimate authorities in a civil war; and a self-
determining majority and suffering minorities in a humanitarian intervention.196 
Even these distinctions are sincerely and truly made, in each and every case the 
conduct of “war” is still a controversial topic. Are these persons different in context: 
cabinet officials and ordinary police officers, then what about managers in public 
companies? What is the difference between soldiers in battlefield and those are not? 
Civilians from the majority who hurt minorities directly are condemned, but what 
                                                
195 Id. at 94.  
196 WALZER, MICHAEL, Just and Unjust Wars : a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations   
(Basic Books 4th ed. 2006), section 6. 
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about those who did so indirectly? At the end it is our moral sense that would lead 
us to decisions in each and every case. 
The issue of “just war” is concerned because Sinitic peoples have not terminated the 
danger of violent conflicts. Chapter 2 introduced that in the Chinese context, there is 
a civil war to be ended across the Taiwan Strait. In 1996 when the Taiwanese 
residents for the first time elected the “President” exclusively and directly in the 
Taiwanese isles, the PRC central government was threatened by the fact, which 
might result in a declaration of Taiwanese independence. The PRC used missile 
tests to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate, and this was the first serious crisis ever 
since the cross-Strait truce. In 2000 a pro-independence politician was elected to be 
the “President” of the “ROC” in Taiwan, and during his two terms of presidency 
(2000-2004, 2004-2008) the cross-Strait tension had never been lessened. For Tibet, 
there were severe ethnic unrests in Lhasa in 1989 and 2008. On 14 March 2008 
Tibetan protestors hurt hundreds of civilians. Dozens of people lost their lives on 
that day. Liberals may of course blame the PRC government for having caused the 
tensions and tragedies, but it does not mean we can escape from the moral dilemma. 
There is also “war”, but where is justice? The best way to resolve the dilemma, 
however, is not to use violent means to purse any political goals at all.  
3.2.2.4 Assistance  
The fourth sort of peoples is “burdened peoples” that deserves to be economically 
assisted by well-ordered peoples. “Burdened societies, while they are not expansive 
or aggressive, lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-
how, and, often, the material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered. 
The long term goal of (relatively) well-ordered societies should be to bring 
burdened societies, like outlaw states, into the Society of well-ordered Peoples.”197 
                                                
197 RAWLS, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited !, p. 106. 
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There are some guidelines Rawls believes backing up his limited assistance amongst 
peoples:  
(i) “The first guideline to consider is that a well-ordered society need not be a wealthy 
society.” … (ii) “A second guideline for thinking about how to carry out the duty of 
assistance is to realize that the political culture of a burdened society is all-important; 
and that, at the same time, there is no recipe, certainly no easy recipe, for well-
ordered peoples to help a burdened society to change its political and social 
culture.”198 (iii)  “The third guideline for carrying out the duty of assistance is that its 
aim is to help burdened societies to be able to manage their own affairs reasonably 
and rationally and eventually to become members of the Society of well-ordered 
Peoples. … After it is achieved, further assistance is not required, even though the 
now well-ordered society may still be relatively poor. Thus the well-ordered societies 
giving assistance must not act paternalistically, but n measured ways that do not 
conflict with the final aim of assistance: freedom and equality for the formerly 
burdened societies.”199 
The LoP is not an egalitarian account, though John Rawls is one of the leading 
liberal egalitarian theorists while talking about a domestic order. A truly 
cosmopolitan egalitarian argument would be in a global order the entire human race 
stands behind a “veil of ignorance”, then establish a cosmopolitan institution, not 
necessarily a centralised global government, which can distribute wealth among 
                                                
198 John Rawls here obviously involves a Weberian argument that certain culture encourages 
economic development but others do not. In Max Weber’s theory Protestant Christianity is the 
only economically positive culture, but in recent years some scholars have notified that neo-
Confucianism in East Asian countries and territories is also doing well, at least in degrees. See 
WEBER, MAX, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Captalism (Routledge. 2001). For Confucian 
capitalism see LEE, KUAN YEW, From Third world to First : the Singapore Story: 1965-2000 
(HarperCollins Publishers. 2000).  
199 See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, §§ 5 and 6. 
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each and every human being.200 A non-cosmopolitan egalitarian argument, however, 
would be: since peoples are basic units of the international order, there is a need of 
global distribution among peoples. The richest and wealthiest peoples should aid 
poor peoples to lift up social and economic condition until the poor ones reach an 
average level. However, this is not what John Rawls said. His idea is it should be 
morally ok for liberal and decent peoples to leave less rich and wealthy counterparts 
alone unless their burden will threaten international stability.  
Why John Rawls is not an egalitarian any more? Leif Wenar explains:  
Citizens within justice as fairness are assumed to want more income and wealth, not 
as positional goods but simply as resources with which to pursue their visions of the 
good life. Peoples within the law of peoples, on the other hand, are not assumed to 
want more wealth, because peoples have no vision of the good life. Rawls says that 
peoples have interests only in maintaining their territorial integrity, securing the 
safety of their citizens, maintaining their free and just social institution, and securing 
their self-respect as peoples. He suggests that the idea that peoples must hunger for 
more territory is left over from the disastrous days of imperial Europe, and the idea 
the peoples must perpetually pursue greater wealth is merely the ideology of capitalist 
businessmen.201 
Leif Wenar suggests members of wealthier peoples could say this to poorer peoples: 
Your society meets the minimal standards of legitimacy and stability. It is just by your 
own lights, or if it is not just it is your task to make it so. We have more wealth than 
you do, it is true. But that is an indifferent matter from the standpoint of 
international legitimacy. If you want more wealth, it is up to you and your 
compatriots to decide to save more, or to borrow more, or to change your population 
policy, or whatever. We still guarantee your decency and stability but we need take no 
                                                
200 BEITZ, Rawls's Law of Peoples. POGGE, THOMAS, Do Rawls's Two Theories of Justice Fit 
Together?, in Rawls's law of peoples: a realistic utopia?, (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy eds., 
2006).  
201 WENAR, LEIF, Why Rawls is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian, in Rawls's law of peoples: a 
realistic utopia, (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy eds., 2006), p. 105. 
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notice of your prosperity. Prosperity is a matter to which legitimate international 
institution need not attend.202 
Nevertheless, this is not what Sinitic peoples should say to each other. We should 
recall that John Rawls’s theory on a domestic order is an egalitarian account that 
requests individuals to aid their worst off fellow citizens until the latter group will 
catch up. The individuals as members of Sinitic peoples are not aliens to each other 
as there is a legal umbrella above them. Having reviewed John Rawls’s theories, it 
can be assumed that the in-between situation may go two directions. First, the 
situation would go to what the LoP supposed. On the one hand, the Sinitic peoples 
may request the PRC central government to enhance the degree of toleration so long 
as they are peaceable participants in the order, and vise versa. On the other hand, the 
peoples and the Chinese mainland will all lose their entitlement to demand high-
level economic assistance in the future, and they will be competitors rather than 
associates in the situation. Secondly, the situation would also go to what Rawls’s 
early theories supposed, say, a more homogenous welfare state. In this situation, the 
host state would be responsive and responsible to all citizens/nationals in Sinitic 
territory regardless of their sub-state societal membership. But on the other hand, 
the peripheral societies will lose their bargain power in pursuit of more autonomous 
competence.   
3.3 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF PEOPLES 
Section 3.2 has outlined four issues raised by the LoP: peoples, toleration, just war, 
and assistance. From these issues derive four corresponding principles of the 
“constitutional law of peoples” (CLP): recognition, representation, reconciliation, 
and reciprocity. This section will set out these principles in the Chinese context. In 
the LoP, the issue of “peoples” suggests we should recognise the international order 
is formed by separate bodies of individuals, in other words, the basic unit of a just 
                                                
202 Id. at 106. 
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international order is “people” instead of “person”. The issue of toleration requests 
the people to make reasonable decisions by a way of representative government or a 
system of consultation. The issue of just war suggests in what conditions liberal and 
decent peoples may use military means to interfere or overthrow outlaw regimes, 
and in wartime where the boundary is between the just and the unjust conduct. The 
issue of assistance, finally, suggests what is the responsibility of capable liberal and 
decent peoples to aid “burdened” societies suffering a tragic social and economic 
disorder, but this responsibility does not exceed a requirement to reinstall peace. 
Similar to the LoP, in the CLP the principle of recognition suggests the host state 
should recognise “internal” peoples, if necessary, by a constitutional apparatus. The 
principle of representation suggests peoples have to be well represented to qualify as 
being of decency or reasonableness. The principle of reconciliation suggests 
perpetual peace is of top priority in reconfiguring the constitutional structure, and 
war is the worst option no matter it is just or not. The issue of reciprocity, finally, 
suggests a much stronger social and economic cooperation among separated but 
associated peoples, because under the same constitutional umbrella individuals have 
a bond with each other much more stronger than those in the LoP. The CLP urges 
peace. It may probably encourage decent peoples to move forward to liberal 
democracy, but even without it violent conflict is still avoidable. 
3.3.1 Recognition 
For John Rawls, recognition to peoples is needed because there is a high level of 
“pluralism of reasonableness” in the international order, in which circumstance we 
have to rely on the second “veil of ignorance” to build overlapping consensus. This 
is generally an objective reason: the international pluralism of reasonableness is an 
objective phenomenon, and our recognition to peoples as basic units of the 
international order is merely a response to the sociological facts of the real world. 
However, there is another subjective reason given by the leading theorist Charles 
Taylor, who is roughly supposed as a right wing liberal nationalist. Charles Taylor 
asserts:  
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The demand for recognition … is given urgency by the supposed links between 
recognition and identity, where this latter term designates something like a person’s 
understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a 
human being … our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by 
the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a 
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in 
a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.203 
In a domestic order John Rawls may worry that this “communitarian” argument will 
exaggerate some “associationist” good that undermines individual liberty. But first, 
recognition to peoples does not by any means turn to nonrecognition to individuals. 
Second, even for John Rawls himself the LoP is a compromise to the need of some 
collective unit of “people” in dealing with the real world. If liberal and decent 
peoples are well represented by their political agents, any denial to their institutional, 
cultural, or moral uniqueness will lead to “real damage and real distortion” to 
individuals within those bodies, as Charles Taylor reminds us, and eventually 
betrays the noble faith of liberalism to individual dignity. 
Chapter 2 has touched this issue. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait were in a 
situation of “mutual denial” at the beginning. Initially, the PRC central government 
and Taiwanese authorities mutually regarded the other as “rebels” in political 
propaganda, and the alleged “legitimate Chinese central government” on both sides 
of the Strait would never talk to “war criminals”. However, in 1986 an aircraft 
hijack led to the first cross-Strait negotiation since the Chinese civil war. The Civil 
Aviation Administration representing the Chinese mainland and the China Airlines 
representing the counterpart agreed on an ad hoc method to send the hijacked 
aircraft of the China Airlines and the Taiwanese staffs back. On 10 September 1990, 
                                                
203  TAYLOR, CHARLES & LAFOREST, GUY, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian 
Federalism and Nationalism (McGill-Queen's University Press. 1993), p. 25.  
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the first treaty-like agreement was sign between the Red Crosses on the two sides, 
which resolved how to repatriate criminals and suspects across the Strait. In early 
1990s, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (hereinafter ARATS) 
in the Chinese mainland, and the Straits Exchange Foundation (hereinafter SEF) in 
Taiwan, as “civil associations”, were set up to represent the two sides in regular 
semi-official negotiations.  
In cross-Strait negotiations nevertheless the most important issue is the definition of 
“one China”.204 In 1992, the ARATS raised that in following negotiations the two 
sides should adhere to the “one China principle”, but in technical discussions the 
precise political definition of “one China” might not be referred so long as both 
sides have asserted that there is only “one China”. The AEATS later suggested five 
ways to express the idea, while the SEF gave eight others. The 8th expression of the 
SEF is: “in the process of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to endeavour to reunify 
the country, both should adhere to the one China principle, but may acknowledge 
the definition of ‘one China’ has been differed”; the SEF also suggested the two to 
express the idea orally. The AEATS then in a letter to the SEF expressed: “both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait should adhere to the one China principle and endeavour to 
reunify the country; but in technical discussions, the political definition of the ‘one 
China’ shall not be referred”, and attached the 8th expression of the SEF to the letter. 
So this is the “92 consensus” across the Strait. The “92 consensus” is neither a 
“mutual denial” nor a “mutual recognition”; at best it is to “agree to disagree”, 
which symbolises there is a long way to go before the two sides of the Strait can 
find a way to recognise the other in political and constitutional terms. 
For Tibet, there have been nine rounds of “dialogue” between the PRC central 
government and emigrated Tibetans. The emigrated Tibetans call this dialogue 
                                                
204 For the “one China principle/policy”, the PRC perspective see White Paper: the One-China 
Principle and the Taiwan Issue. A more objective account see, ALLEN, Recreating 'One China': 
Internal Self-Determination, Autonomy and the Future of Taiwan.  
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“Sino-Tibetan dialogue” that implies it is based on the equal footing between the 
two parties. The PRC central government, on the other hand, regards this dialogue 
as a “meeting with the Dalai Lama’s personal representatives” and insists there shall 
be no personnel from the “Central Tibetan Administration in Exile” that is an illegal 
institution in CPC eyes. This means the PRC central government only recognises 
the personal prestige of the 14th Dalai Lama rather than the Kashag or any 
institution established by emigrated Tibetans in Dharamsala. In 1979, the first 
delegation from Dharamsala arrived in Lhasa. In the 1980s a number of Tibetan 
delegations returned to Tibet or other part of the PRC. However, the dialogue 
ceased in the 1990s after the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Prize and the 
“Tibetan Parliament” in Dharamsala passed a resolution “stating that no new move 
for negotiations should be initiated unless there was a positive change in the 
Chinese leadership’s attitude”. It is not until 2002 that a new round of dialogue 
revived. In November 2008, the emigrated Tibetans submitted a Memorandum on 
Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People to the PRC officials. The memo was 
refuted critically by the PRC in the aftermath. The 9th round of dialogue was held in 
2010, in which the emigrated Tibetans supplemented their memo with a new note. 
The deadlock between the two parties is not yet broken.  
3.3.2 Representation 
In an ideal situation, peoples are well represented by a liberal democracy with a 
representative government, for which deliberation and consultation are helpful to 
make wise decisions. The LoP also accepts decent people may divide individuals 
into separate groups with representatives in the decision-making process, in other 
words, instead of liberal democracy other forms of representation can also be 
reasonable. For internal affairs due representation enables the political agent of a 
people to remain with the people’s interests rather than the bureaucratic interests of 
its own, thus endowing it with legitimacy that demands individual loyalty and 
obedience. For external affairs due representation removes the excuse for military 
interference. This is what the LoP told us.   
 
 Kai Tu 
- 108 - 
The CLP cannot link representation directly with liberal democracy, because there 
are two difficulties. First, the PRC regime is not a liberal democracy and is not 
preparing to change this in the near future. The best hope is that the PRC will fulfil a 
standard of “decency” based on its representation and consultation system. Secondly, 
some may ask, “what if China does democratise”? Many do believe democratisation 
will increase transparency and accountability to Chinese foreign policy and reduce 
military influence. China’s democratisation is a main concern for Tibetan 
communities, Hong Kong “democrats”, and Taiwan, and they probably would more 
willingly engage with a democratised China. But democracy proponents also 
indicate that a rapid democratisation will not change Chinese nationals’ attitude 
towards the peripheral societies.205 Randall P. Peerenboom reminds us that low-
level social and economic development come along with low-level democracy, and 
finally low-level stability in other Asian countries.206 
The PRC central government nevertheless has set up a system of consultation in the 
Chinese mainland. For instance, there are more than 30 ethnic Tibetans among less 
than 3000 congresspersons in Chinese parliament, representing less than 4.6 million 
Tibetans among more than 1.3 billion Chinese nationals. Article 15(3) of the 
Election Act also authorises the National People’s Congress (hereinafter NPC) to 
decide how and how many representatives from Hong Kong shall be chosen.207 For 
the 36 Hong Kong representatives in the 11th NPC, the electorate comprises Chinese 
nationals who have been members of the Hong Kong electorate of the 10th NPC, 
those who are members of the 10th Chinese People’s Political Consultation 
Conference (hereinafter CPPCC), and Chinese nationals who are members of the 
                                                
205 WANG, JIANWEI, Democratization and China's Nation Building, in What if China Doesn't 
Democratize?: Implications for War and Peace, (E. Friedman & B.L. McCormick eds., 2000), pp. 
63-69.  
206 PEERENBOOM, China Modernizes : Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?, p. 280. 
207 The PRC Election Act 2004, art 15(1). 
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electorate of the 3rd Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (hereinafter HKSAR).208 The Election Act does not prescribe how and how 
many Taiwanese congresspersons shall be chosen to the NPC, but it is a convention 
that a number of “Taiwanese representatives” shall sit in the NPC. In the 11th NPC, 
there are 13 Taiwanese congresspersons who are mainland residents coming from 
Taiwan or descendants of Taiwanese migrates since the 1940s.  
The CPPCC is a “legally established” institution in the PRC. As an advisory body, 
the composition of the CPPCC is not distributed according to population proportion. 
There are around 43 ethnic Tibetans CPPCC members among around 2200 in total. 
It would be an advantage for the Tibetans that they may be a significant part of both 
the “ethnic minority” and the “religious” sectors of the CPPCC. Ngapoi Ngawang 
Jigme (1910-2009) and Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai were pointed deputy presidents of 
the CPPCC, which position had been held by the late 10th Panchen Lama. Ngapoi 
Ngawang Jigme was a Tibetan lord; Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai is one of the highest 
tulku slightly lower than the Dalai and Panchen Lamas. The Hong Kong sector is 
even greater than ethnic Tibetans. There are more than 120 Hong Kong members 
invited to participate in the CPPCC. The ex-Chief Executive of the HKSAR is also a 
deputy president of the CPPCC. The Taiwanese Democratic Autonomous Alliance – 
an allied political party of the CPC – send around 20 members to the CPPCC; while 
the Chinese National Sodality of Taiwanese Compatriots contribute around 15 
CPPCC members for the Taiwanese sector. The Taiwanese president Mr Ma once 
considered lifting the CPPCC ban for indigenous Taiwanese after Ms Wu Xiaoli, an 
anchor of the Phoenix Television had participated in the Guangdong provincial 
branch of the CPPCC. But the Taiwanese authorities later repeated no Taiwanese 
                                                
208 The Method for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 
to Elect Deputies to the Eleventh National People’s Congress, art 5. 
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citizenship holder is allowed to sit in the CPPCC, and it also turned out that Ms 
Wu’s CPPCC membership was granted based on her Hong Kong residency.209 
3.3.3 Reconciliation  
John Rawls believes in an international rule of law based on the overlapping 
consensus to end war, the CLP may be not as optimistic as the LoP in this regard. 
David Boucher summarises: “Kant argued that in order for a treaty of perpetual 
peace to be legally binding it must attain the formal consent of civilised nations. In 
other words, it cannot be affected in the absence of a legally constituted framework. 
This is the point that Rawls takes firmly on board.”210 John Rawls indeed endorses 
an international rule of law. Departing from Immanuel Kant who builds his 
perpetual peace mostly on the objective process of commercial globalisation, John 
Rawls relies more on a psychological process of “moral learning” to backup his rule 
of law: “when the Law of Peoples is honoured by peoples over a certain period of 
time, with the evident intention to comply, and these intentions are mutually 
recognised, these peoples tend to develop mutual trust and confidence in one 
another. Moreover, peoples see those norms as advantageous for themselves and for 
those they care for, and therefore as time goes on they tend to accept that law as an 
ideal of conduct.”211  
For John Rawls this moral learning process ensures the LoP is not the same as a 
modus vivendi, as the latter is merely “a stable balance of forces only for the time 
                                                
209 The News Press Record of the Mainland Affairs Commission of the ROC in Taiwan on 18 
September 2008 in Chinese available at  
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=44883&ctNode=5651&mp=105. Retrieved on 19 May 2011. 
210 BOUCHER, DAVID, Uniting What Right Permits with What Interest Prescribes: Rawls's Law of 
Peoples in Context, in Rawls's law of peoples: a realistic utopia?, (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy 
eds., 2006), p. 26. 
211 RAWLS, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited!, p. 44. 
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being.” John Rawls believes we have seen much evidence in history that the moral 
learning process can succeed. Having been aware of its reasonable interests, 
democratic countries have not gone to war with each other for a long time. However, 
John Rawls’s point can be questioned. The strongest objection is that political 
agents of democratic peoples do not necessarily put reasonable interests of the 
international community before the rational interests of their own people, the best 
we have is an international modus vivendi.212 
The CLP, however, would like to cite a very beautiful piece of Michael Walzer to 
express its understanding of reconciliation, who says:  
The dream of a war to end war, the myth of Armageddon (the last battle), the vision 
of the lion lying down with the lamb – all these point toward an age definitively 
peaceful, a distant age that lies across some unknown time-break, without armed 
struggle and systematic killing. It will not come, so we have been told, until the forces 
of evil have been decisively defeated and mankind freed forever from the lust for 
conquest and domination. … The only alternative is non-violence defence, ‘war 
without weapons,’ as it has been called by its advocates, who seek to adjust our 
dreams to our realities. They claim that we can uphold the values of communal life 
and liberty without fighting and killing, and this claim raises important questions 
(secular and practical questions) about the theory of war and the argument for 
justice.213 
The CLP does not envision an end of war or perpetual peace among peoples, but it 
insists that conflict and confrontation shall remain non-violent in nature. Michael 
Walzer is once again right that “non-violence has been practiced (in the face of an 
invasion) only after violence, or the threat of violence, has failed.”214 For the 
civilians who decide to launch a non-violence cause it is very crucial that they have 
                                                
212 KUPER, Rawlsian Global Justice: beyond The Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law of Persons 
at 660. Also see TAN, Liberal Toleration in Rawls's Law of Peoples, p. 288.  
213 WALZER, Just and Unjust Wars : a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, p. 329. 
214 Id. at 330.  
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a leadership that is able to persuade most of them to accept non-violence strategy. 
Additionally a non-violence cause is feasible only if the state prepares to tolerate a 
number of protests, demonstrations, strikes, etc. Michael Walzer reminds us that in 
confrontation to a Nazi-style regime, non-violence means nothing at all. He offers 
the images of a civilian statement like this: “You cannot shoot at me, because I am 
not shooting at you; nor am I going to shoot at you. I am your enemy and will 
remain so as long as you occupy my country. But I am a non-combatant enemy, and 
you must coerce and control me, if you can, without violence.”215 Only if this 
statement is also acceptable for the state, non-violence can be meaningful. Non-
violence turns soldiers into police on the one hand, and turns terrorists into civilians 
on the other hand. There is no hope that reconciliation happens between the non-
violence cause and the state, but when terrorists stop killing innocent civilians of 
other peoples, an inter-people reconciliation is possible. 
On 25 December 1948, the Xinhua News Agency, a CPC-run media, publicised a 
list of “war criminals”, on the top of which was Mr Chiang Kai-shek, while 
Madame Chiang was No. 23. On the Taiwanese side, prosecutions and executions to 
“communist rebels” did not stop until the annulment of the martial law. However, 
since 1 May 1991 the martial law has been abolished in Taiwan. The Taiwanese 
authorities promulgated an act entitled the Act Governing Relations between the 
People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (hereinafter “ROC Cross-Strait 
Relations Act”) on 31 July 1992. Article 77 in that act has largely excluded Chinese 
mainland residents from potential prosecution from the Taiwanese authorities and 
thus resolves the biggest problem in everyday communication across the Strait.216 
                                                
215 Id. at 334.  
216 The ROC Cross-Strait Relations Act, art 77. The provision reads: “Any of the people of the 
Mainland Area who commit treasons outside the Taiwan Area and are permitted to enter into the 
Taiwan Area shall not be prosecuted or punished if it discloses such fact to the authorities upon 
application for entrance; the same shall apply to those who enter into the Taiwan Area to 
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Similar resolutions can be found in the Chinese mainland too. On 14 March 1988 
the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate together issued 
an interpretation that states: “those who fled to Taiwan shall not be prosecuted for 
their crimes before the establishment of the PRC”.217 On 7 September 1989, the two 
supreme judicial institutions of the PRC again issued an interpretation further 
excludes those from prosecutions, whose crimes were committed after the 
establishment of the PRC but before the local “people’s authorities” were 
founded.218 The second interpretation is more important because it not only relieves 
the “war criminals”, but also covers those in Taiwan where no “people’s 
authorities”  – communist authorities – has been set up. The only flaw is the 
expression of “those who fled to Taiwan” seems not referring indigenous Taiwanese. 
But in praxis, there is no difference between the two groups of Taiwanese residents. 
The first stone of reconciliation across the Strait thus is established.   
The Tibetan Kashag never involved in the Chinese civil war. Yet the entire chapter 
of “Crimes of Endangering National Security” of the PRC Criminal Act concerns 
emigrated Tibetans.219 Article 102 punishes “whoever colludes with foreign states in 
plotting to harm the motherland’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and security”; 
Article 103 combats “whoever organises, plots, or acts to split the country or 
undermine national unification”, to “instigate” to do so is also punishable; Article 
104 is about “Whoever organizes, plots, or carries out armed rebellion, or armed 
                                                                                                                                    
participate in conferences or activities approved by the competent authorities and are exempt 
specifically on a case by case basis from the referred disclosure.” 
217 The Joint Announcement of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
on Expiration of Prosecution against Taiwanese Residents for Crimes before the Establishment of 
the People’s Republic of China. 
218  The Joint Announcement of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
on Expiration of Prosecution against Taiwanese Residents for Crimes before the Establishment of 
Local People’s Government. 
219 The PRC Criminal Act.  
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riots”; Article 105 defends the socialist system; and Article 109 warns state organ 
personnel, during the time of performing his public functions, not to leave his post 
without authorization and defects from the country. Most of these provisions lead to 
life sentence or execution, and the term of imprisonment is harsh. There is a grey 
area in judging emigrated Tibetans’ continuous behaviour. The Dalai Lama has 
orally given up “Tibetan independence”, but even “genuine autonomy” is regarded 
as a “distorted independence” that obviously touches the red line. The Dalai Lama 
himself was a PRC official when he fled to India; for him, Article 109 seems having 
prepared to bite.  
Having not been working for Dharamsala, some emigrated Tibetans are also 
involved in crimes according to the PRC Criminal Act. Article 322 reads: “Whoever 
violates the laws and regulations controlling secret crossing of the national 
boundary (border), and when the circumstances are serious, shall be sentenced to 
not more than one year of fixed-term imprisonment and criminal detention or 
control.”220 Since many Tibetan crossed the border without passport and permission, 
they are not free of danger in returning to China. Yet Article 87 provides a potential 
solution.221 For those who crossed the border without a legitimate passport, the 
periodic limitation of prosecution may be a relief. But for those involved in 
“national security” matters, it remains vague.  
                                                
220 The PRC Criminal Act, art 322. 
221 The PRC Criminal Act, art 87. Article 87 reads: “Crimes are not to be prosecuted where the 
following periods have elapsed: (1) in cases where the maximum legally-prescribed punishment is 
fixed-term imprisonment of less than five years, where five years have elapsed; (2) in cases where 
the maximum legally-prescribed punishment is fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years 
and less than ten years, where ten years have elapsed. (3) in cases where the maximum fixed-term 
imprisonment is not less than ten years, where fifteen years have elapsed. (4) in cases where the 
maximum legally-prescribed punishment is life-imprisonment or death, where twenty Years have 
elapsed. If it is considered that a crime must be prosecuted after twenty years, the matter must be 
submitted to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate for approval.” 
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However, Article 90 proscribes:222  
In situations where the autonomous areas inhabited by ethnic groups cannot 
completely apply the stipulations of this law, the people’s congresses of the 
autonomous regions or of the provinces may formulate alternative or supplementary 
provisions based upon the political, economic, and cultural characteristics of the local 
ethnic groups and the basic principles of the stipulations of this law, and these 
provisions shall go into effect after they have been submitted to and approved by the 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee.  
This could be a chance for the PRC to find a way to make reconciliation with 
emigrated Tibetans. 
3.3.4 Reciprocity 
The CLP pays more attention to reciprocity than the LoP. In John Rawls’s early 
theories, individuals in one constitutional order owe each other a responsibility of 
assistance. We may recall Rawls’s two principles of “justice of fairness”: “(i) The 
principle of equal basic rights and liberties; and (ii) a principle of economic justice, 
which stresses (a) equality of opportunity and (b) mutual benefit and 
egalitarianism.” As the CLP shares traits with both the LoP and a constitutional 
order, the latter prescribes individuals within the same constitutional order cannot be 
indifferent to others’ poverty. This pushes the CLP to get close to egalitarianism. 
Yet it will be reluctant for individuals in one people to put other peoples’ well-being 
before their own, so what reciprocity asks is similar with the LoP and does not 
exceed the standard promoted by “justice as fairness.” There are two ways to fulfil 
this requirement.  
The first one is to add responsibilities to capable peoples in order to redistribute 
resources and wealth among peoples in the CLP until all peoples are generally equal 
in social and economic development. The second one is to ignore the boundary 
                                                
222 The PRC Criminal Act, art 90. 
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between peoples when dealing with redistribution and retreat to an ordinary 
constitutional order. This way adds responsibilities to capable individuals instead of 
peoples to aid any worse off individuals in the constitutional order regardless of 
which people they belong to. It is hard to say which way is the best at all times, and 
it may depend on the concrete relationship between contextualised peoples and 
individuals. But a wrong way is to ignore individuals in a worse condition in one 
people to benefit others in a better condition in another people for sake of 
redistribution among peoples. This way is bizarre but it happens.  
Reciprocity is an important force to unite separated but associated peoples together 
in the CLP. In social terms reciprocity may suggest a sort of bilingualism or free 
migration, but after all reciprocity mostly unfolds in the economic arena. If 
reciprocity functions in the first way, it could be economic cooperation, free-trade 
area, common currency, etc. If reciprocity functions in the second way, it is much 
more like a welfare state that carries on redistribution among individuals. 
Experience of industrial liberal democracies makes an example of how welfare or 
reciprocity affects the unity of peoples in one constitutional order. Nicola McEwen 
exhibits how the welfare state enhances unity by expanding an inter-people network 
and symbolises that separated but associate peoples still share a common heritage, 
as well as serves more for worst off individuals than those in better conditions.223 In 
this sense the second way would be closer to the ideal of “justice as fairness” in the 
CLP. 
The PRC Tibet Autonomous Region remains the least developed among territorial 
economies. The PRC government has decided to help the Tibetans to catch up the 
national average of economic development, which goal is also endorsed by The 
Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984. The entire Chapter VI of the act concerns 
“responsibilities of state organs at higher levels”. The PRC central government has a 
                                                
223 MCEWEN, NICOLA, Nationalism and the State: Welfare and Identity in Scotland and Quebec   
(P.I.E.-Peter Lang. 2006), p. 183. 
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personnel-exchange scheme between the TAR and inland provinces. In the sixth 
round of personnel-exchange, around 1000 inland “skilled people” arrived in Tibet 
for a three-year full term or a half term work in the TAR. By the end of the term, 
these people will return to China proper and another round replaces them. The 
Qinghai-Tibet railway is another instance that the PRC government is trying to use 
infrastructure projects to accelerate economic growth in Tibet. According to the 
PRC, the Qinghai-Tibet railway has almost doubled the number of tourists in Tibet, 
which is likely to bring good news for the TAR economy.224 The PRC also poured 
0.24 billion CNY to finance the maintenance of the Potala Palace that was the Dalai 
Lama’s “Holy See” in Tibet. Whereas the harsh environment of Tibet costs too 
much to exploit natural resources, the local revenue of Tibet cannot sustain a 
modern public sector. To enhance literacy rate of Tibetans, the PRC Ministry of 
Education established a number of “Tibetan classes and schools” to train ethnic 
Tibetan students in China proper with better living conditions and scientific 
equipments. 
The PRC governmental aid to Tibet is unilateral, but economic cooperation between 
the Chinese mainland and the other two cases seems more reciprocal. Hong Kong 
and Taiwan are members of the WTO in parallel with the Chinese mainland. The 
WTO allows members to set up bilateral economic cooperation within its 
framework, so the Chinese mainland and the Hong Kong SAR on 29 June 2003 
signed an agreement of “Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement” (hereinafter 
CEPA). The CEPA aims at reducing tariff, removing discrimination, and facilitating 
trade and investment.225 The HKSAR has already applied “zero tariff” to goods 
imported from the Chinese mainland, while the Chinese mainland promised to adopt 
                                                
224 But others argue that the railway also threatens Tibetan environment and cultural sustainability. 
SHAKYA, TSERING, Tibetan Questions, 51 New Left Review 5 at 9-10, (2008).  
225 The CEPA, art 1. 
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“zero tariffs” to hundreds of Hong Kong goods too.226 The two parties agreed not to 
use anti-dumping or anti-subsidies provisions against the other.227 The cooperations 
of finance and tourism are crucial for Hong Kong’s sustainable development. The 
PRC central government promised to encourage mainland banks to set up their 
international centres in Hong Kong and invite Hong Kong financial institutions to 
get involved in mainland financial reforms, which means the Chinese mainland has 
opened its financial market to Hong Kong banks.228 Because of the restriction on 
international banks in mainland financial market, the CEPA gives Hong Kong a big 
chance to strengthen a status as the Asia-Pacific financial metropolis. The 
cooperation of tourism on the other hand opens the Hong Kong market to mainland 
residents, but this still benefits Hong Kong. Tourist consumption will stimulate 
Hong Kong’s economy that employs a majority of the population in service.229 The 
two parties also promised they will cooperate in investment, customs, food safety, e-
business, small business, and Chinese medicines.230 
On 5 March 1994 the NPC Standing Committee promulgated an “Act for Protection 
of Taiwanese Compatriot’s Investment” that pioneers the legal protection of cross-
Strait economic communication. In 2008, the so-call “three openings” were agreed 
in the revived cross-Strait negotiations: airway, marine, and postal direct 
communications across the Taiwan Strait recommenced after a 60-year interruption. 
Since then cooperations in concern of food safety, finance, customs were also 
projected. But the most important agreement is the “Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement” (hereinafter ECFA), which urges the two parties to reduce 
tariffs and set up economic cooperation. But there is no restriction of anti-dumping 
                                                
226 The CEPA, art 5. 
227 The CEPA, arts 7-8. 
228 The CEPA, art 13. 
229 The CEPA, art 14.  
230 The CEPA, art 17. 
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or anti-subsidies measures in the ECFA, implying Taiwan is still free to use these 
WTO mechanisms against the Chinese mainland. The ECPA does also include a list 
of potential cooperations: intellectual property, finance, trade, customs, e-business, 
industrial strategy, small business, and exchange of representatives between 
economic and commercial associations.231 Speaking of “zero tariff”, the "early 
harvest" list of tariff concessions covers 539 Taiwanese products and 267 Chinese 
mainland goods. The advantage to Taiwan would amount to US$ 13.8 billion, while 
the Chinese mainland could receive around US$ 2.86 billion. In fact the surplus of 
Taiwan in trading with the Chinese mainland in 2009 was more than US$ 65 billion. 
The ECFA is likely to increase the cross-Strait imbalance, reflecting that the 
Chinese mainland seems happier to “buy Taiwan” than to “liberate Taiwan” now. 
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The CLP is a variation of John Rawls’s LoP. To assert a normative framework for 
peaceful coexistence among peoples, the CLP is identical to the LoP in many 
aspects. However, the LoP is designed for peoples as participants in the 
international community. The CLP has to differ from the LoP, because in the 
Chinese context, peoples, if at all, are actors in a quasi-constitutional association. 
But this quasi-constitutional association is also highly different from a unitary 
constitutional system or a domestic order, so the CLP does not have to go far away. 
John Rawls starts with the perspective of a capable liberal people, for which decent 
peoples are to be tolerated, outlaw regimes are to be militarily interfered with, and 
burdened societies are to be assisted. But in the Chinese context there is a more 
centralised non-liberal, but in some sense reasonable, host state government. Even 
so, the CLP disagrees with some liberals who insist there is no possible peaceful 
coexistence and sound cooperation unless an overall liberal constitutional umbrella 
will be set up. Putting its top priority in maintaining peace among Sinitic liberal or 
non-liberal peoples, the CLP reckons potential improvement towards liberal 
                                                
231 The ECFA, art 6. 
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democracy of non-liberal peoples is a good but secondary matter, though it also 
reckons a general liberal framework would encourage non-liberal peoples to make 
some differences.  
Chapter 1 introduced the point that towards a new conception of Chinese 
constitutional law, which is “constitutional law of peoples”, this thesis has two goals 
just as the re-conceptualisation has two dimensions. This chapter draws the 
normative dimension of the conception. The principles of recognition, 
representation, reconciliation, and reciprocity are not what surprisingly contrasts 
common sense or moral feelings. I believe a Confucianist or a (Tibetan) Buddhist 
would not disagree much with these ideas in any debate on how to live peacefully 
with a nearby community of our relatives and friends. But it is still better for this 
thesis proceeding from John Rawls’s theory, because his theoretical construction 
and especially his way of thinking have transcended the parochialism of particular 
“comprehensive moral doctrine”. In essence, what the CLP is trying to do is to 
combine Rawls’s early theory and the “law of peoples” together. In a domestic order, 
Rawls emphasises representation and reciprocity, and in the international order he 
subscribes to recognition and reconciliation; so in a quasi-domestic as well as quasi-
international order, what would he or a liberal say? This thesis suggests we should 
bear all these ideas in mind, and retain the balance in employing them in the 
elaborate context. But this is not enigmatic. It is hard to make friends with a mobster 
or a madman; the greatest “welfare state” is the patriarchal regime of two parents 
established for their children. The first case is about reconciliation and 
representation, which leads to reasonableness. The second case is about reciprocity 
and recognition.   
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Chapter 4 Constitutional Accommodation 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses issues of Chinese constitutional accommodation of, and 
integration with, the Sinitic peoples in positive law. The words “accommodation” 
and “integration” are deployed in two ways. First, there is an internal/external 
difference between accommodation and integration: accommodation refers to 
measures the host state uses to hold a plurality of substate societies together, while 
integration renders the agenda of a state to hold break-away societies back. 
Secondly, accommodation and integration also imply a debate between a 
“difference recognising” constitutional design of the host state towards substate 
societies and a “difference diffusing” strategy to assimilate the substate societies or 
subcultures.232 In the first sense, Chinese constitutional arrangements to Tibet and 
Hong Kong are mostly “accommodation”, while for Taiwan “integration” seems to 
be involved. In the second sense, however, there has been a mixture of 
accommodation and integration in Chinese constitutional designs with respect to 
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.  
The chapter argues that the constitutional amendments of the People’s Republic of 
China (hereinafter PRC), the “ethnic regional autonomy”, and “one country, two 
systems” may sometimes encounter the peripheral societies’ constitutional 
aspirations and hence reflect the principles of recognition, representation, 
reconciliation, and reciprocity by and large. Yet there remains a unitary preposition 
of the PRC central government in attending to the peripheral societies’ 
constitutional status, as well as a default one party-state infrastructure in the Chinese 
mainland. Both have constricted the space of further constitutional accommodation 
                                                
232 MEYERS, J, Rethinking'Constitutional Design'and the Integration/Accommodation Dichotomy, 73 
Modern Law Review 656 at 656-659,  (2010). 
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in the centre. Emigrated Tibetans, Hong Kong democrats, and the Taiwanese 
independence movement are therefore not perfectly satisfied. There has been a huge 
gap between what the PRC central government offers and what the peripheral 
societies demand.  
If Chapter 3 is built to partly answer the question of “whether Chinese constitutional 
accommodation of the peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan is just”, 
this chapter will set out to respond the question of “whether the arrangements are 
satisfactory”. Chapter 3 has explained the government of a territory does not 
necessarily reflect the reasonableness of a society, but there is still needed a measure 
to investigate how the peripheral societies consider the contemporary Chinese 
constitutional law. So I will include more political agencies in my analysis, such as 
the administration of the Dalai Lama and political parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
They do not necessarily represent the respective societies either. Yet at last we will 
get a detailed scenario of the interaction between the PRC central government and 
the peripheral societies in exploring the achieved and unachieved constitutional 
aspirations of all related political forces in Sinitic territory.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first section is a historical account of 
the process of constitutional amendments in the Chinese mainland and peripheral 
societies. In the beginning of the second part of the thesis, which will examine 
Chinese constitutional arrangements relating to Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, it is 
helpful to use this section to outline the basic institutional structures of the Chinese 
State and peripheral societies that might not be acquainted by readers. So in this 
section, I will epitomize the history about how the binding Constitutions in Sinitic 
territory were made and what they have created to deliver governance. Although the 
Constitutions have laid the foundation of contemporary Chinese constitutional 
accommodation of the peripheral societies, there are still many constitutional 
constraints from the centre. Section 4.3 will explain that in addition to the 
prohibition of “secessionist” behaviour, the PRC central government has been very 
solicitous in imposing a unitary conception of the Chinese State upon Tibet, and to a 
lesser degree on Hong Kong and Taiwan. In light of this, section 4.4 then shows that 
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emigrated Tibetans’ “genuine autonomy”, Hongkongers’ “universal suffrage”, and 
Taiwanese’ “de jure independence” are ruled out by the PRC central government at 
this moment.  Hence there is work to be done in further constitutional reform, which 
will be discussed in chapter 6. 
4.2 THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
4.2.1 The 1946 Constitution 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, China’s future was to be determined by 
the Nationalist Party of China or the Kuomintang (hereinafter KMT) and the 
Communist Party of China (hereinafter CPC). Our navigation will begin from here. 
The KMT founding father, Mr Sun Yat-sen promised a three-phrase process of 
Chinese constitutionalisation: to, the military rule after the revolution that would 
overthrow the Manchu Crown; secondly, the supervisory rule in which the Chinese 
people should be apprenticed to the KMT; thirdly, the constitutional rule which 
would be started by a codified “Constitution”. The KMT regime in the name of the 
“Republic of China” (hereinafter ROC) remained in the second phase when 
Japanese troops invaded China in the 1930s; the process of Chinese 
constitutionalisation was thus interrupted. In the 1940s, Chinese nationalists and 
Chinese communists were united under the ROC central government to defend the 
nation. Chinese communists were accommodated in national armies and in the ROC 
central government as well, which tolerated or actually, turned a blind eye to the 
“special regions” under communist control. But after the war the accommodation to 
communists had discomforted the KMT. Mr Chiang Kai-shek decided to invite Mr 
Mao Zedong to talks. In preceding negotiations between the ROC central 
government and Chinese communists, the two parties agreed to principles of 
constitutionalisation, democratisation, and military nationalisation; but disagreed on 
the details of implementation. Nevertheless, the two parties agreed to convene a 
“political consultation conference” that would allow not only the two parties but 
also other political parties to participate and discuss issues through.  
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The KMT, the CPC, and some “third parties” held the “political consultation 
conference” in 1946, which produced a constitutional draft and proposed a “national 
assembly” to promulgate it. In the 1930s a “national assembly” had already been 
elected but was never convened because of the war. So the KMT insisted that the 
old national assembly was still functioning, but other parties wished for a re-election. 
At the end, the KMT accepted to double the number of representatives of the 
national assembly to around 2000 combining a half of the 1930s members and 
another half to be elected or appointed, which would accommodate territorial 
representatives from newly recovered Manchurian provinces and Taiwan, as well as 
partisan representatives – most were Chinese communists – who were banned to 
stand in the 1930s. Mr Carson Chang (Zhang Junmai), a founding member of a third 
party was appointed to draft the constitution. The draft later was recommended by 
the political consultation conference to the constituent assembly with minor changes. 
On 15 November 1946, the constituent national assembly was convened. Taiwanese 
and Tibetan representatives all took part in; however, the CPC rejected the quota 
and refused to send representatives. For that, the PRC government does not 
recognise the legality and legitimacy of the 1946 national assembly and “the 1946 
Constitution”, but in Taiwan the 1946 Constitution remains the basic law in the 
legal system.  
The 1946 Constitution adopts a “five-Yuan system” of government that Mr Sun 
Yat-sen initiates based on the “check and balance” and Chinese historical 
institutions. The first chapter of “General Provisions” of the 1946 Constitution 
promulgates that “the sovereignty of the Republic of China shall reside in the whole 
body of citizens”,233 “persons possessing the nationality of the Republic of China 
shall be citizens of the Republic of China”,234 and “there shall be equality among the 
                                                
233 The 1946 Constitution, art 2. 
234 The 1946 Constitution, art 3. 
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various racial groups in the Republic of China”. 235  Article 25 of the 1946 
Constitution reads: “the National Assembly shall, in accordance with the provisions 
of this Constitution, exercise political powers on behalf of the whole body of 
citizens.”236 According to the 1946 Constitution, the National Assembly is entitled 
to elect and recall the President of the Republic of China and his/her deputy,237 and 
another crucial power of the National Assembly is that of amending the 
Constitution.238  
Under the National Assembly, the five-Yuan system comprises the Executive Yuan, 
the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control 
Yuan.239 The initiative of the 1946 Constitution was to create a cabinet system with 
a President of relative powerlessness. Article 55 provided that the President of the 
Executive Yuan shall be nominated and appointed by the ROC President, but the 
consent of the Legislative Yuan is a prerequisite to the appointment,240 which 
exemplified Mr Carson Chang’s endeavour to reduce and resist Mr Chang Kai-
shek’s paramountcy. Article 37 reads “the President shall, in accordance with law, 
promulgate laws and issue mandates with the counter-signature of the President of 
the Executive Yuan or with the counter-signatures of both the President of 
Executive Yuan and the Ministers or Chairmen of Commissions concerned.”241 In 
other words, the Executive Yuan as the “highest administration” of the state may 
restrict the arbitrariness of the ROC President in intervening in the law-making 
process. The 1946 Constitution empowers the Legislative Yuan to be the supreme 
                                                
235 The 1946 Constitution, art 5. 
236 The 1946 Constitution, art 25. 
237 The 1946 Constitution, art 27(1), (2). 
238 The 1946 Constitution, art 27(3); art 174. 
239 LUO, CHANG-FA, The Legal Culture and System of Taiwan (Kluwer Law International. 2006).  
240 The 1946 Constitution, art 55(1). 
241 The 1946 Constitution, art 37. 
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legislature, while requests the Judicial Yuan to interpret the Constitution and unify 
the interpretation of laws and orders as the constitutional court.242 The last two 
Yuan-s are of less importance in that system.243 
In 1947 the first “constituted national assembly” (different from the “constituent 
national assembly”) and the first Legislative Yuan were duly elected in national 
polls pursuant to the 1946 Constitution, and around 3000 members of the National 
Assembly and more than 750 members of the Legislative Yuan returned. But the 
first constituted national assembly had to promulgate a constitutional amendment 
even in the first convention merely several months after the 1946 Constitution was 
made. In the Chinese civil war the KMT could not and indeed did not hope to 
implement the 1946 Constitution that is full of human rights provisions. The 
Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion 
(hereinafter TPEDPCR) was declared, which authorised the ROC President an 
absolute power of executing “emergency measures” without any restriction from 
either Yuan. 
4.2.2 Constitutions: 1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982 
Having overthrown the KMT regime in the Chinese mainland in 1949, the CPC 
decided to convene its own “political consultation conference”. The Chinese 
People’s Political Consultation Conference (hereinafter CPPCC) convened on 21 
September 1949 in which the CPC, eight allied political parties, and a group of 
invited social elites promulgated a Common Programme of the Chinese People’s 
                                                
242 The 1946 Constitution, Chapter VI; art 78.  
243 The 1946 Constitution, art 83 and art 90. Article 83 reads: “The Examination Yuan shall be the 
highest examination organ of the State and shall have charge of matters relating to examination, 
employment, registration, service rating, scales of salary, promotion and transfer, security of 
tenure, commendation, pecuniary aid in case of death, retirement and old age pension”. Article 90 
reads: “The Control Yuan shall be the highest control organ of the State and shall exercise the 
powers of consent, impeachment, censure, and auditing”. 
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Political Consultation Conference (hereinafter “1949 Common Programme”) that 
became the provisional constitutional law of the newly established PRC. The 1949 
Common Programme declares “to repeal all laws, orders, and institutions of the 
KMT reactionary government that have oppressed the people”.244 Article 2 urged 
“the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China shall carry on the 
people’s liberation war to the end until the entire territory of China has been 
liberalised eventually and the great enterprise of China’s unification is 
accomplished”.245 The 1949 Common Programme also authorised the CPPCC to 
organise the PRC central government before a “national people’s congress” is 
elected by a general election.246 The CPPCC stipulated the “National People’s 
Congress” (NPC) to be the parliamentary body in the future and rendered itself an 
advisory body to the government after the NPC had taken charge.247  
In 1954 the first NPC convened in Beijing, which promulgated the first PRC 
Constitution on 20 September 1954. The 1954 Constitution maintains the NPC shall 
be the sovereign organ of the Chinese State to exercise any power according to its 
own decision.248 When the NPC is not in session, a Standing Committee of the NPC 
shall make ordinary laws and orders.249 According to the Constitution, the PRC 
Chairman shall be the head of state, while the Premier is the head of the central 
administration – the State Council;250 the Chairman shall be elected by the NPC,251 
                                                
244 The 1949 Common Programme, art 17.  
245 The 1949 Common Programme, art 2. 
246 The 1949 Common Programme, art 13(2). 
247 The 1949 Common Programme, art 13(4).  
248 The 1954 Constitution, arts 2, 21, 22, and 27(14). 
249 The 1954 Constitution, art 31. 
250 The 1954 Constitution, art 50.  
251 The 1954 Constitution, art 27(4). 
 
 Kai Tu 
- 128 - 
and the Premier shall be nominated by the Chairman and decided by the NPC. 252 In 
the 1954 Constitution, the Chairman’s power was greater than the contemporary 
Chinese President. Article 43 of the 1954 Constitution reads “the Chairman shall 
convene a supreme council of national affairs of necessity and presides by 
himself”,253 which council could advise the NPC, the State Council, or others 
institutions to make decisions.254 The article actually enabled Chairman Mao to rule 
in a constitutional way, but it is a misfortune that he chose in the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) to wipe out the Constitution.  
In the last episode of the Cultural Revolution, the Maoists decided to tailor another 
constitution to replace the shelved 1954 one. The texts of the 1975 Constitution are 
rough, which was replaced again in 1978. The 1978 Constitution almost returns to 
the 1954 version, but the crucial difference is the 1978 Constitution, the 1975 one as 
well, authorises the Party Chief of the Central Committee of the CPC to command 
Chinese military forces.255 The confusion between statal and partisan institutions 
seems odd even to Chinese communists.256 When in 1982 the PRC government 
remade the Constitution, partisan institutions of the CPC disappeared in the 
Constitution. The 1982 Constitution creates a Central Military Commission to 
command Chinese military forces.257 In terms of the relationship between the 
Chinese state and the CPC, Article 5 prescribes: “The state upholds the uniformity 
and dignity of the socialist legal system. No law or administrative or local rules and 
regulations shall contravene the constitution. All state organs, the armed forces, all 
                                                
252 The 1954 Constitution, art 27(5). 
253 The 1954 Constitution, art 43(1). 
254 The 1954 Constitution, art 43. 
255 The 1978 Constitution, art 19(1). 
256 See, POTTER, From Leninist Discipline to Socialist Legalism : Peng Zhen on Law and Political 
Authority in the PRC.  
257 The 1982 Constitution, art 93. 
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political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and undertakings must 
abide by the Constitution and the law. All acts in violation of the Constitution and 
the law must be investigated. No organization or individual may enjoy the privilege 
of being above the Constitution and the law”. In this sense, as one political party the 
CPC literally shall also be obligated by the Constitution.258 The NPC recovers its 
sovereign status. Under the supreme legislature – the NPC and its Standing 
Committee – there are provincial people’s congresses as legislatures of respective 
administrative divisions.259 The State Council is the supreme administration, under 
which administrations of provinces and counties are authorised to issue orders.260 
The Supreme People’s Court shall be the highest judicial court that supervises lower 
courts;261 “the people's courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial 
power independently and are not subject to interference by administrative organs, 
public organizations or individuals”.262 The 1982 Constitution removes the freedom 
of migration (in the 1954 Constitution)263 and the freedom to strike (in the 1975 and 
1978 Constitutions),264 but a charter of human rights is protected at least on 
paper.265  
In the 1982 Constitution, Taiwan appears. The preamble of the 1982 Constitution 
says: “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is 
the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to 
                                                
258 The 1982 Constitution, art 5. 
259 The 1982 Constitution, art 100. 
260 The 1982 Constitution, art 107. 
261 The 1982 Constitution, art 127. 
262 The 1982 Constitution, art 126. 
263 The 1954 Constitution, art 90(2). 
264 The 1975 Constitution, art 28(1). The 1978 Constitution, art 45. 
265 The 1982 Constitution, chapter II. An introductory account of the PRC system see CHEN, An 
introduction to the legal system of the People's Republic of China. 
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accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.”266 The CPC finally has to 
re-address the remainder of the Chinese civil war. The great enterprise of 
“liberalising the entire territory of China” pursued by the first Chinese People’s 
Political Consultation Conference was never accomplished. 
The 1982 Constitution is Janus-faced with respect to peripheral societies. It has an 
authoritarian face. The Chinese parliament’s omnipotence, the monistic leadership 
of the CPC, and the unyieldingness to any “secessionist” danger are all maintained 
in the Constitution, and hence if someone supposes the Constitution is open to any 
constitutional aspirations of the peripheral societies, they definitely are wrong. But 
the 1982 Constitution also has a moderate face. In terms of recognition and 
reconciliation, the 1982 Constitution does not urge the PRC central government to 
wage an immediate war to liberate or unify Taiwan as the 1949 Common 
Programme; on the contrary, it merely calls upon “our compatriots in Taiwan” not 
to forget their “lofty duty” to the motherland. Although the 1982 Constitution does 
not refer to Hong Kong literally, in Article 31 it opens the door for the PRC central 
government to establish a “special administrative region” which could be granted 
autonomous powers extremely greater than ordinary administrative divisions in the 
Chinese mainland. For Tibetans and other ethnic minorities, the 1982 Constitution 
designs an “ethnic regional autonomy” that at least recognises the legitimacy of 
ethnic minorities to pursue some sort of special status in China. In terms of 
representation and reciprocity, the CPPCC and the NPC qualify as consultative 
institutions; even the removal of freedom of migration is helpful to justify the 
separation of jurisdictions of peripheral societies, which blocks off Chinese 
mainlanders entering Hong Kong or Taiwan. 
                                                
266 The 1982 Constitution, Preamble. 
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4.2.3 Constitutional Amendments in Peripheries 
The constitutional amendments of the PRC are nevertheless only one side of the 
coin; on the other side, institutional change in peripheral societies determines what 
the peripheral societies can or cannot do in response to the PRC central 
government’s constitutional accommodation, so it is also necessary to keep an 
account of their “constitutional amendments” in this chapter. But a problem is the 
PRC central government does not recognise the constitutionality or legality of the 
rules made by Taipei or Dharamsala. Secondly, even For Taipei and Dharamsala 
there is still a difference. Taipei’s rules are binding in the territory for everyone 
living there; Dharamsala rules, to a large extent, rely on emigrated Tibetans’ 
voluntary obedience and apply to them exclusively. Needless to say, the difference 
contrasts the two territories’ legal competence and political capacity as chapter 2 has 
introduced.  In this context, “constitutional amendments in peripheries” refer to 
institutional changes expressed in constitutional discourse in respective territories. I 
will put their compatibility to the PRC Constitution aside at this stage. The paradox 
is although the PRC central government cannot recognise the constitutionality of the 
rules of Taipei and Dharamsala; it has to take the contemporary institutions of the 
peripheral societies in consideration while designing the constitutional 
arrangements. 
In Taiwan Article 6 of the TPEDPCR authorises the first “constituted national 
assembly” to function continuously because after fleeing to Taiwan the “ROC” 
regime had been incapable to hold another poll in the “territory controlled by 
communist rebels”.267 The same crisis confronted the first Legislative Yuan too. The 
Judicial Yuan thus issued a constitutional interpretation that also extended the term 
of the first Legislative Yuan till the second Legislative Yuan would be elected.268 
However, members of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan were 
                                                
267 The TPEDPCR, art 6. 
268 The Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 31, 29 January 1954. 
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overwhelmingly elected in the Chinese mainland and had little connection with 
indigenous Taiwanese constituencies. The KMT regime had to add new 
representatives from Taiwanese communities to both institutions. Whereas the 
senior members gradually passed away, the Taiwanese representatives might 
eventually become a majority.269 In 1991 a series of milestones in Taiwanese 
constitutionalisation were set up. On 30 April 1991 then “ROC” President Mr. Lee 
Teng-hui renounced the martial law270 and urged the National Assembly to revise 
the 1946 Constitution. The National Assembly decided to elect the second National 
Assembly and Legislative Yuan and thus could resign itself and the first Legislative 
Yuan. Since then, the representatives of the National Assembly and Legislative 
Yuan are all elected from “ROC” nationals from the “free area”. The “ROC” does 
not regard Chinese communists as “rebels” any more, but instead issues a law to 
regulate the relationship between people of the “free area” and the Chinese 
mainland.271 As the constituent organ that was entitled to amend the Constitution, 
the National Assembly in 2005 dissolved itself and dissimulates the constituted 
powers to the people of the “free area” of the “ROC” and the Legislative Yuan.272 
The “free area” shall elect the ROC President now.273 Departing from the cabinet 
system of the 1946 Constitution, the head of the Executive Yuan now shall be 
appointed directly by the ROC president without prerequisite consent of the 
                                                
269 LUO, The Legal Culture and System of Taiwan, chapter 1. 
270 The TPEDPCR, art 10. 
271 The Additional Articles, art 11.  
272 The Additional Articles, art 1(1). It reads: “The electors of the free area of the Republic of China 
shall cast ballots at a referendum within three months of the expiration of a six-month period 
following the public announcement of a proposal passed by the Legislative Yuan on the 
amendment of the Constitution or alteration of the national territory. The provisions of Article 4 
and Article 174 of the Constitution shall not apply”. 
273 The Additional Articles, art 2(1). 
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Legislative Yuan.274 The five-Yuan system of the 1946 Constitution has also been 
altered.275 
In spite of the controversy on the legal status of emigrated Tibetan communities, 
they have promulgated a “Charter of the Tibetans in Exile” (hereinafter “Tibetan 
Charter”) on 14 June 1991.276 In the 1950s the 14th Dalai Lama brought his Kashag 
– the Tibetan cabinet – to India, which became the predecessor of contemporary 
“Central Tibetan Administration in Exile” sitting in Dharamsala, India. According 
to the agreement between the Kashag and the PRC central government, the Kashag 
in 1951 had already been incorporated as the “Tibetan local government”. When the 
Dalai Lama fled, the PRC State Council exterminated the Kashag and established 
the Tibet Autonomous Region (hereinafter TAR) as a substitute. The Dalai Lama’s 
Kashag nevertheless was trying to define itself as the “Tibetan Government in 
Exile” which is never recognised by any governments. The secondary choice for the 
Kashag is to function as the administration of emigrated Tibetans who are still loyal 
to the Dalai Lama, and the Indian government accepted this choice.277 The Tibetan 
Charter endorses this point in Article 2: “this Charter shall be binding and 
enforceable to all Tibetans under the jurisdiction of the Tibetan Administration in 
Exile”.278 The Kashag now is aware that as a “non-governmental” institution in 
international eyes, “all laws, ordinances, regulations, administrative and executive 
                                                
274 The Additional Articles, art 3(1). 
275 The Additional Articles, art 7(1). It reads: “The Control Yuan shall be the highest control body of 
the State and shall exercise the powers of impeachment, censure and audit; and the pertinent 
provisions of Article 90 and Article 94 of the Constitution concerning the exercise of the power of 
consent shall not apply”.  
276 KHEYAP, T, Homeless but Not Hopeless: How the Tibetan Constitution Governs a People in 
Exile, 36 Hastings Const. LQ 353,  (2008).  
277 HESS, Immigrant Ambassadors: Citizenship and Belonging in the Tibetan Diaspora. 
278 The Tibetan Charter, art 2. 
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orders of the Tibetan Administration in Exile shall endeavour to conform to the 
generally accepted principles of international law as specified by the United 
Nations, and in particular comply with the local laws of the host countries”.279 With 
no contradiction with “local laws of the host countries”, “The executive power of 
the Tibetan Administration shall be vested in His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and shall 
be exercised by Him, either directly or through officers subordinate to Him, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Charter.”280 The Dalai Lama shall nominate 
no less than two candidates for the position of the Chief Kalön of the Kashag, from 
whom the “Tibetan Parliament in Exile” shall elect one. The Kalön and the Kashag 
are in charge of welfare, culture, education, and health of emigrated Tibetans under 
permission of “host countries”. The Tibetan Parliament in Exile composites 10 
members from “three Tibetan provinces” – U-Tsang, Amdo, and Kham; each and 
every major religious sectors of Tibet shall elect 2 representatives; there are another 
one from North America and two from Europe; the Dalai Lama shall appoint 1-3 
Tibetan MPs by himself.281 The Tibetan Supreme Court in-Exile shall interpret the 
charter and deal with complains from within emigrated Tibetan communities in 
India, but genuine judicial powers shall belong to the “host countries”.282  
Taipei and Dharamsala both made some progress in terms of the principles of 
recognition, representation, reconciliation, and reciprocity. In Taipei, the 
Taiwanese authorities have recognised the CPC’s rule in the Chinese mainland to a 
limited degree. In Dharamsala, the Kashag has been cautious to explain its status to 
outsiders. Although having connived at a name of “government in exile”, the 
Kashag is fully aware that it can only be recognised as a civil administration in 
charge of Tibetan refugees in Dharamsala and other settlements in India. In terms of 
                                                
279 The Tibetan Charter, art 6.  
280 The Tibetan Charter, art 19. 
281 The Tibetan Charter, art 37(1). 
282 The Tibetan Charter, art 66. 
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representation, the Taiwanese authorities have democratised in the 1990s. The 
Taiwanese democratisation prevents the “ROC” to wage a war just because of the 
paramount leader’s personal decision, which is good news for maintaining peace 
across the Strait. The Kashag is also trying to democratise its institutions but giving 
the unique situation and historical tradition, there is a long way to go for emigrated 
Tibetans to establish a liberal democracy. However, although the Dalai Lama is an 
absolute authority in Dharamsala, he is a widely recognised peace-lover. So the 
Dalai Lama’s presence is not a serious danger to the process of reconciliation 
between hostile societies. What seems concerning is: if the Kashag would have been 
truly democratised without the Dalai Lama, could it still endorse a non-violent 
campaign? If the LoP is right, they will. But there is uncertainty surrounding the 
Dalai Lama’s political role and the Kashag’s future.  
4.3 CENTRAL RESTRICTIONS ON ACCOMMODATION 
4.3.1 Restrictions on the “ethnic regional autonomy” 
In 1984 the PRC promulgated an Ethnic Autonomous Region Act 1984283 to deal 
with the “national question” in China. “Ethnic regional autonomy” is regarded as 
“the basic policy adopted by the Communist Party of China for the solution of the 
national question in China through its application of Marxism-Leninism”, and is “a 
basic political system of the State”.284  To adopt a form of autonomy to address the 
so-called “national question” is not rare, but some basic features of the Chinese 
ethnic regional autonomy should be articulated.  
First, Article 2 of The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984 makes it clear that 
“all national autonomous areas are integral parts of the People's Republic of 
                                                
283 The “regional national autonomy” is an old translation, while the new one is “ethnic regional 
autonomy”. The two are referring the same Chinese term that itself never changes. 
284 The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984, Preface.  
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China”.285 It denies any sort of “right of secession” of Chinese national autonomous 
areas.  
Secondly, the ethnic autonomous region is primarily an administrative division of 
the unitary Chinese State despite it also eyes on one or several minority 
“nationalities” in the civil service. Article 3(1) of The PRC Ethnic Regional 
Autonomy Act 1984 reads: “organs of self-government shall be established in 
national autonomous areas as local organs of the State power at a particular 
level”.286 In this sense, the Tibet Autonomous Region functions as an ordinary 
province; the Aba Zangzu Qiangzu Zizhi Zhou (Aba Autonomous Prefecture for 
Tibetans and the Qiang people) in Sichuan province as a prefecture; and the Muli 
Zangzu Zizhi Xian (Muli Tibetan Autonomous County) as an ordinary county 
respectively. Article 3(2) of the act also prescribes: “the organs of self-government 
of national autonomous areas shall apply the principle of democratic centralism”.287 
The “democratic centralism” on the one hand looks for a democratic endorsement of 
governmental legitimacy; on the other hand emphasises the unchallengeable 
superiority of the higher authority over lower ones.288 The combination of Article 
                                                
285 The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984, art 2(3). 
286 The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984, art 3(1). 
287 The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984, art 3(2). The Article 3(2) of The PRC Ethnic 
Regional Autonomy Act 1984 actually repeats Article 3 of the 1982 Constitution that reads: “The 
state organs of the People's Republic of China apply the principle of democratic centralism. … The 
division of functions and powers between the central and local state organs is guided by the 
principle of giving full play to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local authorities under the 
unified leadership of the central authorities”. 
288 The “democratic centralism” also appears in the CPC party constitution: “The Party's basic 
principles of democratic centralism are as follows: (1) Individual Party members are subordinate to 
the Party organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower Party organizations 
are subordinate to the higher Party organizations, and all the constituent organizations and 
members of the Party are subordinate to the National Congress and the Central Committee of the 
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3(1) and 3(2) thus describes a horizontal symmetry and a vertical hierarchy of 
governmental institutions in the PRC system. This sheds light on the reading of 
Article 5 and Article 7 of The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984. Article 5 
concerns: “the organs of self-government of national autonomous areas must uphold 
the unity of the country and guarantee that the Constitution and other laws are 
observed and implemented in these areas”;289 while the Article 7 says: “the organs 
of self-government of national autonomous areas shall place the interests of the 
State as a whole above anything else and make positive efforts to fulfil the tasks 
assigned by State organs at higher levels”.290 The judicial courts of higher levels in 
PRC legal hierarchy shall supervise courts of national autonomous areas; the 
procurators, who represent the State in criminal cases, shall be not only supervised 
by but also responsible for those of higher levels.291  
The third feature of the ethnic regional autonomy is although it resists Han 
Chauvinism; ethnic groups are neither allowed to overshadow other ethnos. Article 
12 is a key to understand this:292  
(1) Autonomous areas may be established where one or more minority nationalities 
live in concentrated communities, in the light of local conditions such as the 
relationship among the various nationalities and the level of economic development, 
and with due consideration for historical background. (2) Within a national 
autonomous area, appropriate autonomous areas or nationality townships may be 
established where other minority nationalities live in concentrated communities. (3) 
Some residential areas and towns of the Han nationality or other nationalities may be 
included in a national autonomous area in consideration of actual local conditions. 
                                                                                                                                    
Party.” This is a two-hand provision too.” See also, ANGLE, S. C., Decent Democratic Centralism, 
33 Political theory 518,  (2005).  
289 The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984, art 5. 
290 The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984, art 7. 
291 The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984, Chapter IV. 
292 The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984, art 12. 
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Article 12(1) explains why there is a list of Tibetan autonomous areas outside the 
Tibet Autonomous Region (hereinafter TAR). Article 12(2) embodies in the Muli 
Tibetan Autonomous County that locates in an autonomous prefecture designed 
mainly for the Yi people, another ethnic group in the Sino-Tibetan family. Article 
12(3) exemplifies in the Haixi Autonomous Prefecture that accommodates both 
Tibetans and Mongolians, so does the Aba Autonomous Prefecture for both 
Tibetans and the Qiang people. In fact the entire Chapter V of The PRC Ethnic 
Regional Autonomy Act 1984 urges the entitled ethnic group in respective 
autonomous area not to discriminate smaller groups under the administration. If an 
autonomous area combines two entitled ethnic groups, The PRC Ethnic Regional 
Autonomy Act 1984 calls for mutual respect and solidarity.293 With no idea of a 
“neutral state” or “universal citizenship”, a sense of equality is conceivable only 
when the communists repeatedly privilege the weaker: the working-class in social 
hierarchy, the minority in ethnic affairs, and eventually the smaller minorities facing 
bigger ones.  
It is observed that the PRC central government does recognise there is a “national 
question” to be addressed and hence acknowledges that the Tibetans and other 
ethnic minorities in China need a particular constitutional arrangement. But the PRC 
central government does not recognise there is a separate Tibetan society. Aside the 
Dalai Lama, the TAR government of the PRC is neither recognised as a legitimate 
representative of Tibetans. The second feature of “ethnic regional autonomy” has 
made this point clear. In the Chinese mainland, ethnic Tibetans inhabit in a variety 
of Tibetan areas that are two times larger than the TAR. The TAR does not own the 
privilege to represent all Tibetans as a society. Moreover, in light of the “democratic 
centralism” even in the TAR there is no representative government specialised for a 
demos at all. The TAR cannot be accountable for Tibetans living in the territory 
because of the PRC central government may intervene without legal obstacles. At 
                                                
293 The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984, Chapter V. 
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best the TAR can provide a mechanism of consultation to the PRC government with 
respect to Tibetan affairs in the circumstances. But in terms of reconciliation and 
reciprocity, the “ethnic regional autonomy” is generally right to encourage all ethnic 
groups to live peacefully alongside of each other. The third feature of the “ethnic 
regional autonomy” demonstrates how the PRC central government has to attend the 
interests of smaller ethnic groups and Han Chinese and prevent a single ethnic 
group from monopolising an autonomous territory.  
4.3.2 Restrictions on the “one country, two systems” 
The invention of “one country, two systems” (hereinafter OCTS) is attributed to Mr 
Deng Xiaoping’s idea of “peaceful unification” between the Chinese mainland and 
Taiwan. In comparison with the unilateral approach of political unification under a 
Chinese one party-State, the OCTS grants many more powers to the peripheries in 
proposed constitutional accommodation. Mr Deng’s promise that binds succeeding 
paramount CPC Party Chiefs reads:294  
After reunification with the motherland, the Taiwan special administrative region will 
assume a unique character and may practise a social system different from that of the 
mainland. It will enjoy independent judicial power, and there will be no need to go to 
Beijing for final adjudication. What is more, it may maintain its own army, provided 
it does not threaten the mainland. The mainland will not station anyone in Taiwan. 
Neither troops nor administrative personnel will go there. The party, governmental 
and military systems of Taiwan will be administered by the Taiwan authorities 
themselves. A number of posts in the Central Government will be made available to 
Taiwan. 
In this paragraph Mr Deng has agreed that the Taiwanese authorities may exercise 
independent judicial power and maintain, say, partisan, governmental, and military 
                                                
294 DENG, XIAOPING, An Idea for the Peaceful Reunification of the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan, in 
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, (Foreign Languages Press. 1995).  
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autonomy. Besides, Taiwanese officials will be appointed in the “central 
government” in representation of Taiwan after the peaceful unification.  
However, Mr Deng in the same speech also clarifies that there are several 
restrictions, which at the same time binds contemporary PRC officials too. Deng 
says:295 
We do not approve of “complete autonomy” for Taiwan. There must be limits to 
autonomy, and where there are limits, nothing can be complete. “Complete 
autonomy,” means two Chinas, not one. Different systems may be practised, but it 
must be the People's Republic of China alone that represents China internationally. 
We recognize that the local government of Taiwan may have its own separate set of 
policies for domestic affairs. And although, as a special administrative region, Taiwan 
will have a local government, it will differ from local governments of other provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions. Provided the national interests are not 
impaired, it will enjoy certain powers of its own that the others do not possess.  
There are three conditions of the OCTS to be applied in Taiwan. First, there shall be 
no “complete autonomy”. The “central government” reserves a list of powers that 
restricts the Taiwanese authorities, although these powers have not been written 
down. Secondly, the PRC government shall be the internationally recognised 
Chinese government. The Taiwanese authorities will represent an administrative 
division of the PRC, although this “special administrative region” shall enjoy more 
judicial, administrative and military powers than ordinary Chinese provinces and 
even ethnic autonomous regions. Thirdly, the “national interests” shall not be 
impaired. There is no a priori explanation of what these interests are. The “military” 
part in the speech nevertheless indicates that Taiwanese military forces shall not 
threaten the Chinese mainland. 
Since the OCTS has not yet come true in Taiwan, the Hong Kong case illustrates 
what the real restrictions are. Because Hong Kong never achieves any sort of 
                                                
295 Id. 
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“complete autonomy” or “international recognition” to statehood, these two 
conditions of the OCTS did not catch much attention there.  
In the Hong Kong Basic Law, Article 12 prescribes: “The Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region shall be a local administrative region of the People's 
Republic of China, which shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly 
under the Central People's Government”.296 The Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (hereinafter HKSAR) is fully aware of the meaning of this provision. The 
HKSAR government states: “The PRC is a unitary state, and the HKSAR is a local 
administrative region under such a system. … In other words, all powers exercised 
by the SAR are derived by way of authorisation by the Central Authorities, and 
there are no ‘residual powers’ on the part of the SAR”.297  
Concerning Hong Kong’s international status, Article 13(1) of the Hong Kong Basic 
Law provides: “The Central People's Government shall be responsible for the 
foreign affairs relating to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”298 The 
PRC central government indeed stations an office in Hong Kong to deal with 
“foreign affairs”,299 which seems different from that “the mainland will not station 
anyone in Taiwan”. This reminds us that a remote ministry does not manage the 
periphery’s foreign affairs well thus a local branch of the PRC foreign ministry is 
needed for day-to-day functions, but it can hardly be copied to the Taiwan case 
since Mr Deng had given his word to the contrary.  
                                                
296 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 12. 
297 Green Paper on Constitutional Development  (The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People's Republic of China ed., 2007), para. 2.07.  
298 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 13(1). 
299 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 13(2). 
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The mostly contested restriction nevertheless is the third one – “national interests”. 
Mr Deng in another speech asserts:300 
There is another point that I should make clear. Don't ever think that everything 
would be all right if Hong Kong's affairs were administered solely by Hong Kong 
people while the Central Government had nothing to do with the matter. ... The 
Central Government certainly will not intervene in the day-to-day affairs of the 
special administrative region, nor is that necessary. But isn't it possible that 
something could happen in the region that might jeopardize the fundamental 
interests of the country? Couldn't such a situation arise? If that happened, should 
Beijing intervene or not? Isn't it possible that something could happen there that 
would jeopardize the fundamental interests of Hong Kong itself? Can anyone imagine 
that there are in Hong Kong no forces that might engage in obstruction or sabotage? I 
see no grounds for taking comfort in that notion. If the Central Government were to 
abandon all its power, there might be turmoil that would damage Hong Kong's 
interests. Therefore, it is to Hong Kong's advantage, not its disadvantage, for the 
Central Government to retain some power there.  
Is Mr Deng talking about some sort of “emergency”? In the Hong Kong Basic Law 
Article 14 embodies Mr Deng’s speech:301 
The Central People's Government shall be responsible for the defence of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region.  
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be 
responsible for the maintenance of public order in the Region. 
Military forces stationed by the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region for defence shall not interfere in the local affairs of the 
Region. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, when 
necessary, ask the Central People's Government for assistance from the garrison in 
the maintenance of public order and in disaster relief. 
                                                
300 DENG, XIAOPING, Speech at a Meeting with the Members of the Commitee for Drafting the Basic 
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 
(Foreign Languages Press. 1995).  
301 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 14. 
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Article 14(3) indicates two circumstances of necessity of central intervention: “in 
maintenance of public order” and “in disaster relief”. This seems a normal 
provision. But in Mr Deng’s context, the “national interests” also renders the 
CPC:302 
I should like to ask you to think this over and take it into consideration when drafting 
the basic law. You should also consider a few other things. For example, after 1997 we 
shall still allow people in Hong Kong to attack the Chinese Communist Party and 
China verbally, but what if they should turn their words into action, trying to convert 
Hong Kong into a base of opposition to the mainland under the pretext of 
“democracy”? Then we would have no choice but to intervene. First the 
administrative bodies in Hong Kong should intervene; mainland troops stationed 
there would not necessarily be used. They would be used only if there were 
disturbances, serious disturbances. Anyway, intervention of some sort would be 
necessary.  
Mr Deng opposed the idea that the HKSAR may allow people to attack the CPC in 
deeds, especially to “convert Hong Kong into a base” to oppose the mainland or to 
overthrow the CPC regime. Hence it would be more accurate to say the “national 
interests” in Mr Deng’s eyes are the stability and sustainability of the regime – the 
CPC’s direct rule in the mainland and indirect rule in Hong Kong shall adhere to a 
sort of OCTS arrangement. Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law does prescribe: 
“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to 
prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central 
People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political 
organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to 
prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with 
foreign political organizations or bodies.”303  
                                                
302 DENG, Speech at a Meeting with the Members of the Commitee for Drafting the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
303 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 23. 
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However, in spite of the success in securing the first two conditions, the third 
condition of the OCTS for the HKSAR has never been satisfied. Since the 1840s, 
Hong Kong has been a primary residing site for political dissenters escaping from 
the Chinese mainland. Their complaints are based on not only the freedom of speech 
but also the freedoms of association, consciousness, and migration, etc. There was a 
formidable resistance to potential restrictions to the freedoms when the HKSAR 
tried to promulgate a territorial ordinance incorporating Article 23 to the indigenous 
legal system. After a demonstration numbering more than 50000, the draft was 
blocked in the HKSAR Legislature.  
The invention of the OCTS manifests the CPC and the PRC central government 
intend to simulate the process of reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait. The PRC 
central government’s demand that the Taiwanese authorities should stop their 
military threat to the Chinese mainland has been partly met, as the truce across the 
Strait has lasted for around sixty years. Although the endeavour to enact a territorial 
law to combat treason, secession, and subversion against the government has failed, 
the PRC central government shows no intention to take any serious repression in 
Hong Kong at all. So long as Hongkongers do not turn their “words” to “deeds”, the 
PRC central government definitely will remain in that status. In terms of 
representation, the PRC central government does not request the Taiwanese 
authorities to demolish the representative government in the territory. The Hong 
Kong case also demonstrates that the PRC central government can respect 
Hongkongers’ freedom of expression and allow the HKSAR government to act in 
accordance with Hong Kong residents’ will. The principles of recognition and 
reciprocity are also relevant. It seems that the PRC central government has to 
compromise some “national interests” to trade a lower level of recognition to the 
independence and autonomy of Hong Kong and Taiwan. This strategy so far has 
been working in Hong Kong, but the Taiwanese authorities or at least pro-
independence Taiwanese politicians would rather give up the high posts and 
economic aid from the PRC government if the PRC would recognise Taiwan’s equal 
status in constitutional or international law.  
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4.4 UNACHIEVED CONSTITUTIONAL ASPRIATIONS 
Against the background set out in sections above, we can now discuss some of the 
constitutional aspirations of emigrated Tibetans, Hong Kong democrats, and the 
Taiwanese independence movement that are not compatible with contemporary 
PRC constitutional law. These constitutional aspirations thus remain “unachieved”. 
In fact the unachieved constitutional aspirations of the peripheral societies of Tibet, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan are mostly surrounding the principles of recognition and 
representation. The emigrated Tibetans are demanding a Great Tibet where ethnic 
Tibetans may organise a government that could speak on Tibetans’ behalf at least in 
cultural affairs. The “universal suffrage” requested by Hong Kong society is the 
very foundation of a representative government. For Taiwan, Taiwanese politicians 
actually are stimulating the notion that Taiwanese residents shall be and shall only 
be represented by the Taiwanese authorities despite the fact that there is difference 
within the Taiwanese society as to what is the most appropriate name of the polity. 
In this context, the peripheral societies claim they are entitled to recognition from 
the PRC. Their claims may be translated to a historical nation, or a liberal 
democracy, or a sovereign people. At this moment the PRC central government is 
obviously unprepared to accept these claims. It is indeed very difficult to apply 
these ideas into legal praxis too. However, the good news is the peripheral societies 
have been willing to reconcile with the PRC central government. All of them agree 
with a non-violent approach in pursuing their constitutional aspirations. It is not 
surprising, as reasonableness often leads people-s to this path. The peripheral 
societies are not eager to have reciprocal cooperation with the PRC central 
government. But if the PRC central government will share economic interests with 
them, the peripheral societies may just accept. 
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4.4.1 Emigrated Tibetans: the Great Tibet 
The 14th Dalai Lama in a Five-point Peace Plan addressed to a United States 
Congressional Human Right’s Caucus on 21 September 1987, delivered his 
aspirations as:304 
(1), Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; (2), Abandonment of 
China’s population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans 
as a people; (3), Respect for the Tibetan people’s fundamental human rights and 
democratic freedoms; (4), Restoration and protection of Tibet’s natural environment 
and the abandonment of China’s use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons 
and dumping of nuclear waste; (5), Commencement of earnest negotiations on the 
future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.  
On 15 June 1988 the Dalai Lama addressed another speech to members of the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg, in which the five-point plan was further 
developed and the dimension of “interdependence” was more emphasised than that 
of “independence”. Particularly, in the 1988 Strasbourg Proposal the word 
“constitution” was for the first time mentioned. In the proposal the Dalai Lama 
insisted that the Tibetans should establish a new government for all Tibetans in 
“Great Tibet”. The Dalai Lama made it clear that “the whole of Tibet known as 
Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham, and Amdo) should become a self-governing 
democratic political entity … in association with the People’s Republic of China.” 
Thus, an “independent” sovereign Tibet has been dropped. Secondly, the Dalai 
Lama admitted, “the Government of the People’s Republic of China could remain 
responsible for Tibet’s foreign policy.” On the other hand, “the Government of 
Tibet should, however, develop and maintain relations, through its own foreign 
affairs bureau, in the field of commerce, education, culture, religion, tourism, 
science, sports and other non-political activities. Tibet should join international 
                                                
304 The Dalai Lama, Five-Point Peace Plan, available at his official website 
http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/five-point-peace-plan, retrieved on 2 May 2010.  
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organisations concerned with such activities.” “Constitution” in this proposal means 
a code to be drafted in the future: “the Government of Tibet should be founded on a 
constitution or basic law. The basic law should provide for a democratic system of 
government … this means that the Government of Tibet will have the rights to 
decide on all affairs relating to Tibet and the Tibetans.” This Tibetan “constitution” 
is not necessarily a sub-code or by-product of that of the PRC; the proposal 
declares: “Tibetan people themselves must be the ultimate deciding authority.” 305  
However, in 2009 when emigrated Tibetans submitted to the PRC central 
government a Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for Tibetan People, 
“constitution” has become the PRC 1982 Constitution. The memorandum restates 
emigrated Tibetans’ aspirations that could be categorised into three sorts. The first is 
still “the integrity of the Tibetan nationality,” in other words, “the application of a 
single administration for the Tibetan nationality in the PRC”.  The aspiration of 
combining all “three Tibetan provinces” – the Tibetan Autonomous Region, 
Qinghai province, and part of Sichuan – into a single administrative region has 
already been mentioned in the five-point plan and the 1988 Strasbourg proposal, but 
in this new memorandum it seems Tibetans have accepted that the concrete 
administrative boundary between Tibetan and non-Tibetan areas could be that of 
contemporary PRC administrative lines between different administrative regions.306  
The second sort of Tibetan aspirations can be coined as “cultural autonomy”. 
Emigrated Tibetans demand that “the principal language of the Tibetan autonomous 
areas needs to be Tibetan”; second “[the] distinct [Tibetan] cultural heritage needs 
protection through appropriate constitutional provisions”; third, given the freedom 
of religious belief, “monasteries [should] be organised and run according to 
                                                
305 The Dalai Lama, Strasbourg Proposal, available at his official website, 
http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/strasbourg-proposal-1988, retrieved on 2 May 2010. 
306 Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People.  
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Buddhist monastic tradition, to engage in teachings and studies, and to enrol any 
number of monks and nuns or age group in accordance with these rules. The normal 
practice to hold public teachings and the empowerment of large gatherings is 
covered by this freedom and the state should not interfere in religious practices and 
traditions, such as the relationship between a teacher and his disciple, management 
of monastic institutions, and the recognition of reincarnations”.307  
Although the two sorts of aspirations above may fall into the shade of PRC laws, the 
last sort has transgressed the scope of the PRC 1982 Constitution. In the memo 
emigrated Tibetans demand a “regulation on population migration.” They said: “it is 
not our intention to expel the non-Tibetans who have permanently settled in Tibet 
and have lived there and grown up there for a considerable time. Our concern is the 
induced massive movement of primarily Han but also some other nationalities into 
many areas of Tibet, upsetting existing communities, marginalising the Tibetan 
population there and threatening the fragile natural environment.” But the PRC 
constitution does not authorise any autonomous regions to regulate their own 
administrative boundary.  
Emigrated Tibetans ask the PRC to change some laws too:308  
Implementation of genuine autonomy, for example, requires clear divisions of powers 
and responsibilities between the Central Government and the government of the 
autonomous region with respect to subject matter competency. Currently there is no 
such clarity and the scope of legislative powers of autonomous regions is both 
uncertain and severely restricted. Thus, whereas the Constitution intends to recognise 
the special need for autonomous regions to legislate on many matters that affect 
them, the requirements of Article 116 for prior approval at the highest level of the 
Central Government - by the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress 
(NPC) - inhibit the implementation of this principle of autonomy. In reality, it is only 
                                                
307 HE, B & SAUTMAN, B, The Politics of the Dalai Lama's New Initiative for Autonomy, 78 Pacific 
Affairs 601,  (2005). 
308 Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People. 
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autonomous regional congresses that expressly require such approval, while the 
congresses of ordinary (not autonomous) provinces of the PRC do not need prior 
permission and merely report the passage of regulations to the Standing Committee 
of the NPC ‘for the record’ (Article 100). 
4.4.2 Hong Kong: Universal Suffrage 
In Hong Kong, the major constitutional contestation centres on the “universal 
suffrage”. So far both the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council of the 
HKSAR have been elected in accordance with two annexes of the Hong Kong Basic 
Law and decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) of the PRC. The Chief Executive is elected by a 800-member election 
committee that shall be composed of four groups: 200 from industrial, commercial, 
and financial sectors; 200 from the professions; 200 from labour, social services, 
religious, and other sectors; and the last 200 are members of the Legislative Council, 
representatives of district-based organizations, Hong Kong deputies to the National 
People's Congress, and representatives of Hong Kong members of the National 
Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.309 The British 
Hong Kong Government first introduced this sophisticated election system of 
“functional constituency” to Hong Kong in 1987 by a governmental Green called 
“The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government”.310  
The “functional constituency” system may recruit local elites to participate in 
politics and thus stabilise the governance, but on the other hand it results a 
substantial inequality of voting rights among Hong Kong residents. In a number of 
sectors associations instead of individuals are the basic unit of vote, which means 
one business elite’s voting right counts several times more than an ordinary Hong 
Kong resident. The “functional constituency” system also applies to the Hong Kong 
                                                
309 The Hong Kong Basic Law, Annex I.  
310 Green Paper: the 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government  (British Hong 
Kong Government ed., 1987). 
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Legislative Council. The 60-member legislature of Hong Kong consists of around 
one half of members from functional constituencies, while the other half returned by 
geographical constituencies through direct elections. (See Table 2) The Annex II of 
the Hong Kong Basic Law has prescribed the methods of formation of the second 
and third terms of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and indicates that if the 
HKSAR would amend the method after 2007, the amendment shall be passed with a 
two-thirds majority in the Legislative Council and reported to the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress for record.311 In 2004 when the 
Standing Committee of the NPC reviewed a report from then Chief Executive 
seeking decision in respect of a potential amendment of the method of formation of 
the Hong Kong Legislative Council, the NPC Standing Committee chose not to alter 
the composition of the Hong Kong legislature in 2008.312 One consequence of the 
current election system is the opposition parties – most returned from geographical 
constituencies – never achieves a majority in the Legislative Council. Hence it is not 
a surprise that the self-labelled “Hong Kong democrats” have forwarded a serious 
aspiration to universal suffrage to replace the “functional constituency” system as 
soon as possible.   
                                                
311 The Hong Kong Basic Law, Annex II. 
312 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the 
Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the 
Year 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
in the Year 2008, see Instrument 208 available at the Bilingual Laws Information System operated by 
the HKSAR Department of Justice at http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm. Retrieved on 19 
May 2011. 
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Table 2 Composition of Legislative Council of the HKSAR 
The Legislative Council Functional Constituencies Geographical Constituencies Others 
Term 1 (1998-2000) 30 20 10 
Term 2 (2000-2004) 30 24 6 
Term 3 (2004-2008) 30 30 0 
Term 4 (2008-2012) 30 30 0 
Term 5 (2012-2016) 35 nominally/30 substantially 35 nominally/40 substantially 0 
 
Three major opposition parties in the HKSAR all emphasise that the “universal 
suffrage” shall be the next step in constitutional development in Hong Kong. The 
Civic Party says: “As a cosmopolitan and advanced society, Hong Kong deserves a 
democratic politics that includes all citizens and truly speaks to their interests. This 
is not just our aspiration but also our right. We believe Hong Kong is ready for the 
election of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council by universal suffrage 
and it should be implemented without further delay.”313 The League of Social 
Democrats accuses the “little circle” of Hong Kong business elites of having 
monopolised Hong Kong politics based on the “functional constituency” system, 
and the PRC central government also sets obstacles to block universal suffrage and 
abet the political despotism of the “little circle”.314 The Democratic Party, as the 
                                                
313 The Party Platform of the Civic Party. 
314 The Party Policy of the League of Social Democrats.  
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largest opposition party in Hong Kong urges the “double universal suffrages” in the 
elections of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council too. The aspiration of 
universal suffrage among Hong Kong opposition parties has already transcended the 
right-left gap: the Democratic Party that endures political and economic liberties, 
the Civic Party that sits in centre-left, and the leftist League of Social Democrats 
share the same aspiration of further and fast democratisation, which, eventually 
presses on the HKSAR government and the central government of the PRC to 
respond seriously.  
On 11 July 2007, the HKSAR government published a governmental Green Paper to 
call for open consultation, especially as to when a universal suffrage shall be applied 
to Hong Kong elections after 2007. The options are 2012, 2017, or after 2017 for the 
election of Chief Executive, and 2012, 2016, or after 2016 for the Legislative 
Council. The Green Paper also gives a list of options to change the “functional 
constituency” system. The Chief Executive submitted another report to the Standing 
Committee of the NPC to seek a decision. Upon receiving the report from the Chief 
Executive, the Standing Committee of the NPC decided that the method of the 2012 
election of the Hong Kong Legislative Council shall not be altered at that moment, 
but the Standing Committee accepted that in 2017 the Chief Executive of the 
HKSAR can be elected through universal suffrage, while after the Chief Executive 
could be elected by this way, the Legislative Council can also be formed by the 
same method.315 In addition to this, the Standing Committee of the NPC also 
allowed a change of election method of the Chief Executive and the formation of the 
                                                
315 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the 
Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and 
for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 
2012, see Instrument 211 available at the Bilingual Laws Information System operated by the 
HKSAR Department of Justice at http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm. Retrieved on 19 
may 2011. 
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Legislative Council under the condition that the number of members of functional 
constituencies and that of the geographical constituencies must be the same.  
On 24 June 2010, the Legislative Council of the HKSAR passed the methods of 
2012 elections of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council. The original 
draft of the HKSAR Government contained: (i) add 10 members to the Legislative 
Council; (ii) five shall be elected by a universal suffrage, while the other five shall 
be elected amongst district councillors who themselves are elected directly by Hong 
Kong residents; (iii) add 400 members to the election committee of the Chief 
Executive, that means 100 for each and every group; (iv) 75 members of the newly 
added 100 in the four groups of the election committee shall be elected amongst 
district councillors. (See, Table 3) This draft could be passed with a two-thirds 
majority because the opposition parties refuted that this was another “functional 
constituency” design in nature, especially since the newly added 400 members of 
the election committee are overwhelmingly from functional constituencies. At the 
last moment, the Democratic Party and the HKSAR Government achieved a 
consensus after a meeting the representatives from the PRC central government. The 
core idea of the draft of the Democratic Party is that Hong Kong residents who did 
not have a vote in any “functional constituencies” now shall elect the newly added 5 
members of the Legislative Council for district councillors. In sake of “functional 
constituency”, these 5 members are in fact based on 3 million voters rather than 400 
district councillors now. Additionally, according to this idea all Hong Kong resident 
will have two votes: one for geographic constituency, another for functional 
constituency. The Democratic Party’s draft is much closer to the “double universal 
suffrages” than the original one, and the HKSAR Government finally accepted this 
version and successfully passed it in the Legislative Council with a two-third 
majority.  
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Table 3 The 2012 Election Committee of Chief Executive 
Constituent Parts in Newly Added Members  Total 
District  
Councillors 
Newly Added Member in the Legislative Council  Others 
Group 1 300    
Group 2 300    
Group 3 300    
Group 4 300 75 10 15 
 
4.4.3 Taiwan: De Jure Independence? 
Article 8 of the Anti-secession Act 2005 of the People’s Republic of China reads: 
“In the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under 
any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or 
that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that 
possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state 
shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”316 This article empowers the People’s Republic 
of China an arbitrary discretion on using military forces against the Taiwanese 
                                                
316 The Anti-secession Law, art 8. 
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independence movement, as well as renders the KMT in Taiwan a suspensive 
position across the Taiwan Strait.  
As the founding force of the Republic of China (ROC), the KMT has been hexed by 
the symbolic set of the ROC apparatus. The national flag is the partisan flag of the 
KMT in a red grounding; there is little difference between the ROC national 
emblem and the KMT partisan emblem. In this sense, the KMT does not prefer to 
replace the ROC title with something else, e.g. a “Republic of Taiwan” or “Republic 
of Formosa”. On 14 March 1991 the National Unification Council in Taiwan issued 
the “Guidelines for National Unification” that declared both Taiwan and the 
Chinese mainland are Chinese territory; based on Chinese culture, humanity, human 
rights, democracy and rule of law, the Chinese unification will be accomplished 
eventually, but the timing and means of unification shall benefit residents in Taiwan 
first.317 Although in the KMT eyes the “one China” is the “Republic of China” in 
constitutional terms, the KMT shares the 1992 Consensus, which equates to the 
“one China principle” in Chinese communist eyes. That is why the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) or the PRC does not identify the KMT as “’Taiwan 
independence’ secessionist” in political discourse, and since 2005 the old foes have 
revived their contact that was lost in the 1930s.  
Nevertheless, there are also many unachieved aspirations of the KMT, especially 
when being in charge of the Taiwanese authorities. The PRC never accepts a 
“double recognition” to both Beijing and Taipei. The PRC terminates diplomatic 
relations whenever a third state accepts Taiwanese ambassadors. In the United 
Nations, the PRC successfully took over the Chinese seat in the General Assembly 
and the Security Council in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 2758 that “expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from 
the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the 
                                                
317 The Guidelines for National Unification.  
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organisations related to it”. 318  Before the resolution was passed, the KMT 
representatives unilaterally declared the “ROC” would withdraw the seat in the 
United Nations; but this interpretation of the relation between the Taipei authorities 
and the United Nations only prevails in KMT historical documentations so far. The 
Taiwanese authorities may send economic and cultural delegations to most states 
that have a diplomatic relation with the PRC. Yet the head of the Taiwanese 
authorities, i.e. the “President of the Republic of China” never participates in major 
international summit because of pressure from Beijing; nor did the famous China-
friendly Taiwanese and KMT leader, Mr Ma Ying-jeou make a change in this 
regard. 
As the largest opposition party in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
has an alleged “Taiwanese independence” Party Platform, the most important 
extract from which reads:319  
Territorial sovereignty and self-government are the preconditions for modern nations 
to establish the rule of law and to develop international relations.  The facts that 
Taiwan is sovereign and independent, that it does not belong to the People's Republic 
of China, and that the sovereignty of Taiwan does not extend to mainland China, 
reflect historical realities as well as the present situation, and at the same time form 
part of the consensus of the international community.  According to this reality of 
sovereignty and independence, Taiwan should draw up a constitution and establish a 
nation.  Only then is it possible to guarantee respect and security for Taiwanese 
society and for individual citizens, and to offer the people the opportunity to pursue 
freedom, democracy, prosperity, justice and self-realization. 
The DPP accuses the KMT of unlawfully maintaining the “five Yuan system” in 
Taiwan, which actually was tailored for the Chinese mainland and does not suit the 
Taiwanese society. Based on the idea that “popular sovereignty” should rest in the 
                                                
318 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, 26th Session, A/RES/2758(XXVI) 
(1971). 
319 The Party Platform of the Democratic Progressive Party.  
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Taiwanese people, the DPP demands to overthrow the 1946 Constitution and 
establish an independent “Republic of Taiwan” or “Republic of Formosa” as early 
as possible. The DPP is generally a party of ethnic Hoklo, a subgroup of Han 
Chinese, but in Taiwanese population there are also 15% mainland migrations 
arriving with the KMT and another 15% ethnic Hakka people that is another 
subgroup of Han Chinese. The radical and exclusive aspiration of the DPP to create 
an indigenous Taiwanese state threatens the non-Hoklo Taiwanese residents, to say 
nothing of the fact that the PRC obviously cannot tolerate this. Against this 
background, the DPP on 8 May 1999 passed a Resolution on Taiwan’s Future. The 
resolution realises that the confrontations of national identity and constitutional 
aspirations between the DPP and other political forces, especially the KMT in 
Taiwan remains severe. Under this condition the DPP needs more pragmatic 
measures to implement the party platform rather than pushing the KMT and Chinese 
communists to the corner. The mostly referred part of the Resolution of Taiwan’s 
Future says: “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country. In accordance with 
international laws, Taiwan's jurisdiction covers Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, its 
affiliated islands and territorial waters. Taiwan, although named the Republic of 
China under its current constitution, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's 
Republic of China. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all 
residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite.”320 Actually the new resolution has 
changed the DPP aspirations to (i) Taiwan is a sovereign and independent county in 
the name of the “Republic of China”; (ii) Taiwan’s jurisdiction – not “sovereignty” 
in rhetoric – does not cover the Chinese mainland, thus reconciles with the 
constitutional framework of the ROC in Taiwan; (iii) Taiwan’s future shall be 
determined by Taiwanese residents directly, as it opposes the PRC Anti-secession 
                                                
320 Resolution of Taiwan’s Future of the Democratic Progressive Party.  
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Act 2005 that prefers cross-Strait negotiations instead of democracy in settling 
futuristic reunification down.321 
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
So far we have reached another milestone towards a conception of “constitutional 
law of peoples”. This chapter exhibited a series of Constitutions promulgated by the 
Chinese State since the end of the Second World War. The 1946 Constitution was 
drafted by a Chinese social democrat in the mainland and legendarily survives in 
Taiwan after regime changes and Taiwanese democratisation. The PRC 
government’s Constitutions are all political products. The 1954 and 1982 
Constitutions were produced after a process of deliberation and consultation and 
hence are modest in substance and style; the 1975 and 1978 Constitutions were 
made by Maoists and are comparatively radical as well as rough. Additionally we 
have also seen the outlines of the PRC government’s “ethnic regional autonomy” 
and “one country, two systems” policies. These materials have positively forged the 
conception of “constitutional law of peoples”, but the conception is also shaped by 
the apparent tension between the PRC central government’s effort to retain a unitary 
form of state and the unachieved constitutional aspirations of the peripheral 
societies.  
The PRC central government may recognise the distinctiveness of the peripheral 
societies from ordinary administrative divisions to a larger or lesser degree, but it 
never accepts that “international dual recognition” to both the PRC central 
government itself and any territorial authority of the peripheral societies could be an 
option; the PRC central government may keep its hands off existing representation 
systems of the peripheral societies that are employed to select political agencies, but 
                                                
321 An account of the Taiwanese independence movement see WANG, MEI-LING T., The Dust that 
Never Settles : the Taiwan Independence Campaign and U.S.-China Relations (University Press of 
America. 1999).  
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it is very reluctant to enhance and solidify democracy in the peripheral societies 
because even territorial representative government would defy the legitimacy of the 
central regime; the PRC central government is willing to reconcile, but it does not 
hesitate to maintain and develop military advantages in case reconciliation would 
not be possible; the PRC central government welcomes reciprocity warmly, so long 
as the peripheral societies do not push it too hard in the other three directions. 
However, this chapter has illustrated that the peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan may have their own constitutional agendas. For them, reciprocity 
is good but not necessary if other demands would be fulfilled; reconciliation is 
preferred to conflicts, but the peripheral societies are wary of the authoritarian 
regime of the PRC and its mighty force essentially deployed by Chinese communist 
elites in the politburo; emigrated Tibetans, Hong Kong democrats, and Taiwanese 
politicians all endorse the enhancement of representation in decision-making 
process; at last, a due recognition is the ongoing aim of the peripheral societies 
concerned. The new conception of Chinese constitutional law will not be successful 
unless it has attended to the constitutional aspirations of each and every peripheral 
society. Finally it is this tension between the PRC central government and the 
peripheral societies that definitely indicates the direction of “constitutional law of 
peoples”. 
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Chapter 5 Asymmetric Autonomy 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will focus on the asymmetry of the autonomous powers of Sinitic 
peoples. Chapter 4 examined Chinese constitutional accommodation of, and 
integration with, the peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan in terms 
of “ethnic regional autonomy” and “one country, two systems”, which indicated that 
despite the progress in the last thirty years, a number of constitutional aspirations of 
peripheral societies are still unachieved. In this context, further constitutional reform 
is probably needed to reflect the principles of recognition, representation, 
reconciliation, and reciprocity. This chapter will look at the cases with a 
comparative eye, arguing that the differences between one peripheral society and 
another are numerous. They have fundamentally shaped contemporary Chinese 
constitutional law, and are very likely to remain central in shaping the positive 
dimension of a new conception of “constitutional law of peoples”. Although there is 
no official “separation of powers” in Chinese constitutional system, in this chapter 
the following sections are organised in a sequence of “legislature”, “administration”, 
and “judiciary”. Each and every section will exhibit how asymmetric the three cases 
are. Against this background it would be unrealistic to pursue any symmetric ideal 
in the Chinese context, e.g. a liberal democratic federation or confederation of 
identical territorial units. 
It is unavoidable that the three peripheral societies will be compared. In addition to 
the political reason of enhancing the pressure to the state, the societies are learning 
from others whose success or failure happened in the same system when competing 
with the same rivalry. As some have noticed, emigrated Tibetans endorse the Hong 
Kong model while Taiwan disputes it. 322  By comparing the territories, the 
                                                
322 For the point that the PRC should use Hong Kong model to accommodate Tibet see DAVIS, 
Establishing a Workable Autonomy in Tibet. The positive comparison between Hong Kong and 
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asymmetry of their autonomous powers inevitably attracts scholarly attention. The 
term “autonomy” refers to the territorial self-governance constitutionally recognised 
by the host state, which enables the territory to be independent or at least different in 
running internal affairs from the rest of the state. Many recommend autonomy as a 
method to resolve ethnic, religious, and cultural conflicts within a sovereign state, 
Deng Xiaoping also utilised a constitutional design of territorial autonomy to 
embrace Hong Kong in a late communist state as we have already seen. Because 
these settlements are all aiming at specific conflicts of historical particularity and 
political peculiarity, the constitutional designs applied to each cannot be identical.323 
If there are multiple cases within a single state, they are also inclined to evolve 
unevenly based on a variety of territorial strength and weakness in asserting 
autonomy. Our three cases are not alone in developing asymmetric autonomy, but 
may be relatively classical in this regard.324  
5.2 LEGISLATURE 
5.2.1 Separate Constitutions 
The first issue with regard to territorial law-making power is whether it has a 
separate constitution that governs an autonomous legal system. In this regard, 
                                                                                                                                    
Taiwan see, ALLEN, Recreating 'One China': Internal Self-Determination, Autonomy and the 
Future of Taiwan. A slightly negative one between Hong Kong and Taiwan see COONEY, S, Why 
Taiwan Is Not Hong Kong: A Review of the PRC's One Country Two Systems Model for 
Reunification, 6 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 497,  (1997).  
323 WELLER, M. & NOBBS, K., Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts   
(University of Pennsylvania Press.), pp. 1-13. 
324 The United Kingdom also has classical asymmetry of territorial autonomies among Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland. WARD, ALAN J., Devolution: Labour's Strange Constitutional 
"Design", in The Changing Constitution, (Jeffrey L. Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 2007), pp. 111-
136. HIMSWORTH, CHRIS, Devolution and its Jurisdictional Asymmetries, 70 The Modern Law 
Review 31, (2007).  
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Taiwan and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hereinafter HKSAR) 
are more advanced than the Tibet Autonomous Region (hereinafter TAR). The 
Taiwanese authorities have taken over the 1946 Constitution made in and for the 
Chinese mainland with a list of “Additional Articles”. The People’s Republic of 
China (hereinafter PRC) and the Communist Party of China (hereinafter CPC) 
officially do not recognise the legality and legitimacy of this Constitution. However, 
the 1946 Constitution contains a provision indicating Chinese territorial boundaries 
should not be changed which implies a unity between Taiwan and the Chinese 
mainland under an imagined Chinese State. Hence the CPC prefers to maintain the 
1946 Constitution in Taiwan rather than to replace it with a new constitution to be 
made by and merely for Taiwanese residents. In previous chapters the constitutional 
institutions of Taiwanese authorities have been introduced, and the crucial point is 
under the 1946 Constitution and the Additional Articles Taiwan is exceedingly self-
consistent. The 1946 Constitution should be a truly “separate constitution” in term 
of being different from the PRC 1982 Constitution.  
Hong Kong, on the other hand, does not have a one hundred percent separate 
constitution of its own. The Hong Kong Basic Law has three faces: it is a “mini-
Constitution” of the HKSAR, and it is also a by-product of an international treaty – 
the Sino-British Joint Declaration – and, finally, one of the constitutional acts of the 
PRC.325 In other words: “The Basic Law is a unique document. It reflects a treaty 
made between two nations. It deals with the relationship between the Sovereign and 
an autonomous region [that] practices a different system. It stipulates the 
organizations and functions of the different branches of government. It sets out the 
rights and obligations of the citizens. Hence, it has at least three dimensions: 
international, domestic and constitutional”. The separateness of the Hong Kong 
Basic Law is emphasised by Hong Kong lawyers and legal academics by linking it 
                                                
325 HKASR v. Ma Wai-Kwan [1997] HKLRD 761, [1997] 2 HKC 315. Cited from JIANG, Written 
and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of Constitutional Government in China 
at 38. 
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with the international treaty.326 On the other side, mainland scholars stress that since 
the PRC National People’s Congress (hereinafter NPC) promulgated the Hong Kong 
Basic Law, it has already joined the legal family tree descending from the PRC 
1982 Constitution. Nevertheless, the Hong Kong Basic Law is considerably rigid in 
contrast to other PRC constitutional acts because the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
and numerous political commitments of CPC paramount leadership have endorsed it. 
In procedural terms, the PRC NPC should consult its Hong Kong Basic Law 
Committee first before formally proposing an amendment of the Hong Kong Basic 
Law, which is also different from the ordinary procedure of amending a PRC act. 
Hence the uniqueness of the HKSAR Basic Law is overwhelmingly granted. 
By contrast, there is no separate constitutional act in any sense for the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (hereinafter TAR). The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 
1984 provides: (i) that each and every “ethnic autonomous region” is entitled to 
promulgate its own “autonomous regulation” and “special regulation”; (ii) these 
ethnic autonomous regions shall have a list of powers to circumscribe national 
policy, vary national laws, and favour one or several nationalities (ethnic groups) in 
their administrative regions. But the texts of PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 
1984 are considerably abstract, and the ethnic autonomous region’s extraordinary 
conduct shall always be re-authorised or approved by a higher-level state organ. It is 
usually not a problem with regard to an ethnic autonomous region’s “special 
regulation”, which is a regional law that changes some provisions of a national law. 
An interesting instance of a “special regulation” is the TAR Regulation for 
Implementing the PRC Marriage Act of 1981 (hereinafter, Tibetan Marriage 
Regulation). The Tibetan Marriage Regulation on the one hand implements the 
national act to terminate some Tibetan customary rules such as polygamy and the 
                                                
326 Ng Ka Ling and Another v. The Direction of Immigration [1999] 1 HKLRD 315; (1999) 2 
HKCFAR 4. See also GHAI, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order : the Resumption of Chinese 
Sovereignty and the Basic Law.  
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unilateral burden for the maternal parent to raise filius nullius child.327 On the other 
hand, it adjusts the age of legitimate marriage in Tibet from a national standard of 
22(male)/20(female) to 20(male)/18(female), while declaring not to actively 
challenge existing Tibetan polygamy if the partners themselves remain silent.328 Yet 
the “autonomous regulation” is a different case. Two sorts of cases exist. For lower 
level ethnic autonomous regions, the autonomous regulation usually goes through 
the approval process smoothly. However, for province-level ethnic autonomous 
regions the “autonomous regulation” becomes a “mission impossible”. Because the 
PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984 promises so many powers to ethnic 
autonomous regions, once province-level ones may contextualise these powers in 
respective administrations, there would be five new “mini-Constitutions” emerging. 
At least in symbolic terms, five new indentificatory sites could be a pressurising 
phenomenon for a notionally unitary state. Besides, the respective state ministries of 
the PRC State Council are all extremely reluctant in sharing powers with ethnic 
autonomous regions. The TAR may request its fiscal power according to the 
national act, but given the ministerial interests, the NPC cannot approve the Tibetan 
Autonomous Regulation with ease.  
5.2.2 Separate Systems of Law 
If a separate “constitution” may symbolise the grundnorm in each respective 
periphery, there are now at least three “legal systems” or less arguably, “systems of 
law” headed by the abovementioned basic documents.  
Imperial Chinese law and the civil law system through Japanese colonialism but 
also modern Chinese laws that imitate Germen laws have historically influenced the 
                                                
327 The Tibetan Marriage Regulation, arts 2 and 6.  
328 The Tibetan Marriage Regulation, arts 1-2.  
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Taiwanese system of law.329  Since the 1950s breakaway, the Taiwanese system of 
law has been successful and sustainable reproducing in the jurisdiction of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. But whether it theoretically qualifies an integrated 
“system of law” depends on: (i) whether Taiwanese laws apply to somewhere other 
than the Taiwanese jurisdiction, especially in the Chinese mainland, and (ii) whether 
PRC laws apply in Taiwanese jurisdiction? It is understandable that the attitudes of 
the Taiwanese authorities and the PRC government differ in answering these two 
questions. The Taiwanese authorities never officially clarify their attitude on the 
legality of law of the “Republic of China” in its notional territory of the Chinese 
mainland. Article 11 of the Additional Articles provides that the “relation” between 
people in (Chinese) free area and those in the Chinese mainland shall be attended by 
special laws, however, in narrowest sense, to apply “ROC” laws to mainland people 
or not is not a genuinely relational issue between two areas but one of categorical 
nature. 330  The ambiguity for Taiwanese authorities is: on the one hand, in 
accordance with the Act Governing Relations Between The People Of The Taiwan 
Area And The Mainland Area (hereinafter “Cross-Strait Relations Act”) 
mainlanders who have confessed anti-ROC activities to the Taiwanese authorities in 
the first place while arriving in Taiwan shall be given immunity from treason, which 
means mainlanders are still bound by “ROC” criminal laws; but on the other hand, 
Article 41 of that Act reads:  
Civil matters between the peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area shall be 
subject to the laws of the Taiwan Area except otherwise provided for in this Act. 
Civil matters between any two or more of the people of the Mainland Area and those 
between any of the people of the Mainland Area and any foreign national shall be 
                                                
329 ALLEE, MARK A., Law and Local Society in Late Imperial China: Northern Taiwan in the 
Nineteenth Century (Stanford University Press. 1994). WANG, T. AI-SHENG, Legal reform in 
Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945: the Reception of Western law (University of 
Washington Press. 2000).  
330 The Additional Articles, art. 11. 
 
 Kai Tu 
- 166 - 
subject to the provisions of the Mainland Area except otherwise provided for in this 
Act.331 
Hence the Taiwanese authorities have given up the application of “ROC” laws to 
“civil matters” among mainlanders or between mainlanders and legal aliens. 
Besides, Article 41 of the Cross-Strait Relations Act also indicates how the 
Taiwanese authorities treat PRC laws, though in the name of “provisions of the 
Mainland Area”. Under the condition of “civil matters” and “excluding Taiwanese 
residents”, the Taiwanese authorities have recognised not only the validity but also 
the legality of PRC laws applying in the Chinese mainland. But in Taiwan, the PRC 
laws are merely involved in cases in need of applying “private international rules” 
when mainlanders are of concern.  
The Hong Kong legislature may have less control over the system of law than the 
Taiwanese authorities because of its subordination to the PRC central government. 
Article 8 of the Hong Kong Basic Law says: “The laws previously in force in Hong 
Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation 
and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and 
subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region.”332 These laws include the common law and rules of equity 
applying in England on 30 June 1997 but exclude Westminster parliamentary acts. 
Actually parliamentary acts did not apply unconditionally to Hong Kong in the past 
either. On 5 April 1843 Hong Kong incorporated then English laws to the territory, 
but after that only parliamentary acts specifically referring to Hong Kong would 
apply. In 1966 a new Hong Kong ordinance omits the “cut-off” day and indicates 
English common law and rules of equity apply to Hong Kong so far as they are not 
abolished by legislation affecting Hong Kong. To ignore the “cut-off” day is 
welcome, but a bizarre consequence is a few of Hong Kong judges thus want to 
                                                
331 The Taiwan-Mainland Relations Act, art 41(1-2). 
332 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 8. 
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revive outdated common law rules because they were abolished by parliamentary 
act not affecting Hong Kong. After all the more reasonable understanding held in 
the case of Gensburger v. Gensburger is that the ordinance “was to bring the 
applicable common law up to date in the sense that it was the common law which 
existed in England on the day of decision that was to be in force, it was the amended 
common law which applied, whether the amending Act of Parliament took effect in 
Hong Kong or not”.333 
Another issue concerns Article 18 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which reads:  
National laws shall not be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
except for those listed in Annex III to this Law. The laws listed therein shall be 
applied locally by way of promulgation or legislation by the Region. 
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress may add to or delete from 
the list of laws in Annex III after consulting its Committee for the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the government of the Region. Laws 
listed in Annex III to this Law shall be confined to those relating to defence and 
foreign affairs as well as other matters outside the limits of the autonomy of the 
Region as specified by this Law. 
In the event that the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress decides 
to declare a state of war or, by reason of turmoil within the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region which endangers national unity or security and is beyond the 
control of the government of the Region, decides that the Region is in a state of 
emergency, the Central People's Government may issue an order applying the 
relevant national laws in the Region.334 
Some are wary that despite of the state of emergency, the PRC central government 
would add more national laws to the Annex III thus break up the Hong Kong system 
of law. But this is not really sufficient, because: (i) the contemporary Annex III only 
                                                
333 WESLEY-SMITH, PETER, An Introduction to the Hong Kong Legal System (Oxford University 
Press 3rd ed. 1998), pp. 40-41. 
334 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 18. 
 
 Kai Tu 
- 168 - 
contains several laws in regard with national symbols and national boundary, and 
Article 18 (3) has prescribed that new laws to be added shall also be confined in 
similar areas while not in contrast to the autonomy of Hong Kong; (ii) even if the 
PRC would have lengthened the list, new laws shall not be applied until 
incorporated by Hong Kong local legislation; (iii) the most crucial point is as a 
common law jurisdiction, the final say is held by common law courts that the PRC 
and Hong Kong legislative institutions could not control. Hence it would be unlikely 
for the PRC central government to change the Annex III, while it rather politically 
prefers to declare a state of emergency, but both are politically unwise.  
The Tibet Autonomous Region is incorporated in the PRC system of law, and the 
PRC national laws apply in judicial courts in Tibet. The autonomy of TAR law is 
and can be undermined by the sovereign legislature of the PRC whenever it 
considers necessary. Yet this is a superficial argument. The TAR legislature, i.e. the 
Tibetan people’s congress, is entitled to make two sorts of law: (i) local 
regulations;335 and (ii) autonomous regulations and separate regulations.336 In the 
PRC all provincial people’s congress and dozens of provincial capitals and 
metropolitan cities are also authorised by the NPC to make their own local 
regulations to explicate the national provisions. The PRC Legislation Act also 
allows said institutions to formulate local regulations before a related national law is 
promulgated. Yet “once the laws or administrative regulations formulated on such 
matters by the State come into effect, the provisions in local regulations which 
contradict the said laws or administrative regulations shall be null or void, and the 
organs that have formulated such regulations shall promptly amend or annul the 
provisions.”337  
                                                
335 The Tibetan Legislation Regulation, art 8. 
336 The Tibetan Legislation Regulation, art 7. 
337 The PRC Legislation Act 2000, art 64(2). 
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Having taken local regulations for granted, the Tibet Autonomous Region should 
also promulgate one territorial autonomous regulation and multiple separate 
regulations. The sort (ii) here is different with sort (i) because local regulations shall 
be a by-product of respective national laws, while national laws do not bind 
autonomous and separate regulations. In other words, the Tibetan people’s congress 
is entitled to promulgate laws that contradict national laws – it seems if there are a 
significant number of such laws, it is not impossible to envisage a separate Tibetan 
system of law emerging eventually. The restriction nevertheless reads: 
Where [autonomous and separate regulations] are concerned, adaptation on the basis 
of the characteristics of the local nationality (nationalities) may be made in 
autonomous regulations and separate regulations, but such adaptation may not 
contradict the basis principles of the laws and administrative regulations; where the 
provisions of the Constitution and the Law on Regional National Autonomy as well as 
the provisions in other laws and administrative regulations specially formulated to 
govern the national autonomous areas are concerned, no adaptation may be made.338 
First, these autonomous and separate regulations may contradict national laws in 
literal expression occasionally, in principle a contingency between the two tiers of 
law remains irremovable; second, if national laws specified for ethnic autonomous 
regions are already explicitly drafted, the respective ethnic autonomous region could 
not use regional laws to challenge them. This demonstrates that the PRC central 
government has been fully aware the danger of Tibet and other minority 
nationalities maximising autonomous and separate regulations in their territories 
thus creating fragmental jurisdictions across the country. 
5.2.3 Law-making Procedures 
The crucial difference between the law-making procedures of Taiwan and the other 
two cases is the Taiwanese authorities have added a referendum process.339 The 
                                                
338 The PRC Legislation Act 2000, art 66(2). 
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referendum process is formulated to replace the abolished National Assembly of the 
“ROC” that had been convened to ratify important national laws made by the 
Legislative Yuan or to amend the 1946 Constitution. However, the referendum with 
respect to ordinary laws and that of amending the Constitution result in different 
theoretical interpretations. 340  The “constitutional referendum” symbolises a 
constituent subjectivity in deciding the political future of its independent and 
general will, which is the cornerstone of the Taiwanese independence movement in 
constructing a narrative of Taiwanese “popular sovereignty”. This idea is critically 
refuted by the PRC central government, which has been threatened by the 
impression that the unity of the “Chinese people” would thus split. However, it may 
comfort the PRC in a way that since 2004 the six referenda held in Taiwan had all 
failed because of the low percentage of turnout. The Taiwanese Referendum Act 
dictates a simply majority out of a turnout of half of the national electorate.341 
Article 30 of the Referendum Act reads:  
As regard to the result of voting for a proposal of referendum, if the number of voters 
reaches not less than 1/2 of the total persons having the right of voting in the country, 
municipality or county (city) and more than 1/2 of the valid ballots agree, the 
proposal is adopted. 
If the number of voters does not reach the quantity prescribed in the preceding 
Paragraph or the consenters are not more than 1/2 of the valid ballots, the proposal is 
vetoed. 
So far no Taiwanese referendum has successfully stimulated enough voters, which 
is a consequence of the tremendous gap between the two political and 
indentificatory camps of Taiwanese residents – the Blues and the Greens, or the 
Kuomintang (hereinafter KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (hereinafter 
DPP). For instance, the third proposal of referendum raised by the DPP is whether 
                                                
340 TIERNEY, STEPHEN, Constitutional Referendums: A Theoretical Enquiry, 72 Modern Law Review 
360,  (2009).  
341 The Referendum Act, art 30. 
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the alleged “illegitimate” partisan property of the KMT shall be returned to 
Taiwanese people, while the fourth simultaneously raised by the KMT is whether 
the corrupted leadership shall be investigated by an independent commission set up 
by the Legislative Yuan and cooperated by other governmental branches. The 
background is that in the authoritarian era the KMT had processed a great deal of 
public property while a “ROC” President from the DPP is convinced to the crime of 
embezzlement.342  
The more interesting cases are the fifth and sixth proposals of referendum. The DPP 
in the fifth proposal asked: since being replaced by the People’s Republic of China 
in 1971, the “Republic of China” had lost its seat in the United Nations, in this 
situation Taiwan has been an “international orphan”, do you agree the government 
shall join in the United Nations in the exact name of Taiwan? While the KMT in the 
sixth proposal, which is meant to be an alternative to the DPP one, suggested: do 
you agree our country shall return to the United Nations and other international 
organisations in any name of feasibility and dignity, e.g. the Republic of China, 
Taiwan, or others, in accordance with a realistic and flexible strategy? The fifth and 
sixth proposals embodied the profound disagreement in identity to the “Republic of 
China” and its political history, while also demonstrating the difference of 
international and cross-Strait policies between the independence-attached DPP and 
the ROC-attached KMT. Unless either party would command a confident majority 
of the Taiwanese electorate, the referendum in Taiwan is hardly productive as a 
constitutional referendum should be, which is of significant meaning to the political 
life of the people.  
For Tibet and Hong Kong, their law-making autonomy is more or less controlled by 
the PRC legislature. Besides to add new laws to the Annex III of the Hong Kong 
                                                
342 Mr Chen Shui-bian has been charged and jailed by Taiwanese judicial courts for his illegally 
laundering money and other crimes. He is an ex-president of the Taiwanese authorities and the 
Democratic Progressive Party.  
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Basic Law, the PRC central government does not have sufficient mechanisms to 
impose any law to Hong Kong. However, for statutes made by the HKSAR itself, 
the PRC retains the power to disagree and annul. Article 17(2) of the Hong Kong 
Basic Law reads: “Laws enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region must be reported to the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress for the record. The reporting for record shall not affect the entry 
into force of such laws.”343 While Article 17(3) explains:  
If the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, after consulting the 
Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under 
it, considers that any law enacted by the legislature of the Region is not in conformity 
with the provisions of this Law regarding affairs within the responsibility of the 
Central Authorities or regarding the relationship between the Central Authorities and 
the Region, the Standing Committee may return the law in question but shall not 
amend it. Any law returned by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress shall immediately be invalidated. This invalidation shall not have 
retroactive effect, unless otherwise provided for in the laws of the Region.344 
The provisions are clear. However, in the past decade the NPC Standing Committee 
has not returned any statutes to the HKSAR Legislative for said reasons.   
The NPC and its Standing Committee are also entitled to annul the provincial 
regulations made by the Tibet Autonomous Region’s people’s congress or its 
standing committee. But in the Tibetan case, the PRC central legislature shall do 
this in a similar but more complex manner. After the local regulations have been 
promulgated by the Tibetan people’s congress, they shall be reported to the NPC 
Standing Committee for the record. The Standing Committee shall assign one or 
several committee(s) to review the regulation and submit a report indicating whether 
the regulation is in conformity with the 1982 Constitution and other national laws, if 
not, the review committee(s) will return the regulation to the local legislature and 
                                                
343 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 17(2). 
344 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 17(3). 
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request amendment. If the local legislature refuses to amend, the reviewing 
committee could appeal the Standing Committee, or through it to the NPC, to annul 
the local regulation eventually.345 It is necessary to point out that the reviewing 
process for ordinary local regulations and those of “autonomous and separate 
regulations” will be different. For, the autonomous and separate regulations shall 
literally contradict national laws, so the NPC and its Standing Committee are 
required to prevent a collapse of unitary legal system in the first place. The 
autonomous and separate regulations for ethnic autonomous regions are not valid 
until approved by the higher legislature, and in the Tibet case, that is the NPC and 
the Standing Committee.346 Emigrated Tibetans oppose this process of approval that 
seems to undermine Tibetan autonomy to the extent of a less ordinary province,347 
but they misunderstand the difference between ordinary local regulation and those 
of autonomous and separate nature. 
In concluding this section, it is helpful to recall the principles of recognition, 
representation, reconciliation, and reciprocity towards a conception of 
“constitutional law of peoples”. The PRC central government’s attitudes towards the 
separateness of territorial constitution and system of law illustrate its variety of 
recognition to the peoplehood of the peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan. In fact the PRC central government is reluctant to recognise any substate 
peoplehood at all, but the Taiwanese authorities have used the 1946 Constitution, 
Additional Articles, and the Cross-Strait Relations Act to successfully draw a 
boundary separating Taiwanese residents from Chinese mainlanders. Due to the 
heritage of Hong Kong common law, the separateness of Hong Kong system of law 
                                                
345 The Procedure to Record and Review Administrative Regulation, Local People’s Congress 
Regulation, Autonomous and Special Regulation of Ethnic Autonomous Region, and Regulation 
of Economic Special Zone. 
346 The PRC Legislation Act 2000, art 66(1). 
347 Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People.  
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has also been recognised by the PRC central government eventually. So the 
weakness of Tibet in this regard is apparent. The principle of representation urges 
the Sinitic peoples to make reasonable decisions in addressing the relationship with 
the PRC central government, and vice versa. The law-making procedures of the 
peripheral societies may more or less reflect their relative competence to reach 
decisions of reasonableness. In the Taiwan case, Taiwanese residents have from 
time to time refused to vote in controversial referenda that could provoke anger and 
anxiety in and outwith Taiwan. So the PRC central government does not need to 
dread devolving more legislative powers to Hong Kong and especially Tibet. The 
limited recognition of PRC laws in Taiwan, the existence of the Annex III of the 
Hong Kong Basic Law, and the coordination between Tibetan regulations and PRC 
national laws all exemplified the peripheral societies’ acceptance of the principle of 
reconciliation. Despite the tension and turbulence, long-term peace in this region is 
also a sign of the PRC central government’s desirability to reconcile. If all parties 
are prepared to compromise, it is possible that they may develop a reciprocal 
relationship too.  
5.3 ADMINISTRATION 
5.3.1 Head of Administration 
The autonomous power of each and every head of administration in the three 
societies has all broadened in the last three decades, but the extent varies. Chapter 4 
has briefly introduced that the Taiwanese administration endures a premier-
presidential system while swaying to a consolidating presidential system since the 
making of the Additional Articles. The 1946 Constitution mandates a parliamentary 
consent to the appointment of the head of the Executive Yuan, which is the 
contemporary administration of the “ROC” government in Taiwan, while the 
Taiwanese president now may appoint the head of the Executive Yuan without such 
an approval from the Legislative Yuan. Against this background, although the 
administrative powers of the Taiwanese authorities legally reside in the Executive 
Yuan rather than the President of the “ROC”, who, in constitutional terms, shall be 
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merely in charge of defence and foreign affairs and mediate five Yuan-s, the 
President in practical terms has taken control over the entire administration due to 
his power to nominate the head of the Executive Yuan. Combining the two offices 
of the President and the head of the Executive Yuan – say, the Taiwanese “Premier” 
– together, the administration in name of the “ROC” has been efficient and effective 
in self-governance of almost all aspects of internal affairs.  
However, the role of the President in managing external affairs is not yet 
satisfactory for the Taiwanese residents. Because the “ROC” government is 
recognised by few states across the world, the President never enjoys many state 
receptions. Heads of both sides of the Taiwan Strait are not yet ready to meet in 
international summits. The pragmatic arrangement is to allow a lower level 
Taiwanese official to take part in instead. When the DPP was incumbent, only 
ministerial representative could appear in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(hereinafter APEC) meetings. Since the alleged “China-friendly” President from the 
KMT took over, a former Deputy President of the “ROC” has participated the 
APEC meetings as “the representative of the leadership” yearly. The PRC President 
and the Taiwanese representative of the leadership encounter in APEC meetings in 
the name of partisan heads: the PRC president is also the Party Chief of the 
Communist Party, while the Taiwanese representative is the honourable chairperson 
of the KMT. This scenario shows how the PRC “shortens” the Taiwanese 
authorities on the international stage as the Taiwanese independence movement 
claims, but on the other hand, both sides also seek to establish a footing as “equal” 
as possible in this circumstance.  
Modelled on the British Hong Kong Governor who “was not merely the head of the 
executive, but also the head of the legislature and responsible for the appointment 
and dismissal of the judiciary”,348 the Chief Executive of the HKSAR secures a 
                                                
348 GHAI, Hong Kong's new constitutional order : the resumption of Chinese sovereignty and the 
Basic Law. p. 282.  
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wide scope of powers in his pocket, while losing his formal role in the other two 
branches of the government. 349  The powers of the Chief Executive may be 
understood more clearly through Article 62 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which 
provides the Hong Kong administration to “(i) formulate and implement policies; (ii) 
conduct administrative affairs; (iii) conduct external affairs as authorised by the 
[Central Government]; (iv) draw up and introduce budgets and final accounts; (v) 
draft and introduce bills, motions and subordinate legislation; and (vi) designate 
officials to sit in on the meetings of the legislature and represent the government.”350 
There is no wonder that this so-called “executive-lead system” conforms to the 
interests of the PRC central government that may control the HKSAR executive 
branch merely through the appointment of the Chief Executive. By stressing the 
supremacy of the Chief Executive, the PRC central government does find a way to 
syncretise the policies of the central and the local governments. 
But even so, there is a difference between internal and external situations. In the 
international stage, the PRC central government never appears to stand together 
with the HKSAR administration in parallel. To use the same instance of the APEC, 
the Chief Executive of the HKSAR as the head of a member of the organisation also 
takes part in the summits and meetings regularly. But in face-to-face meetings 
between the PRC president and the Chief Executive, the two do not use an equal 
footing.  
The role of the Chairperson of the Tibetan administration is not entirely clear. The 
PRC Act for Local People’s Congress and Local Government (Local Government 
Act) prescribes the powers and functions of PRC local governments generally. 
Article 62(1) provides that the head of administrations shall be responsible for 
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respective administration.351 But being different from the HKSAR whose Chief 
Executive may or may not agree with consultative advice of the Executive Council 
that is appointed by the Chief Executive himself,352 the Tibetan administration are 
not run by the Chairperson personally. Article 63 of the Local Government Act 
dictates the PRC administrations to deal with important issues based on collective 
decisions of an administrative council comprising the head and his deputies.353 In 
the Tibetan case, the administrative council sits with the Chairperson and a number 
of vice chairs, and the Tibetan Chairperson may not drive the TAR on his own.  
Much more importantly, in the PRC one party-state the head of administration shall 
be politically subordinate to his respective Party Chief. The Tibetan Chairperson 
usually is the deputy Party Chief of the TAR, while the true leadership of Tibet 
should belong to the TAR Party Chief. The PRC uses the nomenklatura system to 
appoint officials and agents, which is a comprehensive list of posts to be filled by 
selected persons.354 The nomenklatura system is in hands of the party, so the TAR 
Party Chief takes the principal control over the administration. Against this 
background, the Tibetan head of administration becomes the weakest among the 
three cases, which mirrors the fact that the autonomous powers of Tibet are far less 
than Hong Kong, to say nothing of Taiwan. This explains the Tibetan Chairperson is 
not entitled to participate in international summits, although the Tibetan head once 
was an important figure in regional “diplomacy”.355 
                                                
351 The PRC Local Government Act 1979, art 62(1).  
352 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 56. 
353 The PRC Local Government Act 1979, art 63. 
354 CHEN, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People's Republic of China. pp. 74-5. 
355 An interesting historical account of the diplomatic role of the Panchen Lama see, TELTSCHER, The 
High Road to China : George Bogle, the Panchen Lama and the First British Expedition to Tibet.  
 
 Kai Tu 
- 178 - 
5.3.2 Social Policies 
5.3.2.1 Custom Territory, Fiscal Policy and Taxation 
Being separate custom territories of Taiwan and the HKSAR, there is no fiscal 
redistribution between these two territories and the PRC central government. For 
Taiwan, the de facto independence government may efficiently and effectively 
manage its own fiscal policy and taxation. The only harassment in the past for the 
Taiwanese authorities was whether goods from the Chinese mainland should be 
entitled “importation” in terms of inter-national trade. This leads to the question 
whether persons smuggling across the Taiwan Strait should be punished according 
to the very provision in the criminal law, or if it would be legitimate to transport 
goods between the two sides. The Cross-Strait Relations Act answered this question 
in Articles 29-32. Nevertheless, these articles are primarily concerned about the 
security issue since the Chinese civil war never officially ended. Article 29 
provides: “Unless permitted by the competent authorities, no Mainland vessels, civil 
aircraft or other means of transportation may enter into the restricted or prohibited 
waters of the Taiwan Area or the controlled airspace of the Taipei Flight 
Information Region.”356 The Taiwanese Anti-Smuggling Act in its Article 12 also 
makes it clear that to transport goods across the Strait illegally should be regarded as 
illegal exportation/importation thus punished in accordance with the Act.357  
After the 1997 sovereign handover, the status of a separate customs territory of 
Hong Kong became a challenging issue to the Taiwanese authorities. There are two 
interpretations in parallel. One is that the HKSAR has now been incorporated into 
the “Mainland Area” in terms of Taiwanese laws. For, Article 2(2) of The Taiwan-
Mainland Relations Act reads: “2. ‘Mainland Area’ refers to the territory of the 
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Republic of China outside the Taiwan Area.”358 Some argue that Hong Kong should 
fall into the category based on the sovereign handover. Thus also be regulated 
according to the aforementioned Article 12 of the Taiwanese Anti-Smuggling Act. 
But others dispute this argument by contending that the Taiwanese authorities have 
been fully aware of the autonomous status of the HKSAR and promulgated a 
separate law – Act Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macau (hereinafter 
“Hong Kong Relations Act”) – to attend to the relation between Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. Article 1(2) of the Hong Kong Relations Act clarifies that “for matters not 
provided for in this Act, the provisions of other relevant laws or regulations shall 
apply”, but crucially the Cross-Strait Relations Act is not applicable except where 
explicitly specified in this Act.”359 Article 35 of the Act also provides: “Hong Kong 
or Macau goods imported or carried into the Taiwan Area shall be deemed as 
imported items. The inspection, quarantine, administration, and taxation of such 
items shall thus be carried out in accordance with relevant import laws and 
regulations. Goods exported to Hong Kong or Macau shall be deemed as export 
items and shall be treated in accordance with the relevant export laws and 
regulations.”360  Combining the two provisions, most judges on the bench of the 
criminal court of the “ROC” Supreme Court agreed to exclude the application of the 
Taiwan-Mainland Relations Act in combating smuggling between Taiwan and Hong 
Kong.361 
In the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, the PRC has promised: “(6) The Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of a free port and a 
separate customs territory. … (8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
will have independent finances. The Central People's Government will not levy 
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taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”362 The provisions have 
been enacted by the arrangement of Hong Kong’s membership in the WTO as a 
separate custom territory and Article 106 of the Hong Kong Basic Law reads:363 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have independent finances.  
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall use its financial revenues 
exclusively for its own purposes, and they shall not be handed over to the Central 
People's Government.  
The Central People's Government shall not levy taxes in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region. 
Accordingly, the HKSAR may manage its own finance, fiscal policy, and taxation 
independently, while at the same time: “The land and natural resources within the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be State property. The Government 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible for their 
management, use and development and for their lease or grant to individuals, legal 
persons or organizations for use or development. The revenues derived therefrom 
shall be exclusively at the disposal of the government of the Region.”364 In a 
nutshell, the PRC central government does not collect a single penny from Hong 
Kong.  
The PRC central government did not promise identical arrangements to Tibet as to 
Hong Kong but in fact it would be unwise and arguably immoral to profit from one 
of the most undeveloped economies around the globe. The PRC Ethnic Regional 
Autonomy Act 1984 guarantees that ethnic autonomous regions may take advantage 
from territorial economy in priority to other administrative divisions, even that of 
the host state. For instance, Article 28 provides: “In accordance with legal 
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stipulations and unified state plans, autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous 
areas may give priority to the rational exploitation and utilization of the natural 
resources that the local authorities are entitled to develop.”365 Another similar 
provision is Article 32:366  
Autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas have the power to autonomously 
administer the finances of their areas. All revenues accruing to the ethnic 
autonomous areas under the financial system of the state shall be managed and used 
by autonomous agencies in these areas on their own.  
Regional autonomous governments enjoy preferential treatment from the next higher 
level of government when transfer payments are being calculated as part of the 
unified state financial system.  
Article 34 formally empowers ethnic autonomous regions to vary local taxation. The 
provision reads: “While implementing the tax laws of the state, apart from those tax 
reduction items that should be centrally examined and approved by the state, 
autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas may grant tax exemptions or 
reductions for certain items that belong to local financial revenue and that should be 
encouraged or given preferential tax terms. The decisions of autonomous 
prefectures and autonomous counties on tax reduction and exemption are reported to 
the people's governments of the relevant provinces, autonomous regions, or directly-
administered municipalities for approval.” 367  After 1994 the PRC state has 
distributed taxes between the central and local governments according to difference 
of sorts. The PRC central government mainly collects the customs as well as 
turnover taxes from major state-run corporations and industries, while the local 
governments rely on income tax and some others. Article 34 does not allow ethnic 
autonomous regions to vary national/central taxes, but they may give some local 
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366 The PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984, art 32. 
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taxes up with the approval of a higher authority. However, it is interesting that the 
Tibet Autonomous Region does not establish a local taxation bureau in parallel with 
the national branch as other provinces and ethnic autonomous regions; in Tibet, the 
national branch also takes the burden of collecting “local taxes”. This does not mean 
the PRC central government will use this mechanism to shadow Tibet’s fiscal power; 
actually the reason is the Tibetan administration is not efficient and effective enough 
to collect taxes in the harsh environment, thus there is no need to build two taxation 
bureaux when even one lacks of staff. The taxes of Tibet all fall into the pocket of 
the TAR, additionally the PRC central government also pours a lot of money to 
Tibet each and every year: in a pound spent by the TAR, there are more than ninety 
pence from the centre. So the result is the PRC does not collect a single penny from 
Tibet after the 1950s reformation either, as it has done in Taiwan and Hong Kong.  
5.3.2.2 Transportation and Security 
With help from the United States, the Taiwanese authorities so far may defend the 
territory in a situation of cross-Strait homeostasis. The Taiwanese authorities never 
drop their alertness because in the PRC perspective the Chinese civil war has not 
been officially ended, which urges the Chinese authorities to complete the process 
of national unification whenever possible. This task is written down in both the 
1982 Constitution and the PRC Anti-Secession Act 2005 where the Article 8 states 
if peaceful means are exhausted the PRC government will use military force to 
unify the nation.368  Against this background, the Taiwanese authorities, although 
having ceased the martial law repressing “communist rebels” in the 1990s, did not 
genuinely lower the special barrier to restrict mainland-related activities in 
Taiwanese society, especially with respect to cross-Strait transportation. This policy 
was encapsulated into “three no-s” in the Taiwanese side: no contact, no negotiation, 
no compromise; while in the Chinese mainland there are “three links”– the PRC 
government asked the Taiwanese authorities to revive direct links of postal service, 
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transportation, and trade as soon as possible. For the Taiwanese denying the direct 
links, cross-Strait transportation should be made though a third territory, usually 
Hong Kong. This was originally a concern of the KMT, which is the old enemy of 
the Chinese communists. But in the 2000s the DPP, though differs with the KMT in 
many aspects, continued the “three no-s” voluntarily. The KMT, on the other hand, 
has moved away from this position after having revived communication with the 
Chinese Communist Party in 2005. In 2008 the KMT took over Taiwanese 
administration. Since then, a series of cross-Strait negotiations have produced a list 
of agreements on reviving the direct links of postal service, transportation, and trade 
across the Strait. The postal service across Taiwan Strait had been functioning in 
practice; the only arrangement of need was a formal recognition of the direct link, 
which eventually was reached on 4 November 2008. However, the direct link of 
airfreight is not that simple. On 4 November 2008 the two representative agencies of 
both sides of the Strait also agreed to open a direct airline between the Chinese 
mainland and northern Taiwan; on 26 April 2009 the airline connecting the Chinese 
mainland and southern Taiwan was also set up. For Taiwan’s benefit, it is better to 
include the “fifth freedom” in these agreements but the Chinese mainland so far is 
not willing to push that button. The “fifth freedom” means an airline may carry 
passengers from its own country to the second country, and go on from the second 
one to a third one. To restrict cross-Strait airfreight within the extent which concerns 
merely the two sides of the Strait can help to avoid the legal dispute of whether the 
airline is “national” or “international”. When a third country is involved, an 
international agreement should be signed among at least three parties, which 
eventually raises the issue of Taiwanese “international space” that principally pulls 
the Chinese mainland back; additionally, the Chinese mainland may provide far 
more midway stops than Taiwan, and it also lets the Chinese mainland down 
economically.  
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The HKSAR has the legal competence and political capacity to manage its internal 
transportation and security, while external transportation and security partially rest 
on the shoulders of the PRC state. The Hong Kong Basic Law in Article 14 
provides:369 
The Central People's Government shall be responsible for the defence of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region.  
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be 
responsible for the maintenance of public order in the Region. 
Military forces stationed by the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region for defence shall not interfere in the local affairs of the 
Region. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, when 
necessary, ask the Central People's Government for assistance from the garrison in 
the maintenance of public order and in disaster relief. 
In addition to abiding by national laws, members of the garrison shall abide by the 
laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
Expenditure for the garrison shall be borne by the Central People's Government. 
Hong Kong maintains a separate police force from the Chinese mainland to carry on 
the responsibility of Article 14(2), which since the 1840s has turned the city into 
one of the safest polities around the world. The PRC stations a People’s Liberation 
Army (hereinafter PLA) garrison that recruits soldiers exclusively from the Chinese 
mainland, and local residents of the HKSAR are not obligated to serve the PLA 
within or outside Hong Kong because the Annex 3 of the Basic Law does not 
include the PRC Conscription Act, which in the Chinese mainland calls all citizens 
up to national service. Although only a tiny percent of Chinese male citizens are in 
active military duty – due to the great number of Chinese population – Chinese 
conscription remains mandatory regardless of individual ethnicity, career, religion, 
or education. In British Hong Kong, the United Kingdom also stationed a garrison 
in Hong Kong with soldiers from outside the territory, but on the other hand, there 
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was the Royal Hong Kong Regiment (hereinafter “The Volunteers”) recruiting 
members from local residents voluntarily, which had been funded by the British 
Hong Kong government. However, it is hard to compare British military institution 
with the PLA. The PLA, as a communist military force, in each and every unit has a 
communist commissioner pairing the military commander, and the former not only 
secures a sort of civil control over the military force but also manages ideological 
discipline. If the PLA would start to recruit local residents from Hong Kong, it 
could be a problem to harmonise them with the PLA; but if the PRC would establish 
a separate local regiment without communist commissioners, the CPC might lose 
the control over a part of the military service, which indeed is a crisis in the Chinese 
context. It is not possible to extend the mandatory conscription to all Chinese 
citizens in Hong Kong, let alone non-Chinese residents, but if a few of Chinese 
citizens in Hong Kong would like to join the PLA voluntarily without discomfort to 
the communist way of military life, it is arguably not a problem for either side.  
Article 24 of the PRC Ethnic Regional Autonomy Act 1984 provides: “Autonomous 
agencies in ethnic autonomous areas may, in accordance with the military system of 
the state and practical local need and with the approval of the State Council, 
organize local public security forces for the maintenance of public order.”370 The 
ethnic autonomous regions need the approval of the State Council to catch up the 
Hong Kong model where the police force has been separate and independent from 
central supervision for decades. There is no such “local public security forces” 
organised in that manner. In spite of the army, the PRC state maintains a system of 
“armed police” to guard tremendously important industrial sites, prisons, 
transportations, as well as to combat terrorists and suppress riots. The “armed 
police” is under joint command from the Central Military Commission (as a quasi-
military force) and the State Council (as a part of the national police force), and in 
local administrative regions the armed police branch is commanded and supervised 
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by both the central commander and the local administration’s police department. So 
the Tibet Autonomous Region, as one local administration of the PRC rather than 
the “ethnic autonomous region”, may also influence the armed police branch in 
Tibet. But the “local public security force” referred in Article 24 seems to be 
exclusively managed by the ethnic autonomous region, which obviously is a 
different institution from the armed police stationed in Tibet. The PRC does not 
establish any ethnically defined branch in military forces, so there is no “Tibetan 
regiment” in the PLA or the PRC armed police. Many ethnic Tibetans carry their 
national service in various parts of the country, while many soldiers of other 
ethnicities are stationed in Tibet as well.  
Outside Tibet, the ethnic Tibetans once had a guerrilla force in the name of Chushi 
Gangdruk (literally, four rivers and six ranges) with support from the United States. 
They fought the Chinese in Sino-Nepalese border throughout the 1960s. 
Occasionally it also received assistance from the KMT in Taiwan. But in 1974, the 
United States stopped the funding. Under pressure from the Nepalese government, 
the Dalai Lama ordered them to surrender. Nowadays, ethnic Tibetans also form an 
Indo-Tibetan Border Police (hereinafter ITBP) of Indian armed force. The Indian 
government recruits emigrated Tibetans and trains them in the ITBP. Against the 
background of Sino-Indian War in the 1960s, the ITBP is not a positive presence to 
China, and more or less a military threat to the security of the Tibet Autonomous 
Region. 
5.3.2.3 Language, Education, and Religion 
Language, education, and religion are crucial in socialisation and formation of self-
identity. Generally speaking, the Taiwanese authorities are once again advanced, but 
Hong Kong’s autonomy is merely a bit less than Taiwan. The Tibet Autonomous 
Region’s situation is unique, not only because it is integrated by the PRC system but 
also there is a Tibetan culture involved.  
In Taiwan there are four main linguistic groups: the Hoklo, the Hakka, post-war 
migrants from the Chinese mainland, and the aboriginal ethnic groups. Except the 
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aboriginals, the others all speak Chinese. But the three Han Chinese subgroups in 
Taiwan cannot understand each other’s mother tongue. The traditional Chinese 
characters unite the Han Chinese subgroups. Few tried a sort of Hoklo literature 
with a Romanised form but had failed. In the 1950s the KMT brought Mandarin to 
Taiwan, and established it as the national language to bridge the four linguistic 
groups. The Mandarin language played that role in Taiwan before, but after 1895 
the Japanese language replaced it until the end of the Second World War. The status 
of Mandarin remains. However, since the Taiwanese democratisation the Hoklo 
majority has been interrogating the legitimacy of using a mother tongue of 15% 
population as the official language rather than that of 70%. The DPP showed 
enthusiasm for promoting the “Taiwanese” language publicly, while pro-DPP media 
are also overwhelmingly using “Taiwanese” instead of Mandarin Chinese. On 12 
February 2003 a Taiwanese act for promoting the “national language” was 
abolished, which once required all public media to use Mandarin.371 Sometimes the 
Hoklo majority regards their mother tongue should be the true “Taiwanese”, 
although the Hakka group arrived in the island no later than the Hoklo group, to say 
nothing of the aboriginals. The response from the Taiwanese authorities is to set up 
a television channel exclusively for the Hakka group.372 Nevertheless because of the 
correspondence between the written form and Mandarin Chinese, as well as the 
international influence of the Mandarin language, it is not quite possible for any 
“Taiwanese” languages to replace Mandarin’s status as the common language in the 
long term.  
In Hong Kong local residents mainly speak Cantonese instead of Mandarin, and in 
written form they use traditional Chinese characters. The Hong Kong Basis Law in 
Article 9 provides: “In addition to the Chinese language, English may also be used 
as an official language by the executive authorities, legislature and judiciary of the 
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Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”373 The praxis is in judiciary courts the 
English language remains dominant, while the executive and legislative branches 
are used to adopt Cantonese in everyday communication.  
In the Tibet Autonomous Region the status of Tibetan language in official usage has 
been wobbling for decades. The Provisional Regulation of Learning, Using, and 
Developing the Tibetan Language in the Tibet Autonomous Region 1987 
(hereinafter “Tibetan Language Regulation 1987”) was determined to champion for 
the Tibetan language after the Cultural Revolution. The Tibetan Language 
Regulation 1987 requested public sectors in Tibet must use Tibetan as the primary 
language in communication. The most astonishing provision reads: if there is no 
Tibetan version, lower level governmental organs may not accept any 
documentation from higher ones.374  If the Tibetan Language Regulation 1987 
applies completely, the Tibetan language undoubtedly will take advantage in Tibet; 
however, the regulation as a local regulation promulgated by the Tibetan people’s 
congress is challenged by the PRC National Language and Character Act 2000, 
which prescribes that governmental organs should use the Mandarin language and 
simplified Chinese characters.375 The Act is a national law with a higher authority 
than the Tibetan regulation. Although the Act compromises that other law may take 
an alternative position, whether the Tibetan regulation qualifies a “law” (that in 
narrow definition should be promulgated by the National People’s Congress) in 
PRC terms is called to question. The consequence is that a new one replaced the 
Tibetan Language Regulation 1987 in 2002, which allows public sectors to use 
either Tibetan or Mandarin or both in everyday communication. The Tibetan 
Language Regulation 2002 loosens many provisions that favour the Tibetan 
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language. Instead of being bound to learn Tibetan, individuals now may choose to 
speak either Tibetan or Chinese in Tibet. 
Both Taiwan and Hong Kong manage separate educational systems from the 
Chinese mainland. For Taiwan, the authorities’ main concern is to maintain the 
barrier between Taiwanese and mainland students to the extent that mainland 
students, as potential migrations, will not compete with Taiwanese students in the 
internal market. The process of amending the “mainland-student three laws” 
illustrates that point. In the past The Cross-Strait Relations Act only allowed 
Taiwanese students to study in Taiwanese-managed schools in the Chinese 
mainland, while other mainland educational qualifications were not recognised in 
Taiwan.376 Hence not only mainland students but also Taiwanese students studying 
in mainland educational institutions are barred from advanced education in Taiwan. 
This discrimination specially aiming at mainland students becomes inappropriate 
when they are becoming one of the largest consumer groups in the international 
educational market. In 2010 the provision barring mainland students in the Cross-
Strait Act was abolished. But the traditional alertness towards mainland “Trojan 
Horse” remains. The revised University Act in Article 25, although opens arms for 
mainland students, prohibits them to study in institutions or departments “involving 
national security or secrets”.377 The Cross-Strait Act also blocks mainland students 
from taking part in examinations for civil service and professional qualifications.378  
In contrast to this attitude, the Taiwanese authorities have been more positive 
towards Hong Kong and emigrated Tibetan students, both are neither “legal alien” 
nor “mainland residents” in the “Republic of China”.379 For Hong Kong, it is 
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understandable because (British) Hong Kong has developed an educational system 
that deserves reasonable recognition around the world. Article 136 of the Basic Law 
also guarantees: “On the basis of the previous educational system, the Government 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate 
policies on the development and improvement of education, including policies 
regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, 
the allocation of funds, the examination system, the system of academic awards and 
the recognition of educational qualifications.” 380  The Hong Kong educational 
institutions shall be genuinely autonomous in recruiting staff from outside Hong 
Kong.381 There is no worry for anyone including the Taiwanese authorities that the 
Chinese communist will initialise their “brain-washing” machines in the special 
administrative region.  
For Tibetans, the territorial educational institutions are integrated into the national 
system generally. In fact the education in Tibet remains backward, and it is not the 
time to talk about an “autonomous” educational system that, hypothetically, should 
postpone the process to combat illiteracy without outside assistance. We do not need 
to take any political stand on this issue. The emigrated Tibetan communities are also 
eager to seek international aid in developing modern education, especially with 
regard to natural science and technology for which the Tibetan language is 
struggling in building up a comprehensive vocabulary. The PRC sets up many 
institutions in China proper to recruit and train ethnic Tibetan students with better 
equipments and living condition; additionally national examinations in Tibet also 
lower the standard of passing to qualify more Tibetan students to join the market. 
Are these integrationist or assimilationist policies? After all there is no politically 
irrelevant policy. The Taiwanese authorities’ favourite educational policy also 
echoes its “ROC” imagination, while emigrated Tibetan students should learn how 
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to carry on the cause to fight against the Chinese. What really matters is a number. 
The Dalai Lama envisions seven in ten students should learn the culture and 
tradition, others Chinese and science; others may think it should be the reverse. 
The last part of this section examines the religious autonomy in the three territories, 
but this issue is slightly different from the other two issues mentioned in this section. 
For linguistic and educational autonomy, we are talking about whether and how 
much the territorial authority may control the social policy in these regards. 
However, the religious autonomy is merely in some parts concerning the territorial 
authority, in others it concerns the competence and capacity of religious authority. 
The religious freedom is well protected in Taiwan and Hong Kong. For instance, the 
Holy See of the Roman Catholic Church as the only European sovereign 
recognising the “Republic of China” may appoint bishops in Taiwan without 
governmental interference. In 1998 the late Pope John Paul II appointed Paul Shan 
Kuo-Hsi a Catholic cardinal in Taiwan, who is also the fifth Chinese cardinal in 
history. The sixth Chinese cardinal in Roman Catholic Church is Joseph Zen Ze-
Kiun in Hong Kong appointed by Pope Benedict XVI. Article 141(4) of the Hong 
Kong Basic Law reads: “Religious organizations and believers in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region may maintain and develop their relations with 
religious organizations and believers elsewhere.”382 It should be noted that in the 
PRC 1982 Constitution Article 36(4) provides: “Religious bodies and religious 
affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.”383 So Article 141(4) of the Hong 
Kong Basic Law has moved a big leap in this regard in comparison with the Article 
36(4) of the PRC Constitution. 
We can go on to another instance of Buddhism. Despite originally coming from the 
Subcontinent, Buddhism is already an indigenous religion in Sinitic territories. 
There is no “foreign domination” involved, especially talking about the Chinese 
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Buddhism thriving in China proper. An interesting case is Tzu Chi, a Chinese 
Buddhist organisation based in Taiwan, which carries on relief and charity around 
the world including the Chinese mainland. The PRC government determined to 
embrace Tzu Chi but refused the Holy See, partially because the latter has a 
“colonist” history while the former symbolises the cultural link across the Strait.384 
However, talking about Tibetan Buddhism, the situation turns a bit intolerant. The 
PRC Administration for Religious Affairs issued a “method” in 2007 to regulate the 
process of finding Tibetan tulkus, which prescribes lamas should be recognised by 
governmental offices in accordance with their rankings. 385  The lamas with 
tremendous influence should be recognised by the State Council, e.g. the 11th 
Panchen Lama; below the Panchen Lama, the 17th Karmapa was recognised by the 
Administration for Religious Affairs. In fact the Republic of China also had a series 
of acts regulating the registration, appointment, promotion, and process of finding 
Tibetan tulkus,386 but the Taiwanese authorities finally abolished them all. In the 
liberal democratic isle these acts have turn to be overwhelmingly meaningless: few 
tulkus live there, and the liberal democracy should theoretically be neutral to the 
religious affairs. 
To conclude, there is powerful administration in all the three territories. The “ROC” 
President in Taiwan can appoint the Premier without approval of the Taiwanese 
legislature, the Chief Executive in the HKSAR is a gubernatorial head of the 
territory, and in Tibet the Tibetan Chairperson is also privileged, let alone the CPC 
Party Chief who is almost a despot because of the nomenklatura system. So the 
                                                
384  For PRC’s attitude towards Taiwanese Buddhist organisation see "Harmonious Society", 
"Peaceful Re-unification", and the Dilemmas Raised by Taiwanese Philanthropy, in The Chinese 
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385 The Method of Regulating the Process of Finding Tulkus of Tibetan Buddhism.  
386 The Method of Lama Registration. The Method of Lama Appointment. The Method of Lama 
Incarnation. The Method of Rewarding and Punishing Lama. The Regulation for Lama Monastery.  
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democratic elements in all the three territorial governments are not as many as those 
in liberal democracies. In terms of representation, this situation is not perfection but 
relatively acceptable so long as the peripheral societies can sustain the existing 
representative or accountable government in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and at least 
guarantee there is a mechanism of consultation in Tibet. Ironically, the powerful 
administrations are not strong enough to be duly recognised by the PRC central 
government. Obviously, the PRC leadership is trying to prevent the “ROC” 
President from being visible on the international stage on an equal footing with the 
PRC President, and this policy seems also applicable to the Dalai Lama. The Chief 
Executive of the HKSAR and the Tibetan Chairperson are both inferiors, and this is 
the red line to be defended by the PRC central government. However, both the PRC 
central government and the peripheral societies are making progress in terms of 
reconciliation. The Taiwanese authorities have shown an attitude of more openness 
towards the Chinese mainland now, and the emigrated Tibetans abandoned their 
weapons decades ago. Lastly, the PRC central government is politically wise to give 
up the power of taxation in Hong Kong and hypothetically in Taiwan as well, and it 
also pours a lot of money to Tibet since the takeover. But the peripheral societies are 
not the only beneficiaries, as the PRC central government needs to use economic 
interests to gain support for its policies in other areas.  
5.4 JUDICIARY 
5.4.1 Judicial Independence 
It is of no surprise that the judiciary in the Tibetan Autonomous Region is once 
again the weakest among Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The Tibetan judiciary is 
determined to resolve increasing social disputes among persons and serve the 
common interests of Party-state in this way.387 The autonomy of Chinese judiciary 
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is limited. The Article 126 of the 1982 Constitution admits: “The people's courts 
shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power independently and are not 
subject to interference by administrative organs, public organizations or 
individuals.”388 The 1982 Constitution does not mention the legislature, neither the 
Party, nor internal interference from within the courts.  
As the sovereign organ of the state, the National People’s Congress is entitled to 
“supervise” the courts and do whatever necessary it deems in its own will.389 There 
are rounds of debate concerning the legitimacy and feasibility of legislature 
“supervising individual cases”, however, the legislature itself has not yet stepped 
into the judicial field. It is obvious that the members sitting in the legislature lack 
the training and expertise, but the legislature never gives that possibility up in the 
context where no “separation of powers” exists. Secondly, Chinese judiciary 
remains under cast-iron control of the Communist Party of China. The CPC is not 
an ordinary “public organisation” in Chinese terms, which has a Political and 
Legislative Affairs Committee to control the intelligence, police, prosecutors, and 
judicial courts. The Committee stands behind a curtain so there is no reliable 
description of the relationship between the party and courts in everyday praxis. But 
this arrangement at least suggests the de-politicisation of Chinese courts remains to 
be finished. For internal interference within the judiciary, there is more information. 
In Chinese courts, there is an adjudicative committee consisting of the leadership of 
the courts and some senior judges. If the case before the bench is complex and 
beyond the confidence of judges in the panel – many in China are still lacking 
sufficient training and expertise in delivering the judgement by oneself – the panel 
should refer the case to the adjudicative committee for an advisory opinion. This 
procedure sounds not ideal because the adjudicative committee does not hear the 
case personally and their consciousness is built upon somewhat secondary 
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impression from those sitting in the panel. But senior judges in the adjudicative 
committee may provide considerably better legal discretion while the leadership will 
deal with the political responsibility of the judgment, which though rare, would 
endanger a judge’s career. A defence of the system is when the adjudicative 
committee is involved, there is an internal division of labour in the court: the juniors 
act as a “jury” deciding the issue of fact while the seniors address the law. But this 
after all raises the question that who is really running the trial? 
Binding by the triple constraints, the Tibetan judiciary’s autonomy is very limited. 
For the legislative constraint, Article 124 of the PRC 1982 Constitution reads: “The 
People's Republic of China establishes the Supreme People's Court and the local 
people's courts at different levels, military courts and other special people's courts. 
... The organization of people's courts is prescribed by law.”390  In the plain 
expression, only the Supreme People’s Court is of an irremovable nature that has 
been guaranteed by the Constitution. Hypothetically, the entire Tibetan judiciary can 
be abolished by the sovereign legislature of the National People’s Congress that is 
entitled to establish national institutions by law.391 Historically, the modern Tibetan 
judiciary was indeed installed by the PRC central government after the “democratic 
reformation”, which situation makes the said hypothesis even more convincing. For 
the one party-state constraint, the Tibetan judiciary is under the control and 
supervision of the CPC leadership. The CPC itself is a highly centralised 
organisation that also undermines the autonomy of the Tibetan judiciary. Even the 
legislature and the party would not interfere for political reasons, the Tibetan 
judiciary’s autonomy is still limited. Because PRC laws are of a highly unitary 
nature and in Tibet except for a few the Tibetan laws are very similar and in 
consistency with national acts, the Tibetan judiciary cannot defend themselves by 
claiming expertise of local knowledge. On the contrary, Tibet is backward in 
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developing legal professionalism. The national bar exam has to lower the standard 
in Tibet to recruit enough lawyers and judges to fill in the posts. In addition to this, 
the Tibetan judiciary never gets the bigger and final say on any tribunal. The 
national Supreme People’s Court always has a mechanism to take each and every 
case to its own jurisdiction. In spite of the ordinary appellate procedure, the national 
Supreme People’s Court may use “response” to reference from lower courts to 
influence the discretion of Tibetan judiciary. Different from ordinary courts that are 
merely entitled to decide concrete disputes, the Supreme People’s Court can also 
issue abstract law-like “judicial interpretation” to bind lower courts in interpreting 
the law. So the result is the Tibetan judiciary is the least possible option on which 
the Tibetan people may rely to sustain territorial autonomy. In fact the central 
authorities never admit there is a chance either. In establishing the “ethnic 
autonomous regions”, the 1982 Constitution provides what “autonomous powers” 
shall be given to the legislature and administration of “ethnic autonomous regions”, 
while saying: “The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas are the 
people's congresses and people's governments of autonomous regions, autonomous 
prefectures and autonomous counties.”392 The Constitution never accepts that the 
judiciary of “ethnic autonomous regions” shall be a part of the “organs of self-
government”, which implies there is no expectation that the territorial judiciary 
should stand out. On the contrary, the crucial responsibility for courts may be to 
“uphold the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system” as a whole.393 
In contrast to the Tibetan case, judicial independence is one the most serious 
promises the PRC had written down in the Hong Kong Basic Law. Article 85 of the 
Basic Law provides: “The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
shall exercise judicial power independently, free from any interference. Members of 
the judiciary shall be immune from legal action in the performance of their judicial 
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functions.” To protect the autonomous performance of judicial functions, the Basic 
Law in the Article 88 prescribes: “Judges of the courts of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region shall be appointed by the Chief Executive on the 
recommendation of an independent commission composed of local judges, persons 
from the legal profession and eminent persons from other sectors.” To remove a 
judge from his position for misbehaviour, there must be a tribunal consisting of not 
fewer than three local judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Court of Final 
Appeal.394 Only “The Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal and the Chief 
Judge of the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be 
Chinese citizens who are permanent residents of the Region with no right of abode 
in any foreign country”;395 other “Judges and other members of the judiciary of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be chosen on the basis of their 
judicial and professional qualities and may be recruited from other common law 
jurisdictions.”396 Secondly, in addition to the arrangement of appointment of local 
judges, the new Hong Kong courts have grasped the power of administration of 
justice in their own hands. In the British system, the Lord Chancellor’s multiple role 
has been long contested: for, as a member of the cabinet the Lord Chancellor was 
also the head of the judiciary and sat time to time as a judge on the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords before the UK Constitutional Reform Act of 
2005, which although transforms judicial functions of Lord Chancellor to the Lord 
Chief Justice of England and Wales, does not cut all the connections between the 
Lord Chancellor and the judiciary off.397 However, as Colin Turpin and Adam 
Tomkins observes: “The Lord Chief Justice has an enhanced capacity to influence 
decisions in relation to the administration of the court system, including decisions 
                                                
394 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 88(1). 
395 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 90(1). 
396 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 92. 
397 The discussion of the relation between Lord Chancellor and judicial independence see, TURPIN & 
TOMKINS, British Government and the Constitution, pp. 115-124. 
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on resources for the administration of justice”.398 The confusion of ministerial and 
juridical roles disappears in the new system of Hong Kong. Now the Chief Justice 
of the Court of the Final Appeal is empowered to “be the head of the Judiciary and 
shall be charged with the administration of the Judiciary and such other functions as 
may from time to time be lawfully conferred on him.”399 The power to appoint local 
judges of the Chief Executive in accordance with recommendations of the Chief 
Justice is based on the Chief Executive’s role as the head of the region instead of 
head of the administration. Horizontally the judicial independence of the Hong 
Kong judiciary is stable.  
In Taiwan, Article 80 of the 1946 Constitution provides: “Judges shall be above 
partisanship and shall, in accordance with law, hold trials independently, free from 
any interference.”400 This provision intentionally emphasise that political parties 
shall not interfere with judges. The Judicial Yuan’s committee consisting of 24 
members from the Judicial Yuan, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative 
Court, and the Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries is in charge of 
the appointment of local judges in Taiwan.401 The Judicial Yuan, except its Council 
of Grand Justices, is generally an organ for administration for justice. The ordinary 
civil and criminal cases flow to the Supreme Court, while the administrative courts 
in Taiwan are to decide disputes with regard to administrative law with the Supreme 
Administrative Courts as their head. The Discipline of Public Functionaries is 
responsible for internal discipline and disputes in civil service. These organs have 
                                                
398 Id. at 119. 
399 The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, sec. 6(2) in Chapter 484 available at the 
Bilingual Laws Information System operated by the HKSAR Department of Justice. 
 http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm. Retrieved on 19 May 2011. 
400 The 1946 Constitution, art 80. 
401 The Personnel Appointment Committee of the Judicial Yuan Rule for Personnel Appointment, 
arts 1-3. 
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together formed the highest layer of Taiwanese final appeal. 402  Since the 
committeepersons and judges to be appointed all come from the judicial system or 
at least are qualified based on a high standard of professionalism, the autonomous 
judiciary is by and large free from political appointment. The only place where the 
administration may have a say in judgeship appointment is the Council of Grand 
Justices, which consists of nine Grand Justices who shall be nominated by the 
“ROC” President and approved by the Legislative Yuan. But the Council of Grand 
Justices as the organ to interpret the Constitution has a very different nature from 
ordinary courts of justice. The Grand Justices do not have lifetime tenure and each 
shall sit in the council no more than eight years except the President and Deputy 
President.403  
Different from the Hong Kong case, in Taiwan it is not unnecessary for the Council 
of Grand Justices to clarify that in the panel the chief justice does not have powers 
more than others in deciding the cases. We have seen in the PRC courts, junior 
judges shall from time to time submit cases to the judicial committee for opinions 
from senior judges and the leadership of the court. To avoid this, the Grand Justices 
in their Interpretation No, 539 explain: “… the chiefs of the panels of the courts are 
to supervise the matters of the panels, which are auxiliary judicial administrative 
matters to facilitate judicial functions. The chiefs may serve as the presiding judge 
on a panel. However, if there is no chief of a panel or if he is not available, a senior 
judge may be appointed presiding judge. The chief judge serving as the presiding 
judge on a panel has the power to direct the proceeding of the case. In addition to 
such power, there is no difference between the presiding judge and other judges of 
the panel. The post of a presiding judge is designed for the purpose of conducting 
                                                
402 LUO, The Legal Culture and System of Taiwan, pp. 13-17. 
403 The Additional Articles, art 5. 
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the proceedings of the lawsuit uniformly. It differs from the post of a chief judge, 
which is administrative in nature.”404  
5.4.2 Constitutional Jurisdiction 
It is of interest that the three cases or judiciaries are representing three very different 
as well as typical models of constitutional jurisdiction so long as there is 
constitutional jurisdiction at all in Tibet. Scholars as early as Hans Kelsen have 
categorised judicial review over administrations and (delegated) laws into two 
forms: one is based on the praxis of common law courts that deal with the 
administrative misuse and alleged unconstitutional laws in hearing real cases; the 
other is embodied in continental designs that establish one special organ to review 
the constitutionality.405 Whereas the communists never trusted the undemocratic 
judiciary, many state-socialist countries including the PRC insist the parliamentary 
organ shall have a monopoly over the power in deciding constitutionality. The PRC 
1982 Constitution authorises the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress to “interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement” as well as to 
annul unconstitutional laws, regulations, and decisions alike.406 Since this model of 
constitutional review is not a judicial discretion but essentially renders a political 
organ the power to check itself, whether it can be called constitutional “jurisdiction” 
is a question.  
This brings us to the most serious concern in the recent Hong Kong constitutional 
history starting from the sovereign handover. Based on the common law model, the 
Hong Kong judiciary reckons the courts rather than the political organs shall decide 
                                                
404 The English version of the Interpretation cited from LUO, The Legal Culture and System of 
Taiwan. p. 16. 
405 KELSEN, HANS, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the 
American Constitution, 4 The Journal of Politics 183,  (1942). 
406 The 1982 Constitution, art 67. 
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the constitutionality of administrative actions or laws in hearing cases. Actually the 
Hong Kong judiciary has become even more active and radical than it was before 
the sovereign handover. Under the British rule, the Hong Kong judiciary could not 
challenge primary acts promulgated by the Westminster Parliament in accordance 
with the Diceyan theory of “parliamentary sovereignty”. They could even be more 
humbled because in the colony the institution of courts itself was never 
constitutionally secured. Metamorphosing from this old body, the Hong Kong High 
Court once held that the Hong Kong judiciary couldn’t challenge the laws and 
decisions issued by the NPC or its Standing Committee either. The newly created 
HKSAR Court of Final Appeal does not agree so:407 
Under the Chinese Constitution (Articles 57 and 58), the National People's Congress 
is the highest organ of state power and its permanent body is the Standing Committee 
and they exercise the legislative powers of the state. So their acts are acts of the 
Sovereign. The jurisdiction of the Region's courts to examine their acts to ensure 
consistency with the Basic Law is derived from the Sovereign in that the National 
People's Congress had enacted pursuant to Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution the 
Basic Law for the Region. The Basic Law is a national law and is the constitution of 
the Region.  
… 
In HKSAR v Ma Wai Kwan David, which concerned the survival of the common law 
in the new order and the legality of the Provisional Legislative Council, the Court of 
Appeal (Chan CJHC, Nazareth and Mortimer VPP) held, accepting the Government's 
submission, that the Region's courts have no jurisdiction to query the validity of any 
acts of the National People's Congress since they are acts of the Sovereign. It was held 
that the jurisdiction of the Region's courts is a limited one to examine the existence 
(as opposed to the validity) of the acts of the Sovereign or its delegate. In our view, 
this conclusion of the Court of Appeal as to the jurisdiction of the Region's courts is 
wrong. The correct position is as stated above. 
                                                
407 Ng Ka Ling v. The Director of Immigration [1999] 1 HKLRD 315; [1999] 2 HKCFAR 4.  
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We may understand this holding as a Hong Kong version of bi-polar sovereignty 
recently developed by common law radicalism that argues the common law– in fact 
the Crown in the courts – shall have a parallel status with the Crown in the 
parliament, or, the so-called parliamentary sovereignty only ever existed because the 
common law courts accept it while this attitude is not unchangeable.408 But the 
Hong Kong judiciary finds an even better stand than British unwritten constitution 
in supporting their argument: for Hong Kong, the “mini-Constitution” of Hong 
Kong Basic Law explicitly admits the courts’ status and powers that originally 
derives from the Chinese sovereignty per se resting in the NPC. The court declares:  
In exercising their judicial power conferred by the Basic Law, the courts of the Region 
have a duty to enforce and interpret that Law. They undoubtedly have the jurisdiction 
to examine whether legislation enacted by the legislature of the Region or acts of the 
executive authorities of the Region are consistent with the Basic Law and, if found to 
be inconsistent, to hold them to be invalid. The exercise of this jurisdiction is a matter 
of obligation, not of discretion so that if inconsistency is established, the courts are 
bound to hold that a law or executive act is invalid at least to the extent of the 
inconsistency. Although this has not been questioned, it is right that we should take 
this opportunity of stating it unequivocally. In exercising this jurisdiction, the courts 
perform their constitutional role under the Basic Law of acting as a constitutional 
check on the executive and legislative branches of government to ensure that they act 
in accordance with the Basic Law. 
Neither the British Privy Council nor the Court of Session or Queen’s Bench had 
said so, but actually the HKSAR Court of Final Appeal has identified itself as 
functioning like the Supreme Court of the United States, which is another common 
law court of final appeal under a rigid written constitutional document with a capital 
letter “C”. 
                                                
408 See Sir Stephen Sedley [1995] PL 386, 389, in TURPIN & TOMKINS, British Government and the 
Cconstitution, p. 66. 
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The Council of Grand Justices in Taiwan has been fully aware the Taiwanese model 
of constitutional jurisdiction belongs to the continental category, in the J. Y. 
Interpretation No. 371, which is also one of the most important constitutional 
interpretations issued by the Council, says:  
Based on the constitutional principle of separation of powers, modern countries with 
a written constitution and rule of law have set up a judicial review system. Those 
which do not have a special judicial tribunal for judicial review delegate this power to 
their ordinary courts through precedents, as the United States does, or through 
explicit constitutional provisions, as Japan does (Article 81 of the 1946 Constitution). 
In those countries which have special judicial tribunals for judicial review, the 
constitutionality of statutes is reviewed by the special judicial tribunals, such as the 
Constitutional Courts of Germany (Articles 93 and 100 of the 1949 Basic Law), 
Austria (Articles 140 and 141-1 of the 1929 Constitution), Italy (Articles 134 and 136 of 
the 1947 Constitution), and Spain (Articles 161 and 163 of the 1978 Constitution). 
Different countries with different situations could not be expected to have the same 
systems and applications. Nonetheless, their purposes are all to protect the 
constitution's highest authority in law, as well as to maintain a judge's independence 
in exercising his duties, in order that in trying a case, a judge shall obey nothing but 
the constitution and statutes without any interference. Because our legal system 
mainly adopted the statutes of continental countries, the development of our judicial 
review system has been very similar to those of the abovementioned continental 
countries since our Constitution went into effect. 
The Council rules that the procedure of constitutional review shall be: 
A judge shall have no capacity to hold a statute unconstitutional, and shall not refuse 
to apply a statute for that reason. Nonetheless, since the Constitution is the state's 
highest authority, judges have an obligation to obey the Constitution over any other 
statutes. Therefore, in trying cases where judges of different levels have suspected, 
with reasonable assurance, that the statute applicable to the cases is unconstitutional, 
they shall be allowed to petition for interpretation of its constitutionality, regardless 
of the levels where the cases are pending. This may eliminate a judge's dilemma of 
obeying the Constitution and applying the controversial statute, as well as avoid the 
waste of judicial resources. In the abovementioned situation, judges of different levels 
may suspend the pending procedure on the ground that the constitutionality of the 
statute is a prerequisite issue. At the same time, they shall provide concrete reasons 
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for objectively believing the unconstitutionality of the statute, and petition to the 
Justices of the Yuan to interpret its constitutionality.  
However, to block unbearable case flow towards the Council, the Grand Justices 
also explain in J. Y. Interpretation that they will consider no specific disposition of 
the administration, but merely carry on the duty of review statues by interpreting the 
Constitution.  
5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has shown the asymmetry of territorial autonomous powers among 
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The three peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan can rely on the legislative, judicial, and administrative branch of the 
government respectively in responding or resisting the pressure of the PRC central 
government. For Tibet, the Tibet Autonomous Region is unusually the weakest of 
the three in asserting its autonomy, but the most promising governmental branch for 
Tibet would be the legislature if it can promulgate autonomous and separate 
regulations inconsistent with national provisions of the PRC. Although there is not 
yet an autonomous regulation as such, which may qualify another sub-Constitution, 
it is a legal promise that will be realised in due course. For Hong Kong, this chapter 
has mentioned that the Hong Kong judiciary always stands in the front line to 
defend regional autonomy and luckily their work has been widely regarded as a 
success. For Taiwan, the de facto independent entity’s only deficient capacity has 
been unconditional autonomy in amending the constitution. Besides that in all 
branches the Taiwanese authorities has been so far running the regime efficiently, 
especially in the aftermath of democratisation and the abolition of martial law. But it 
is the Taiwanese administration that has a direct contact with the PRC central 
government in cross-Strait negotiations. This is the feasible way to construct the 
relationship between the two sides, and it is also preferred by the PRC central 
government that has no intention to confront pro-independence Taiwanese 
politicians in the territorial legislature. The asymmetric autonomy of the territories 
lays down the foundation of any feasible agenda of constitutional reform, so it is 
hardly possible to establish any symmetric federation of identical units. These 
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should be the positive features a new conception of Chinese constitutional law will 
incorporate, but to inform the projection we once again need a flashback to the 
principles set out in chapter 3. 
The principle of recognition notes the PRC central government shall recognise a sort 
of peoplehood of the peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in 
constitutional terms. In this chapter and chapter 4 we have seen the PRC central 
government generally has been very reluctant to do so. But on the other hand, the 
PRC central government’s reluctance varies with respect to different societies. 
Despite the overall denial to any statehood of the territorial polities, the PRC central 
government has already recognised the validity of the regime of the Taiwanese 
authorities as well as the legality of autonomous Hong Kong and Tibetan 
governments. The Taiwanese and Hong Kong representatives secure an equal 
footing with those from the Chinese mainland in several international organisations; 
in cross-Strait negotiations the two sides have also found a modus vivendi to do 
business. The principle of representation calls for a reasonable mechanism to make 
decisions, which is needed not only by the PRC central government but also each 
and every peripheral society. This chapter and previous chapters all demonstrated 
that Taiwan and Hong Kong’s system of representation or consultation is effective. 
There is absolutely no liberal representative government in Tibet, but Tibetan elites 
may have a say in the PRC governmental system as head of administrations or 
members of the central and local legislatures or advisory bodies. In constitutional 
arrangements the PRC central government can accept what representation 
mechanisms the peripheral societies already have, but it is not willing to enhance the 
democratic elements rapidly. In fact the referenda in Taiwan demonstrated that there 
is no prospect of danger if the PRC central government keeps a modest and open 
mind towards the peripheral societies’ democratisation. Of course, it is unknown 
what the result of referenda would be if the PRC central government completely 
conceded the right of the peripheral societies to freely decide whether they should 
break away. Meanwhile, it is the principle of reconciliation that is mostly endorsed 
by the PRC central government and the peripheral societies. Almost all parties 
concerned have ruled out the option to use massive military forces to suppress the 
 
 Kai Tu 
- 206 - 
opposition. The danger remains, but it is extremely unlikely we will see another 
civil war in the headlines of newspapers tomorrow. Against this background, it is 
possible to talk about the principle of reciprocity eventually. Now it is mostly the 
PRC central government that relinquishes interests to the peripheral societies in 
order to balance the deficiency with respect to the principles of recognition and 
representation. But if the PRC central government will improve in recognition and 
respect for the representative government of the peripheral societies, the latter 
should also be more active in a positive relationship between them and the PRC 
central government.  
Bearing this in mind, we will move to the sixth and last chapter in this thesis that 
will discuss Chinese constitutional reform in the future. Some possibilities may 
provide insights and inspirations, but it seems others are not flexible enough and 
have overlooked the asymmetric feature of Chinese constitutional arrangements to 
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. If there is a constitutional reconfiguration at all, it 
will be still asymmetric in nature. 
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Chapter 6 Constitutional Reform 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter in this thesis is built to provide a futuristic perspective for 
constitutional reconfiguration of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter PRC). 
The previous chapters have introduced the fact that the peripheral societies of Tibet, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan are already entitled to a variety of autonomous status in 
Chinese constitutional law. Yet the constitutional aspirations of political forces in 
these territories usually exceed what the PRC state aims to offer. This is probably 
the main reason why the PRC occasionally needs to re-configure the constitutional 
apparatus to accommodate the territories. However, even many “Utopian figures” 
may not expect legal solutions will create on earth a harmonious Garden of Eden or 
Shangri-la – Immanuel Kant said either an international legal order or the end of 
humanity will eventually arrive, thus he did not rule out the possibility that the 
mankind is incapable of reaching a social contract for good. In other words, there 
are numerous uncertainties on the road to a brighter constitutional future for both 
the PRC central government and the peripheral societies. The Dalai Lama’s fate and 
that of thousands of emigrated Tibetans without citizenship are some of the 
difficulties to be addressed. There is a continuous civil war between the two sides of 
the Taiwan Strait waiting to be officially finished. Hong Kong, though very peaceful 
and prosperous, is in need of democratic transition in the next decade. It is the 
political forces that have the final word in these issues, but constitutional law 
nevertheless can signal some ways forward and help politicians and the Sinitic 
peoples to reach there. The futuristic perspective thus becomes necessary. If there is 
no preparation of a constitutional solution at all, we probably have to approach the 
second end Kant once showed to us.  
Constitutional scholarship did not do much in seeking solutions for divided societies 
before the 1990s. The dominant paradigm of troubleshooting between host states 
and substate societies since the end of Second World War has been rooted in 
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international legal conventions informed by dated political philosophies. The United 
Nations’ international conventions granted ex-colonised societies the right of self-
determination that eventually resulted in newly created sovereign states in the 
overwhelming majority of cases. Yet for societies not governed by colonial rule yet 
unconformable with the host state of a somewhat alienating nature, international 
academia has been sharply divided in recognising a similar right of “internal 
determination,” or “secession”.  With the statist left being defeated in the 1980s and 
many ex-communist states released from two Leninist unions – Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia – more liberals are confident to talk about internal determination under 
conditions of discrimination and injustice. Allen Buchanan, among others, went 
further to contend the moral right of “political divorce” between discordant substate 
societies and the host state based on a more purist liberal commitment.409 Even if 
the moral argument was sound, it is far from a legal rule internationally accepted. 
Margaret Canovan reminds us: “Liberals who theorise international justice and 
human rights do not in general think of themselves as Utopians whose ideas have no 
practical relevance; nevertheless, they show little interest in the possible sources of 
the power that would be needed to implement such ideals. Remarkable as it may 
seems, many contemporary political theorists rarely think about the sources, costs 
and limitations of political power at all, tending to assume that popular, consensual, 
non-coercive power will be available as required.”410 This is why John Rawls’s idea 
of “realistic utopia” is dispensable, which shows the importance that theoretical 
reconstruction should reconcile with the political situation first before the ideals will 
transcend the real.  
Constitutional solutions may hopefully reduce naivety and become more realistic 
and flexible because there is no either-or paradigm in a constitutional way of 
                                                
409 BUCHANAN, ALLEN, Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania 
and Quebec (Westview Press. 1991).  
410 CANOVAN, MARGARET, Nationhood and Political Theory (E. Elgar. 1996), p. 114. 
 
 Kai Tu 
- 209 - 
thinking. It is still possible to create separate constitutional regimes with sovereign 
status when the constitutional deal is worked out. But many constitutional scholars 
rather believe the legal and moral right of self-determination can be realised in 
various forms and that sovereign statehood is merely one extreme among them. In 
chapter 3 four principles of reconciliation, recognition, representation, and 
reciprocity were advanced in informing a legitimate constitutional project, and it is 
essential that the principles should be balanced in concrete cases while external 
sovereignty mostly undermines existing reconciliation and reciprocity even it may 
lift recognition and representation to some new levels. Nevertheless, the first section 
of this chapter will still include the option of sovereign independence for the 
territories in consideration. Suffice it to say that the author endorses no single option 
at this stage, nor one option among non-sovereign status options set out in following 
sections. Each and every constitutional solution has pros and cons, and it remains 
for the people to decide the constitutional prospects of China, peacefully if we are 
fortunate. This chapter can only contain some of the options of interest promoted by 
politicians and academics since the 1990s. The hope nevertheless is that academic 
research and political context may give birth to a Chinese constitutionalism 
satisfying our principles by and large, and take the Chinese people, or the Sinitic 
peoples, to a better future.  
6.2 SOVEREIGNTY? 
The traditional Westphalian model, simplistically speaking, offers an either-or 
solution for the unsatisfied substate societies: they may either establish their own 
sovereign states or remain under governance of the host state. Yet the traditional 
model also tolerates some variables, though the number of these is limited.  
6.2.1 Tibet  
There is indeed a lot of literature addressing one or several peripheries seeking to 
become independent from Chinese sovereignty. Alen Brouder illustrates one of the 
latest examples. Alen Brouder insists: “Tibet satisfies every condition by even the 
most cautious commentator in meeting the criteria for the right of self-determination. 
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There is a clear case of an unjustifiable historical grievance, evidence of genocide, 
torture, murder, arbitrary arrests and executions and religious intolerance. Tibet is 
treated as a colony by the Chinese leadership and it used primarily as a military 
base.”411 He thus prefers the comprehensive independence of the Great Tibet that 
covers a quarter of the territory of the PRC no matter whether there is a regime 
change or not in China proper towards liberal democracy. At the same time the 
international community must raise “human rights concerns and [the] plight of 
Tibetans and those in the Xinjiang [Uygur] Autonomous Region as well as Inner 
Mongolia … at every available opportunity with the Chinese dictatorship”.412  
For an independent Great Tibet, Alen Brouder has provided a sort of argument of 
need that is necessarily different from the more radical idea of secession promoted 
by Allen Buchanan and others. As a more “purist” liberal, Allen Buchanan contends 
there is a moral right of secession because fundamentally each and every adult shall 
voluntarily decide his own form of political life.413 Allen Buchanan’s sophisticated 
theory, however, concedes secession based on cultural claims is weaker than that on 
“discriminatory redistribution”; yet the overall commitment that the “boundary of 
states should as far as possible depend on individual content” is the core of Allen 
Buchanan’s ideal. “This might seem to be nothing more than a recipe of anarchy,” 
says David Miller.414 Allen Buchanan’s ideal essentially implies liberty’s absolute 
superiority over democracy and enables minorities to become a new majority 
whenever convenient. David Miller is right that “the practical implication of 
[Buchanan’s ideal] is that any sub-community in any state has the right to vote to 
secede from that state, provided that it is in turn willing to allow any sub-sub-
                                                
411 BROUDER, Self-determination for Tibet: Prospects in International Law, p. 200. 
412 Id. at 200-201. 
413 BUCHANAN, Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and 
Quebec.  
414 MILLER, DAVID, On Nationality, (Clarendon Press. 1997), p. 111. 
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community the equivalent right, and so on indefinitely”, however, “the principle for 
fixing the borders of states is simply the will of the majority in any territorial 
area”.415 Bearing this in mind, it is understandable that Alen Brouder’s idea, which 
is not that radical, becomes the more convincing liberal argument in the context. 
First, even though there is no unconditional moral right of secession, political self-
determination as the reaction to longstanding discrimination and “genocide” of 
states is universally accepted and respected. Secondly and importantly, Alen 
Brouder does not forget to describe Tibet as China’s colony – external or at least 
internal – that means even if Tibet had a legal connection with Chinese sovereignty, 
it still qualifies for self-determination in terms of decolonisation. 
Few may justify the historical grievance in Tibet. After the 1950s lamas and nuns 
were arrested and monasteries destroyed, but the accusation that Chinese 
communists are intentionally executing genocide in Tibet, physically or culturally, 
seems to be untrue. Many who feel nothing for the communists have questioned the 
illusion. Barry Sautman in his systemic examination asked where is the explanation 
for the alleged 1.5 million executions – the number used by Tibetan sympathisers 
and politicians – “that can be one-fifth of a Tibetan population that the [Tibetan] 
émigrés always peg at 6 million”?416 Others in their fieldwork find that Tibetan 
population has been growing in Tibet/the Chinese mainland after the 1950s, and 
there is no birth control policy applying to ethnic Tibetans in rural Tibetan areas in 
the PRC.417 Barry Sautman in another lengthy article also explains there is no 
“cultural genocide” in Tibet: “There is, however, no evidence of an ongoing PRC 
government plan to destroy religion in Tibet, nor is there any indication that Tibetan 
religious institutions or religiosity are in sharper decline than those in other 
societies. Nor can it be interred from available evidence that Tibetans in Tibet are 
                                                
415 Id. at 111. 
416 SAUTMAN, Is Tibet China's Colony: The Claim of Demographic Catastrophe at 93. 
417 FISCHER, "Population Invasion" versus Urban Exclusion in the Tibetan Areas of Western China.  
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losing their native language or that PRC authorities intend it to erode. Finally, the 
process of cultural hybridization in Tibet is not unusual or negative in a world 
context.”418  He thus reckons it would be extremely unwise to use distortion to 
legitimatise any political agenda, either for the Chinese State or for Tibetan 
sympathisers, otherwise no reconciliation can be reached. 
The 14th Dalai Lama himself does not agree with scholars like Alen Brouder 
probably because of the realpolitik. The Dalai Lama’s demands have already 
decreased from overall autonomy to somewhat cultural autonomy in decades,419 and 
he has been very cautious to gain support from Chinese dissenters rather than 
turning the political confrontation into an ethnic gap. On the contrary, Alen 
Brouder’s words referring to Inner Mongolia, which is long regarded as the 
communist model of an “ethnic autonomous region”, are highly likely to exhaust 
Chinese patience in listening and engaging. Zhu Weiqun, the Party Chief of United 
Front Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that is in charge of 
negotiation and cooperation with non-communist political forces, once accused the 
Dalai Lama of having a secret agenda to disintegrate Chinese sovereign territory 
into small pieces, e.g. Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. Alen Brouder’s 
suggestion just authenticates this is an intention backed up by “foreign forces” in 
communist eyes, thus makes more complex the situation. 
Even if the Tibetans could have established an independent state of their own, there 
would be a series of constitutional problems to be addressed. First, where should be 
the new Sino-Tibetan international boundary? According to the memorandum 
submitted to the PRC central government by emigrated Tibetans in 2009, all Tibetan 
autonomous areas in the PRC should be incorporated into a single administration of 
a refined “Great Tibet”. This boundary is clear but will break up many Chinese 
provinces adjoining the Tibet Autonomous Region. Because the “Tibetan Charter” 
                                                
418 SAUTMAN, Cultural genocide and Tibet at 208. 
419 HE & SAUTMAN, The Politics of the Dalai Lama's New Initiative for Autonomy.  
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only recognises Tibetan citizenship based on ethnicity and naturalisation for 
marriage, there would be a danger that the Tibetan administration might expel other 
ethnic groups out of Tibet. Some pro-PRC lamas would be banished too. After the 
13th Dalai Lama expelled the amban and Chinese troops, he also forced the 9th 
Panchen Lama to leave Tibet – it is likely this history may be repeated. Hence it 
would take some time to rebuild reconciliation and reciprocity, depending on what 
the political situation would be. But in terms of representation and recognition, a 
state-like Tibetan administration definitely will meet the aspirations of emigrated 
Tibetans.  
6.2.2 Taiwan 
The Taiwanese political forces do not need a basis of sovereign independence that 
roots either in “discriminatory redistribution” or in “cultural preservation”, while a 
significant advantage for them is the Taiwanese authorities in the name of “Republic 
of China” (hereinafter ROC) has been recognised by around twenty states in the 
world. So for Taiwan, the next move is to change the entity’s name and cut off the 
constitutional connection across the Taiwan Strait. This is unlikely to be feasible, 
given the PRC central government’s opposition and enhancing military might that is 
prepared to prevent the Taiwanese authorities to become de jure independent. 
However, if the Taiwanese people did accomplish the goal of establishing a 
Taiwanese republic, there would be two issues of concern. First, although the 
Taiwanese authorities have already decriminalised most mainlanders from a trial of 
treason, they still notionally regard CPC-related activities as anti-governmental 
behaviour in law and strongly refuse the possibility that a Taiwanese resident could 
link himself officially with any PRC institutions of political nature. A completely 
independent Taiwan may equalise the treatments to legal aliens, including then 
Chinese mainlanders. For now the Taiwanese authorities request mainland migrants 
to spend a much longer period of time in the process of naturalisation, and the only 
reason is to prevent a “Troy” accident which would not happen any longer as there 
would have already been a political settlement with respect to Taiwan’s relationship 
with then Chinese State. Secondly, an independent Taiwan’s territory would be 
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another issue. As David Mill reminds us, a secession-like agenda inevitably leads to 
redistribution of territory and property that once belonged to the existing sovereign 
state.420 The more “purist” liberal Allen Buchanan also agrees that secession, albeit 
morally positive, shall not create a political, economic, and cultural enclave that 
would result endless conflicts in the future.421 Combining these ideas, for the 
Taiwan case politicians must be cautious in constitutionally addressing Kinmen, 
Matsu, and isles in South China Sea respectively. Kinmen and Matsu never in 
history belong to the Taiwanese administration, and they are now under Taiwanese 
governance merely because the CPC failed, probably intentionally, in taking them 
over from the KMT in the 1950s civil war. The Taiwanese authorities 
administratively confer Fujian province instead of Taiwan province to guide the two 
island counties too, and the two counties for long have been supportive for both 
Chinese unification and pro-China political figures. A county head of Kinmen 
declares he is keen to construct the island as an experiment for Deng Xiaoping’s 
“one country, two systems”, hence it is wondered that the county might finally 
decide to reuse the self-determination mechanism to secede from the to-be-created 
Taiwanese republic. In addition to this, the Taiwanese authorities are also in charge 
of administrating the biggest island in the Spratly Isles in South China Sea, which 
ownership derives from its historical linage with China. The Taiwanese republic 
seems much weaker in defending the uninhabited isles than China, legally and 
politically, and it could be a possibility that Taiwan might exchange these isles for a 
better relationship with China.422  
                                                
420 MILLER, DAVID, On Nationality.  
421 BUCHANAN, Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and 
Quebec.  
422  ALLEN, Recreating 'One China': Internal Self-Determination, Autonomy and the Future of 
Taiwan. 
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6.2.3 Lhasa “Holy See” 
This section in the beginning accentuates that the approach of “sovereign 
independence” in line with the Westphalian idea of sovereignty is an either-or 
solution. However, in the last part of this section we will observe the limited 
flexibility that the international legal scholarship has. Dating back to Oppenheim’s 
classic, a series of entities had been noticed that did not fit a trichotomy of unitary 
state, federation, and confederation – that is of less importance.  
These variations include but are not limited to a protected independent state, a 
vassal state, or a Condominium. Both a protected independent state and a vassal 
state have their powers controlled by, say, a guardian state, and the two differ in that 
the former should never be part of the protector and “is not ipso facto bound by 
treaties of the protector”, while the latter is regarded as a suzerainty where “the 
suzerain holds the source of the governmental authority of the vassal state whose 
ruler he grants the right to exercise the authority autonomously.”423 In this sense a 
protected independent state retains its general control over foreign relations except 
those it gives up itself to the protector usually by a treaty between them, while the 
protected independent state may cease the relationship at any time as it wills 
theoretically. Here we see a guest and a host, and when the former is preparing to 
leave the latter must not hold him back. While the relation between a vassal state 
and its guardian state resembles one between junior and senior family members, the 
bond is too strong to be cut off unilaterally. 
It is actually of interest that “vassal state” or “suzerainty” was a legal term invented 
by Westerners, probably Britons, to describe Asian entities under the aegis of 
imperial powers such as the Ottoman Empire and the Qing Empire. The inventor 
might have seen the dissimilarity between Asian ways of hierarchising feudal lords 
                                                
423 HANNUM, HURST, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination : the Accommodation of 
Conflicting Rights (University of Philadelphia Press. 1990), pp. 16-17.  
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and that of Medieval Europe and found it necessary to use new terms to apply, or he 
could merely introduce the difference between some entities and other part of 
imperial territory under an Asian monarch when European states were endeavouring 
to homogenise their territorial units and people in terms of nation-building. Tibet 
per se played a very crucial role in helping the terms become legally meaningful. In 
Article 2 of the Simla Accord the British government proposed: 
The Governments of Great Britain and China recognising that Tibet is under the 
suzerainty of China, and recognising also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to 
respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the 
administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai 
Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. The 
Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The 
Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.424   
The use of “suzerainty” alienated Tibetan areas under Dalai Lama’s control from 
(other part of) China, and this indeed was the reason why the Chinese government 
did not sign the accord and never accepted it is a solution. The British government, 
on the other hand, continuously defined Tibet is an autonomous part of China that 
makes the position symbolically different from other states around the world. While 
the problem is: as protected independent states disappeared, vassal states vanished 
in the contemporary system of states too. The British position that “Tibet belongs to 
China but being autonomous” so far has been meaningless. So the British Foreign 
Secretary issued a written statement on 29 October 2008 finally recognising Tibet is 
part of China and that is Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. It thus could be the end of 
a chapter in history, as well as the odyssey of “suzerainty” or “vassal state” as valid 
legal terms since the Colonising era.  
                                                
424 The Simla Accord, art 2. This position is repeated in an official document issued by the British 
government to the United States government. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS. Tibet and 
the Chinese People's Republic (International Commission of Jurists. 1960), p. 318. 
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So much for this, what about other variations? In 2009 a British delegation of 
Parliamentarians undertook a visit to Tibet at Chinese invitation, and during the visit 
Lord Steel of Aikwood and Lord Alton of Liverpool both provided personal 
recommendations to the Chinese government in creating a reformed Tibet. Lord 
Steel was once the Presiding Officer of Scottish Parliament and his suggestion is 
China may learn lessons from British devolution of powers to three constituent 
units, i.e. Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Lord Alton’s idea sounds 
interesting too, which urges “consideration be given to the making of a religious 
Concordat with the Dalai Lama, which might designate Lhasa as a holy city, 
comparable to the standing enjoyed by the Pope and the Holy See in the Vatican 
City within Italy.”425 Of course in the short report of the delegation no details can be 
revealed about what Lord Alton had suggested. Presumably, however, Lord Alton 
might not have said much since the Chinese or the emigrated Tibetans both dislike 
the idea of a Lhasa version of “Holy See”, albeit comparing Lamaist Lhasa with 
Catholic Vatican City has been a long-standing phenomenon in Western media and 
academia. The Chinese have long regarded the only problem to be solved to be the 
Dalai Lama’s return to the People’s Republic of China, for whom the Chinese 
prepare a high-ranking political post. On the other side, the emigrated Tibetans 
demand at least “meaningful autonomy” for the entire “Great Tibet” in exchange for 
giving up independence, and a “Holy See” in Lhasa may be too small for them. 
While Lord Alton did say China/Tibet should replicate the Vatican model, it 
remains disputable what the Vatican model actually is. The Catholic Holy See is not 
a full member of the United Nations – an observer as the Palestinian state – but it 
sets embassies around the world; the sovereign status of the Vatican City is 
guaranteed by the Italian state in Lateran Pacts that is also confirmed by the Italian 
constitution; there is a Concordat between the Holy See and the Italian state on 
                                                
425 THE ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY CHINA GROUP [OF THE UNITED KINGDOM], Tibet: Breaking the 
Deadlock, (2009), see 3.8. 
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religious matters; and “forming part of the Vatican City, St. Peter's Square shall 
continue to be normally open to the public and shall be subject to supervision by the 
Italian police authorities”,426 but the arrangement is changeable by the Vatican City 
with Italian assistance. One of these features might be feasible in a Concordat 
between the Chinese State and the Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leadership, probably 
the Dalai Lama himself, to the extent which does not challenge Chinese sovereignty 
over Tibet as well as Lhasa. China in the 1950s did accept a status quo of the 
spiritual leadership of the Dalai Lama under the condition that the Kashag should 
restore the late Panchen Lama’s conventional status in Tibet.427 Although most 
religious sectors in China enjoy much lower status than the state, an equal footing 
agreement of a contractual nature is not impossible if the Dalai Lama wishes to 
come back and compromise too. It is also imaginable that a part of Lhasa could be 
drawn as a “special administrative region” by constitutional law so long as it would 
not impact on other parts of Tibetan areas. The Lhasa city has expanded greatly in 
decades with many non-Tibetans now living in urban areas. The special zone may 
be designed in line with the wall surrounding Potala Palace, as the Vatican City is a 
tiny part of Rome. Yet the Potala Palace zone can never be sovereign. Neither could 
the Potala Palace send embassies, while the Dalai Lama’s personal representatives 
may be welcomed as usual. 
But all of these can be possible only because the Dalai Lama – the individual as well 
as the office – can truly reach a papal status in and outside China/Tibet. However, 
the Dalai Lama is not a Buddhist Pope, and this is what observers always ignore. In 
Tibetan Buddhism, not only “Peter” but also all apostles have established their 
sectors by incarnation; the Dalai Lama’s importance has been due to his role in 
Tibetan administration backed up by imperial powers – Qing and Britain; in past 
                                                
426 The Lateran Treaty, art 3. The document is available at the official website of the Vatican City 
State, at http://www.vaticanstate.va. Retrieved on 19 May 2011. 
427 The 17-Point Agreement.  
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centuries minor Dalai Lamas have faded from time to time, and this is a crisis 
probably to happen when the incumbent Dalai Lama incarnates. Before emigrated 
Tibetans find a way to manage an era of no/minor Dalai Lama, it seems no 
Concordat is agreeable for China. The Karmapa case demonstrates the danger. After 
the 16th Karmapa passed away, there are two competing candidates for the 17th 
Karmapa. Trinley Thaye Dorje was found by the Shamar Rinpoche who is in charge 
of a trust set up by the 16th Karmapa for administrating the Kagyu monastery in 
Sikkim. Ogyen Trinley Dorje is recognised by both the Dalai Lama and the Chinese 
government and claims right of succession to the Sikkim monastery and procession 
left by the 16th Karmapa. The Indian Supreme Court has to decide who is entitled to 
own the Kagyu monastery in Sikkim eventually.428 This implies controversies 
around the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama in the future can be more deleterious, 
because the Karmapa roughly ranks the third – lower than the “big two” – in 
Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy of prestige and the Kagyu sector is much smaller than 
the Gelug sector of the Panchen and the Dalai Lamas. If the Chinese should 
interfere in face of such controversies, does a “Potala Holy See” really matter? This 
is the weakest part of Lord Alton’s idea. 
6.3 STATUS QUO 
Before envisioning constitutional reforms, status quo is also an option especially for 
the Taiwan case. The incumbent president of the Taiwanese authorities, Ma Ying-
jeou declares a “three-no” policy of cross-Strait relations, which is “no unification, 
no independence, and no military conflict”. He does not support a rapid political 
unification between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, neither Taiwanese 
independence, nor any possibility of using military means (by the PRC side) to 
change the contemporary equilibrium. Ma Ying-jeou supposes this policy 
representing the “greatest common divisor” or overlapping consensus of Taiwanese 
people, because the official polls in the long-run shows “status quo” – in a broad 
                                                
428 The Supreme Court of India, SLP (C) No. 22903 of 2003, Item No. 41, Court No. 5, Section XIV.  
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sense – has most supporters in Taiwan. One of the most reliable public-opinion polls 
as such is Taiwanese Mainland Affairs Council’s research on attitudes towards 
unification/independence. In this decade, around 35% of Taiwanese people 
continuously express their preference of “status quo now” and keep an open attitude 
towards alternative solutions – either unification or independence. Since Ma Ying-
jeou has taken over the presidency, the number of supporters of “status quo 
indefinitely” is mounting up impressively from 20% to 30% of pollees. If supporters 
of rapid independence and gradual independence are combined, they cover around 
20% of pollees; the number is 10% for those for rapid unification and gradual 
unification. In Ma Ying-jeou’s calculation the “gradualists” – for independence or 
unification – nevertheless do not oppose the status quo at this stage, so the overall 
supporters of status quo, in one way or another, are 85% Taiwanese population thus 
have definitively marginalised supporters of rapid constitutional change no matter 
for independence or unification. This is the basis for Ma’s three-no policy that 
endorses the cross-Strait status quo, and indeed succeeded in appointing him in 
2008 election where the pro-independence DPP lost calamitously. 
Yet the paradox is that between extremes of “(political) unification” and 
“independence” there are also infinite possibilities towards which the political 
pendulum swinging back and forth, and an absolutely stagnant  “status quo” never 
exists. Before Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, a diplomatic contest between Beijing and 
Taipei had erupted. Macedonia terminated the diplomatic relationship with 
Taiwanese authorities in 2001 and recognises the PRC as the solely legitimate 
government of China, following which Liberia in 2003, Dominica in 2004, Grenada 
in 2005, Senegal in 2005, Chad in 2006, Costa Rica in 2007, and Malawi in 2008 all 
shifted their recognition to Beijing. Ma Ying-jeou decides not to challenge Beijing’s 
authority on the international stage in exchange for Beijing’s abeyance to shut down 
Taiwanese embassies. This works till now, but in the long-run losing diplomatic 
recognition probably is fated for Taiwanese authorities. Other significant changes 
are also in process. Since 2008 the Chinese quango in charge of cross-Strait 
relations and its Taiwanese counterpart have resumed regular communication in 
which direct postal, transportation, and trade links between the Chinese mainland 
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and Taiwan have been set up. A representative office in the other’s territory is also 
about to be established by both. Most importantly, the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement signed by both parties on 29 June 2010 is expected by many 
to bring the two parties into a new era of further integration, at least as regards 
economics. This is no one-way process, yet it is a stagnant one. To avoid a war, 
there must be a legal/constitutional deal one way or another between the two sides; 
the status quo cannot last forever.  
For the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hereinafter HKSAR) one of the 
most concerning uncertainties is what the situation will be after fifty-year remaining 
of “capitalist system and way of life”. Article 5 of the Hong Kong Basic Law 
promises: “The socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of 
life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.”429 Actually Deng Xiaoping himself in a 
speech to the drafters of the Hong Kong Basic Law said there is no need of change 
after the fifty-year term so long as Hong Kong will have been stable and prosperous 
in the period of time and the People’s Republic of China per se does not have 
regime change with the Chinese communists staying in power.430 Deng is politically 
wise to say so because no one can expect Hong Kong’s status quo if there would be 
a dramatic societal change in Hong Kong or China. The promise was made by the 
communist leadership in name of the PRC central government; if the one party-state 
itself would have changed – democratised or returned to a Maoist state – the relation 
between Beijing and Hong Kong is highly likely to be reconfigured. However, if in 
fifty years the PRC regime will stand still, Deng’s words might count but it is up to 
the next political generations to decide.  
                                                
429 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 5. 
430 DENG, Speech at a Meeting with the Members of the Commitee for Drafting the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
 
 Kai Tu 
- 222 - 
For Hong Kong society the turning point that matters more is not as far as 2046. The 
PRC central government has allowed Hong Kong residents to elect the Chief 
Executive directly in 2017 by universal suffrage instead of an electoral college that 
makes more complex the representative proportionality, while in 2020 or later the 
Hong Kong people may elect directly the Legislative Council by universal suffrage 
too.431 The majorities in the current Electoral College for the Chief Executive and in 
the Legislative Council are supportive to a pro-centre Hong Kong government in 
opposition to the minority “democrats” who are anti-communists, if not anti-
Chinese. In this circumstance the PRC central government may easily be cooperated 
by the Chief Executive in addressing Hong Kong affairs and by the Legislative 
Council too at most times. Once the Chief Executive becomes freer from the central 
government’s influence, disputes surrounding distribution of powers between the 
region and the centre could emerge and the centre’s reserved power of appointing 
the Chief Executive may be legitimately undermined since the Chief Executive will 
be the democratic choice of the Hong Kong people. In that case there will be no 
arbitrator in the judiciary because the PRC has already given up the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court over Hong Kong and the relation between the region and the 
centre, which may further deteriorate the disputed matters.  
From Beijing’s perspective, the Tibet Autonomous Region is almost perfect so 
status quo will be sufficient. Yet Beijing also admits that “the Dalai Lama issue” 
needs to be addressed and the best solution is if the Dalai Lama himself decides to 
return to Tibet/China as well as accepts a political post in the PRC central 
government. This is far from emigrated Tibetan people’s expectation. No matter 
                                                
431 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the 
Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and 
for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 
2012, see Instrument 211 available at the Bilingual Laws Information System operated by the 
HKSAR Department of Justice at http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm. Retrieved on 19 
May 2011. 
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whether the social unrest in March 2008 demonstrated Beijing’s Tibet policy has 
failed or not, at least both parties recognise the Dalai Lama’s refuge is a political 
embarrassment to be corrected. If so, the status quo of Tibet is hardly near 
perfection at all.  
6.4 ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
6.4.1 Tibet 
Marc Weller recently contends that there are at least three sorts of autonomy: 
personal, functional or cultural, and territorial. In some Muslim countries the state 
allows non-believers to practise their non-Islamic religion in private sphere, if there 
is one, but the Islamic religion remains the legally established faith in society. Other 
countries may set up a number of public funds or communitarian organisations to 
take care of entitled ethnic group(s) or to preserve particular culture(s) or life 
style(s). While most countries still use territorial administration as the autonomous 
unit, which functions just like the host state although lacking some political 
capacities or legal competences in providing public goods and consolidating the 
relation between the unit and the corresponding society that it aims to represent.432 
We already have a Tibet Autonomous Region in line with the territorial model. The 
personal autonomy is generally irrelevant to Tibetan people.  There is no 
“established religion” in China and they are not forced to convert so long as not 
promoting separatist activities for religion’s sake. So at last Weller’s trio helps a lot 
in highlighting the “functional or cultural” model in projecting the autonomous 
agenda, which may likely turn out to be the best alternative in the context.  
We must return to the “Great Tibet” aspiration of emigrated Tibetans for a while. 
The “Great Tibet” is the territory where emigrated Tibetans demand to establish 
their genuine autonomy (before getting a chance to move on to sovereign 
                                                
432 WELLER & NOBBS, Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts, pp. 1-13. 
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independence, probably). The territory covers all areas inhabited by ethnic Tibetans 
under control of the People’s Republic of China – Chinese claimed “South Tibet”, 
i.e. Indian “Arunachal Pradesh”, has been excluded by the Dalai Lama who has to 
be cautious to avoid offending the Indian government. In the latest memo sent by 
the Dalai Lama’s representatives to the Chinese central government, the provincial 
capital of Xi’ning in Qinghai, i.e. Tibetan Amdo province, is also absent from 
“Great Tibet”. The city is co-inhabited by Tibetans and a larger number of 
Mandarin-speaking ethnic Hans and Huis, but once played a historic role in Tibetan 
history. According to the 2008 memo, the “Great Tibet” comprises all Tibetan 
autonomous administrations in contemporary China, that are not only the Tibet 
Autonomous Region but also many Tibetan prefectures and counties in 
neighbouring provinces. The emigrated Tibetans argue that there is no reason to 
refuse to merge these “autonomous” administrations into one that will represent and 
administer all ethnic Tibetans since the PRC already admits the autonomies are 
established to benefit Tibetans. The PRC refutes the alleged “Great Tibet” will 
damage other ethnic groups’ interests because the imagined administration 
obviously would promote a Tibetan-first policy while existing Tibetan prefectures 
and counties are required to balance territorial and ethnic preferences, and the PRC 
leadership also points out that no Dalai Lama or Lhasa regime had ever 
administrated the vast land.  
As said, the territorial model for autonomous Great Tibet is rootless no matter it is 
the variation promoted by emigrated Tibetans or another endorsed by a group of 
Chinese studies scholars, which is to copy Hong Kong’s “one country, two 
systems”. Among them, Michael Davis finds that Article 31 of the PRC Constitution 
of 1982 allows the state to create “special administrative regions” with separate 
constitutional systems as the Hong Kong SAR, and he also contends for Tibet, the 
policy of “ethnic regional autonomy” based on Article 4 of the Constitution is 
insufficient to accommodate the constitutional aspirations of (immigrated) Tibetan 
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people any more, even if it had been before.433  The crucial point here is still to 
remove the communist oversight to Tibet, which will be a fundamental change to 
the system of the Tibet Autonomous Region as well as the People’s Republic of 
China as a whole. The realistic consideration for military capacity and social 
consequence needs also to be taken. The PRC officials have repeatedly showed their 
unwillingness to apply “one country, two systems” to Tibet, and the demolishing of 
the communist infrastructure is a highly unlikely voluntary action of the CPC 
leadership. A watered-down variation could be to let the communists stay there. 
Option one is to appoint a couple of communist amban from non-Tibetan ethnic 
groups, such as a Han Chinese Party Chief plus a deputy from Tibet-related smaller 
ethnos. The Tibetan government might be localised and nationalised in this option, 
which roughly is how the Qing Empire addressed Tibet. Another option is to 
recreate a Tibetan Communist Party as a subsidiary organisation of the CPC, which 
in Tibet may run some campaigns (if Tibet would have democratised) or prioritise 
Tibetan interests in partisan and governmental systems. Either will be a way of 
enhancing subsidiarity but both are fantasies as long as the economic basis of Tibet 
does not dramatically change in the near future. The entire system of Tibet now 
completely relies on financial subvention from both the central government and 
prosperous coastal provinces, so there ideas would probably not genuinely help. 
A functional autonomy, however, is a choice that has never been tried. The Chinese 
“New Left” thinkers try to match the “ethnic regional autonomy” with Austrian 
Marxists who had envisaged establishing some national associations across the 
country in parallel with territorial units after socialists’ taking over the 
government.434 They did not succeed but confronted numerous critics from the 
leftwing of then socialists, e.g. Luxembourg and Lenin. The radicals deem the 
                                                
433 DAVIS, Establishing a Workable Autonomy in Tibet. 
434 This point of view available at Professor Zhiyuan Cui’s personal website 
http://cui-zy.cn/Recommended/China/CuiNYUchineseversion.pdf. 
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alleged national associations would encourage division and cleavage within the 
communist party that is supposed to be solid and united, and there was no need to 
complicate the then Austrian constitutional system because the socialist government 
could work out in line with national self-determination what would create a group of 
sovereign states who could decide for themselves whether or not to reunite in a 
larger socialist union. The CPC leadership is distant from their Austrian comrades 
and have faithfully followed the Leninist idea although they did not endorse the 
union of sovereign socialist states but favoured non-sovereign administrative units 
mixing up ethnic and territorial management. However, despite the failure of 
Austrian Marxists, Belgium’s sophisticated federal system somehow demonstrates a 
constitutionally functional autonomy is not impossible. Overlapping the regions and 
provinces, linguistic communities in Belgium also have administrative offices to 
provide public service in cultural, educational, and linguistic matters.  
If ethnic and administrative boundaries are not the same, there always is a need to 
adjust rather than to ignore. In 1973 the PRC State Council consigned Inner 
Mongolia to convene a meeting amongst representatives from Inner Mongolia and 
the other seven provinces to coordinate Mongolian textbooks publishing for primary 
and middle schools. In 1975 Jilin province and two others had a meeting for Korean 
textbooks too. For Tibetans, in 1985 a “Tibetan Textbook Coordinating Committee 
for Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan” was convened, which distribute 
assignments to respective administrations to normalise Tibetan scripts, unify 
terminology, raise money, etc. In 1990 the National Commission for Education and 
the National Commission for Ethnic Affairs joined to establish a “Leading and 
Coordinating Committee for Tibetan Education of Five Administrative Regions” as 
replacement to the 1985 organisation and the new leading committee is in charge of 
not only the textbooks but also all significant matters in Tibetan education. The 
1990 Committee consists of a deputy minister of the National Commission for 
Education as its head, a deputy minister of the National Commission for Ethnic 
Affairs as the deputy head, five deputy provincial governors as the leading team, ten 
deputy chiefs of provincial educational and ethnic affairs agencies as the 
coordinating team. The 1990 Committee never weighs much in the PRC system 
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because they are merely low ranking deputy officials, nor genuine “Tibetans” in 
terms of the few in the committee who are ethnic Tibetans. Yet the existence of the 
legally established organisation could be some warm-up for a functional autonomy 
for the Tibetan people in cultural, educational, and religious areas. The latest 
“Working Convention for Tibet” in 2010, which is the fifth in PRC history and 
indeed the highest leadership in making PRC Tibet policy, for the first time includes 
Tibetan areas outside the Tibet Autonomous Region in its final report; and 
emigrated Tibetans have occasionally played down the tone of cultural autonomy. A 
high ranking official committee or council, some admixture of the 1990 Committee 
and the 2000 Convention focussing on Tibetan cultural preservation and educational 
development, could echo the longstanding voice of emigrated Tibetans for “Great 
Tibet” and symbolise Tibetan unity beyond Tibet proper as an public site. This may 
in a way satisfy the principle of recognition and simultaneously does not contravene 
the principle of reciprocity. The functional and cultural autonomy for Tibetan 
people cannot decrease the interests of any other ethnic groups in the PRC; on the 
contrary, a vivid and creative Tibetan culture may enhance the common heritage of 
PRC citizens eventually. 
The functional and cultural autonomy for Tibetan people may also lend itself to the 
solution for two other problems. The first is in relation with the principle of 
representation. The so-called six million Tibetans in the PRC remain an iceberg in 
the ocean of Han Chinese population. In the PRC parliament ethnic Tibetan 
representatives can never reach a significant number. While the situation is better in 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultation Conference, ethnic Tibetans still cannot 
veto constitutional change regarding Tibet and Tibetan affairs. The 10th Panchen 
Lama thought this issue through before his reincarnation, where he conceived a 
powerfully enlarged National Commission for Ethnic Affairs whose opinion should 
counterpoise Han Chinese parliamentarian majority in initiating and repealing 
national laws for ethnic affairs. The National Commission for Ethnic Affairs in PRC 
convention is composed of ethnic minorities with few Han Chinese, which may give 
ethnic Tibetans a bigger say. This reminds us of Charles Taylor’s discussion on 
Canadian constitutional reform in face of Quebec nationalism. On the one side, the 
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communication between Quebec and other Canadian provinces may enhance the 
French presence in North America thus reducing the Quebecers’ pressure of being 
surrounded by a more homogeneous English culture – this point is closer to 
principle of reciprocity; on the other side, Charles Taylor himself suggests the 
Canadian federation should give Quebec a constitutional veto right and a bigger say 
to differentiate Quebec from ordinary Canadian provinces that once and again have 
used their majority blocking constitutional reform to accommodate Quebec within 
the federation.435 Similarly, the refurnished leading and coordinating committee 
representing Tibetan areas in all five Tibetan-inhabiting administrative regions in 
the PRC may be entrusted in representing Tibetans in addressing laws for and 
merely for Tibetan welfare, and in this case the committee can be given an equal 
footing with other provinces combined. This sounds far too optimistic at this stage, 
frankly, so does the next solution we discuss.  
The emigrated Tibetans can be divided into three categories. The first group is legal 
immigrants holding Chinese or other national passports and citizenship that are 
ethnic Tibetans and can freely attach to respective authorities. The second group is 
illegal immigrants crossing the border after the 1980s that are criminals as well as 
nationals in the PRC except they obtain other citizenship later and Chinese 
immunity before returning to Tibet/China. The third group is Tibetans going along 
with the Dalai Lama in the 1950-60s that usually have been given asylum in India 
and many of their descendants have been issued other national passports outside 
India. One of the most painful experiences “in exile” for Tibetans is migration 
incompetence. Most refugees are not entitled to travel freely in India with asylum 
status, and it is extremely difficult for them to go abroad without a national passport, 
let alone to return to Tibet/China. The Indian government does not issue legal 
passports or citizenship to the second or third generation exile Tibetans, and the 
                                                
435  TAYLOR & LAFOREST, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and 
Nationalism, pp. 140-154. 
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future of the one hundred thousand Tibetans is at stake. It is not easy to resume the 
second generation’s PRC citizenship unconditionally and ever harder for later 
generations born outside Tibet/China. There is a possibility that functional 
autonomous administration for Tibetans may issue a travel document to those to 
replace the Indian certificate of identity, which may not be more useful but won’t be 
any worse. This is to urge the PRC state to redefine the responsibility to the Tibetan 
people, while assorting with the diversified political and social attachments as well. 
This will be the final reconciliation between emigrated Tibetans and the PRC state.  
6.4.2 Hong Kong 
For Hong Kong and Taiwan, every “alternative model” inevitably should alter one 
aspect or others in the original design of “one country, two systems”. The logic is: 
on the one hand the alternative model does not pursue separate sovereignties for 
China and peripheries so “one country” is acceptable to some degree; on the other 
hand “status quo” cannot satisfy them in all aspects so there is some need for 
change. Yet Hong Kong and Taiwan differ. Although there was suspicion that the 
PRC state would have failed to keep its promise of sustaining Hong Kong’s 
autonomy at the initial stage after the 1997 handover – George Edwards in 1998 
remarks there was no “one country, two systems” but “one country, one and one-
half systems” because the constitutional praxis had been emphasising the “one 
country”436 – the past decade has seen a prosperous and generally stable Hong Kong 
despite the annul protest for enlarging democracy. Few now are seriously attempting 
to overthrow Hong Kong’s constitutionalism; Hong Kong’s main political parties 
including the self-labelled “democrats” in opposition are all supportive for the ideal 
of “one country, two systems” and the Hong Kong Basic Law. The “democrats” 
demanding rapid democratisation are often antagonistic and always annoying to the 
PRC central government, but the implementation of universal suffrage in elections 
for the Chief Executive and the Legislature has been the CPC leadership’s own 
                                                
436 EDWARDS, Applicability of the "One Country, Two Systems" Hong Kong Model to Taiwan.  
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words and appears in black letters of the Basic Law. The timing selections, no 
matter which prevail eventually, will not principally change the system in theory – 
in practice, a democratically elected Chief Executive is likely more independent 
from the PRC centre and accountable to the Hong Kong people, but no one could 
predict this will happen for sure after 2012.  
Given that the Hong Kong Basic Law has already set the trajectory, ideas for future 
change in Hong Kong constitutionalism are few. The most heartfelt and probably 
fruitful discussion is about the prospective role of the Hong Kong Basic Law 
Committee in the PRC parliament, which is now an advisory committee for the 
Standing Committee of the PRC National People’s Congress. In previous chapters 
the unease between the Hong Kong Final Appeal Court and the PRC NPC Standing 
Committee has been repeatedly visited. In a nutshell, the Hong Kong Final Appeal 
Court, being entitled to the power of final judgement, obviously prefers to avoid 
applying for any aid from the NPC Standing Committee in regard to interpreting the 
Hong Kong Basic Law.437 The Basic Law does authorise Hong Kong courts to 
interpret, “in adjusting cases”, the Basic Law, only save: 
If the courts of the Region, in adjudicating cases, need to interpret the provisions of 
this Law concerning affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People's 
Government, or concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities and the 
Region, and if such interpretation will affect the judgments on the cases, the courts 
of the Region shall, before making their final judgments which are not appealable, 
seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region.”438  
                                                
437 LO, P. Y., Rethinking Judicial Reference: Barricades at the Gateway, in Interpreting Hong Kong's 
Basic Law: the Struggle for Coherence, (Hualing Fu, et al. eds., 2007).  
438 The Hong Kong Basic Law, art 158 s 3.  
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However, the Hong Kong Final Appeal Court contrives a formula in applying the 
provision. While the Court in the famous Ng Ka Ling case declares it is for the 
Court alone to decide whether there is a provision concerning the responsibility of 
the PRC centre or the relationship between PRC centre and Hong Kong, or whether 
there is necessity to request reference from the NPC Standing Committee. The 
Court’s opinion is if Hong Kong courts feel no difficulty in interpreting the Basic 
Law even those provisions concerning the PRC centre, no reference is needed from 
the centre through a request of the Hong Kong Final Appeal Court.439 Beneath the 
doctrinal reasoning is the Court’s belief that the NPC Standing Committee as a 
communist political organ with no judicial neutrality or expertise at all is essentially 
incompatible with Hong Kong’s liberal common law. So far the PRC centre would 
rather enforce its will straightforwardly, and the NPC as the sovereign organ in 
China is indeed constitutionally entitled to compel the courts to yield. But a better 
deportment for the PRC centre may be to respect the Hong Kong or, accurately, 
common law jurists’ way to interpret the law. Chinese academics are talking about 
establishing a judicial committee in the Chinese parliament as the United Kingdom 
did – possibly by transforming the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee – and 
conferring the judicial committee with competence in both PRC and common law to 
issue judicial references in response to Hong Kong requests, which model is 
somehow similar to the European Union’s praxis in bridging the European Court of 
Justice and national courts across the Union. This innovation will on the one hand 
qualitatively change the current constitutional system, and on the other hand create a 
common law institution in the Chinese mainland. Is this scenario attractive? At least 
it is in line with all principles abovementioned. The institution may reduce distrust 
of Hong Kong courts to the PRC centre as well as consolidate Chinese recognition 
to Hong Kong’s particularity and peculiarity; it will help Hong Kong lawyers to 
secure several seats in PRC parliament as well as facilitate the PRC centre to be 
conjunctive with Hong Kong legal system, which now has been cut off by the Hong 
                                                
439 Ng Ka Ling v. The Director of Immigration [1999] 1 HKLRD 315; (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4.  
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Kong Final Appeal Court’s power of final adjudgement. The only impediment is the 
further jumbling between PRC legislative and judicial power that can disastrously 
complicate the system, which, frankly, has already been too abstruse. 
6.4.3 Taiwan 
It is extremely difficult to replicate the Hong Kong model without modifications in 
Taiwan. The previous chapters have mentioned that Taiwan remains recognised by 
around twenty states with the title of “Republic of China”; the Taiwanese military 
might has declined in face of China’s rise, but the Taiwanese authorities may still 
resist the Chinese People’s Liberation Army for a couple of weeks at most and thus 
make time for the United States to prepare military interference, if at all; most 
importantly, as Sean Cooney puts it, the Taiwanese authorities have become an 
accountable government after the democratisation, which must subordinate to the 
Taiwanese electorate in decision-making, while there is never a democratic and 
comprehensively accountable Hong Kong government despite the fact that the Hong 
Kong government serves the Hong Kong residents well.440  
Yet it is a misunderstanding that the PRC leadership unrealistically wants to clone 
the Hong Kong model in Taiwan, or thinks the “one country, two systems” ought to 
apply equally in the two territories. From the start Deng Xiaoping has made it clear 
that the prospective Taiwanese government shall be entitled to much greater powers 
after the national unification. Deng Xiaoping himself proposed that Taiwan should 
maintain its partisan, governmental, and military institutions as well as be provided 
some high-ranking posts in the PRC centre. It seems in Deng’s mind, the Taiwanese 
authorities must trade international recognition for this, but there was an opinion 
that Taiwan would be internationally derecognised sooner or later. The updated 
proposal for national unification from the PRC leadership can be seen in the PRC 
                                                
440 COONEY, Why Taiwan Is Not Hong Kong: A Review of the PRC's One Country Two Systems 
Model for Reunification. 
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Anti-Secession Act. Most Taiwanese observers focus on the Article 8 of the Act, 
which reads: “In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces 
should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession 
from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should 
occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely 
exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures 
to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 441  For them it is 
unacceptable that the PRC still does not give up “non-peaceful means” in addressing 
the problem, since so many decades have gone after the de facto truce across the 
Strait. However, they probably miss some positive signals in Article 7. The Article 
7(2) provides:  
The two sides of the Taiwan Straits may consult and negotiate on the following 
matters: 
(1) officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides; 
(2) mapping out the development of cross-Straits relations; 
(3) steps and arrangements for peaceful national reunification; 
(4) the political status of the Taiwan authorities; 
(5) the Taiwan region's room of international operation that is compatible with its 
status; and 
(6) other matters concerning the achievement of peaceful national reunification. 
The PRC leadership has finally been aware that the “political status of the Taiwan 
authorities” needs to be settled as the “room of international operation” for 
Taiwanese people.  The simplest answers would be: Taiwan shall become a “special 
administrative region” as Hong Kong whose government notionally derives from 
authorisation of the unitary state, while the Taiwanese people may participate in 
international organisations with a non-sovereign membership as the Taiwanese 
authorities already do in WTO, APEC, and as the “Chinese Taipei” committee in 
                                                
441 The PRC Anti-Secession Act 2005, art 8. 
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the Olympics. But Chapter 3 has shown that the Taiwanese constitutional 
aspirations have gone far beyond the said solution. The PRC leadership hopes “the 
achievement of peaceful reunification” may be reached “through consultations and 
negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits”, but as 
an accountable government it is in no way the Taiwanese authorities would make a 
deal with the PRC side without a overwhelming majority in Taiwan endorsing. 
The subsequent alternatives all acknowledge Taiwan’s resistance to Hong Kong 
model that will undermine Taiwan’s international status, which is much higher than 
Hong Kong. But what they save for Taiwan in alternative proposals may lead to 
uncertainty in the Chinese response. Neither of the following alternatives has been 
officially discussed by the PRC state.  
The first is “one China, three constitutions” promoted by a Taiwanese academic. 
Although the Hong Kong model also creates a mini-constitution for the territory, it 
theoretically remains the outcome of the PRC Constitution that shall be the only 
constitution in unified China. The idea of “one China, three constitutions” departs 
from this point, urging the PRC side to recognise there is another separate 
constitutional system in Taiwan that stems from the 1946 constituent moment in the 
mainland and thrives in Taiwanese isles. This argument is generally right. When the 
PRC Anti-Secession Act declares that the civil war never ends, it implies the 
constituent process is not complete either. The Chinese People’s Political 
Consultation Conference, originally being the constituent organ, survives but takes 
no place officially in the Chinese governmental hierarchy. This also reminds us that 
some jobs remain unfinished and the CPPCC may resume its work again. The idea 
of “one China, three constitutions” suggests the Chinese people can learn from the 
European Union. The EU states “pool” their sovereign powers together and have 
established a unique supranational entity for the benefits of EU citizens. Notionally 
the Chinese sovereignty processed by the entire Chinese people in both sides of the 
Strait never splits, so the two sides do not even need to “pool” their powers. The 
next step is to promulgate the third constitution for the entire Chinese people and 
finalise the longstanding constituent process starting in the 1940s. The third 
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constitution needs not to be a codified document, and probably it will be a 
“constitutional treaty” between the two sides. The crucial point is the PRC side shall 
recognise that the Taiwanese constitutional system remains legitimate while the 
Taiwanese side shall agree to make a political deal for constitutional unification in 
exchange.  
The second alternative can be called a “unification referendum”. The means to 
realise “one China, three constitutions” is inter-governmental negotiation as PRC 
Anti-Secession Act suggests. But the second alternative imagines a “company 
merge process” for futuristic national unification. Whenever the PRC side wants to 
unify, it needs to make a detailed proposal for Taiwanese people and the Taiwanese 
authorities shall be constitutionally bound to test the PRC proposal in a territorial 
referendum. If the proposal is accepted by a majority of the Taiwanese people, the 
national unification may happen “that very night”; while if the proposal does not 
pass, the PRC side is still entitled to propose again but there shall be a temporal gap 
for around ten or more years. The alternative does not allow the Taiwanese people 
to use referendum to legitimatise de jure Taiwanese independence, but since the 
“possibility of unification” never disappears, the PRC side shall have no reason to 
invade Taiwan. It sounds attractive that the second alternative leaves the Taiwanese 
people the final say as well as reassures the possibility of Chinese unification for the 
PRC; nevertheless, the question is the “political status of Taiwanese authorities” 
remains vague.  
The third is Taiwanese “Finlandisation”. Bruce Gilley contends:  
To understand the evolution of the Taipei-Beijing relationship, it is useful to consider 
the theory and practice of what has become known as "Finlandisation" in the field of 
political science. The term derives its name from Finland's 1948 agreement with the 
Soviet Union under which Helsinki agreed not to join alliances challenging Moscow 
or serve as a base for any country challenging Soviet interests. In return, the Kremlin 
agreed to uphold Finnish autonomy and respect Finland's democratic system.  
For Taiwan, Bruce Gilley suggests “Taiwan would reposition itself as a neutral 
power, rather than a U.S. strategic ally, in order to mollify Beijing's fears about the 
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island's becoming an obstacle to China's military and commercial ambitions in the 
region. It would also refrain from undermining the CCP's rule in China. In return, 
Belling would back down on its military threats, grant Taipei expanded participation 
in international organizations, and extend the island favourable economic and social 
benefits.”442 The “Finlandisation” removes the obligation of Taiwan to be waiting 
for eventual national unification. But in any way the Taiwanese people cannot stand 
side by side with the military presence of the United State in Chinese seas. There is 
indeed a chance for the PRC side to ignore a harmless political entity off shore, 
which can be internally sovereign as well as internationally visible in proper name 
so long as it cannot be a rebellious base for anti-China/anti-communist activities. 
But the bad news is after the fifty-year KMT anti-communist propaganda and eight-
year DPP anti-Chinese education, the Taiwanese people could not easily become 
PRC-friendly, and the United States’ China/Taiwan-policy is ambiguous to boot. In 
2009 a DPP major successfully welcomed the Dalai Lama to pay to visit to Taiwan, 
which was seen as a betrayal to the reconciliation policy by the CPC. Against this 
background, the Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou concedes that Finlandisation is 
not an option at this moment.443 It probably is my conclusion too. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
Many liberals based on the modernist constitutionalist paradigm envision that a late 
communist Chinese State is incompetent and incapable of managing antagonistic 
peripheral societies successfully, and for them the best way to do justice to the 
politics is to allow self-governing political units to establish states of their own in 
accordance with liberal democratic ideals. Some may compromise that those small 
liberal democracies can re-unite in one way or another, say, they can create a 
                                                
442 GILLEY, BRUCE, Not So Dire Straits, 89 Foreign Aff. 44,  (2010).  
443 Ma Ying-jeou, his point of view in Chinese available at 
 http://www.nownews.com/2010/01/01/301-2553327.htm. Retrieved on 2 January 2010. 
 
 Kai Tu 
- 237 - 
federation, or a confederation, or even an international organisation that grants 
membership to all Sinitic peoples. But the quintessential idea is there should be a 
symmetric order of liberal peoples regardless of their experience and expectation. 
This thesis does not exclude the possibility that an order of Sinitic peoples with 
symmetric liberal democratic government can be a good option, but it seems that 
prospect does not reconcile with the political situation easily. Chapter 2 has 
described although the Sinitic people-s, are not integrated into a unitary domestic 
order, they do not qualify as liberal democratic self-governing entities independent 
from a host state. The host state, which is not a liberal democracy, survives and 
thrives against the liberal hypothesis. It is this cognition that sets this thesis apart 
from the modernist constitutionalist paradigm. Given the existence of the mighty 
non-liberal host state, there is still the possibility to talk about a just constitutional 
structure that can accommodate multiple societies for peace and prosperity.  
Leaning against John Rawls’s theory of “law of peoples”, this thesis generates four 
principles of recognition, representation, reconciliation, and reciprocity to inform 
Chinese constitutional arrangements to the peripheral societies of Tibet, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan. The conception of “constitutional law of peoples” in the normative 
dimension prescribes related people-s in a constitutional order should put peace on 
top of other values so long as none is waging war or fails to fulfil a minimised 
standard of human rights protection and thus provokes serious humanitarian concern. 
If the peoples are qualified to a decent level of representation or consultation in 
decision-making, which guarantees they are not only rational but also reasonable, 
other peoples are not entitled to interfere by military means. Moreover, the 
“constitutional law of peoples” differs from the “law of peoples” in the principle of 
reciprocity. The theory of “law of peoples” does not request peoples to aid each 
other merely because some are in social crisis. But the conception of “constitutional 
law of peoples” distributes the peoples a heavier burden to assist others because 
there is a stronger bond among them. As we have seen, a constitutional order, no 
matter how similar to an international order, does not completely alienate peoples 
and persons in constitutional terms. But in concrete context, we need balance the 
four principles in order to do justice to every people in that constitutional order. 
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The “constitutional law of peoples” is also a descriptive conception, which attempts 
to capture some basic attributes of Chinese constitutional law. The first attribute is 
the PRC central government has already recognised Sinitic peoples are not ordinary 
administrative divisions, say, Chinese provinces, in Chinese constitutional structure. 
The Tibetan Autonomous Region is established to carry a Chinese “ethnic regional 
autonomy” over the Tibetan case. The Hong Kong Basic Law guards Hong Kong’s 
special status. The PRC central government does not recognise the title or the 
legitimacy of the Taiwanese authorities, but at least there is cross-Strait negotiation 
between semi-official agencies on both sides of the Strait. The second attribute is 
within the same constitutional order Sinitic peoples have to a larger or lesser degree 
created a separate system of representation or consultation. The demoi of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan both are embodied in an electorate. In the PRC Tibet 
Autonomous Region, the right to elect or to stand is assigned to residents who are 
overwhelmingly ethnic Tibetan; in Dharamsala, there is also an emerging 
democratic institution that will in some measure manifest the Tibetan people’s will 
and reasonableness. The third attribute is Sinitic peoples are joining in a process of 
reconciliation. Although not unanimous, political forces among the Sinitic peoples 
have already become more moderate and tended to accept some constitutional 
solutions. Finally, the economic cooperation and mutual assistance among Sinitic 
peoples reflect that the constitutional order is more reciprocal than international 
relations. 
Chapter 5 reveals Chinese constitutional arrangements to Tibet, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan are asymmetric by nature. In the PRC Tibet Autonomous Region, the 
communist leadership has supervised the administration and the Tibetan judiciary is 
incorporated into a unitary PRC system of judicial courts. This encourages the 
Tibetan legislature to be the autonomous institution that probably can make a 
difference. The Tibetan legislature is entitled to enact autonomous regulations and 
special regulations, which can be different from the PRC parliamentary acts and 
take care of special demands of ethnic Tibetans. In Hong Kong, the judiciary is 
constitutionally independent and has been regarded as the most antagonistic 
institution in the “special administrative region”. This situation may change after the 
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Chief Executive and the Legislative Council will be elected by universal suffrage, 
but the Hong Kong common law courts will continue their disobedience to 
administrative and political interference from the territorial or the central 
government. Taiwan, as an alleged de facto state, obviously possesses a great deal 
of autonomous powers; so the PRC central government’s offer to reunify Taiwan is 
much more generous in comparison with the other two. Chapter 6 has discussed 
some options of constitutional reform in the future. As we have seen, it is unlikely a 
symmetric constitutional structure will be created in the Chinese context. The 
asymmetry of constitutional solutions, eventually and essentially, may defy the 
traditional constitutional dichotomy of unitary/federal state. 
The Sinitic cases can be drawn into a bigger picture. The modernist 
constitutionalism has been a trinity of nation-state, constitutional discourse, and 
liberal democracy. The nation-state lays the foundation for a modern constitutional 
site, which sets up a closed legal configuration for the state with a pivot concept of 
“popular sovereignty”. The raison d'état of a state therefore should be to promote the 
interests of citizens and protect their liberty, which is in contrast to totalitarian 
regimes that put its own survival in priority over the people. However, the last 30 
years are so dynamic that an alternative conception of constitutionalism has 
emerged in contemporary academia – constitutional pluralism. Neil Walker says: 
“constitutional pluralism recognises that in the post-Westphalian world there exists 
a range of different constitutional sites and processes configured in a heterarchical 
rather than a hierarchical pattern, and seeks to develop a number of empirical 
indices and normative criteria which allow us to understand this emerging 
configuration and assess the legitimacy of its development.”444 The “constitutional 
law of peoples”, in this sense, is a variation of constitutional pluralism, which is 
rooted in a heterarchy of authorities and attempts to do justice to the constitutional 
configuration with a series of normative ideals. The uniqueness of this conception, if 
                                                
444 WALKER, NEIL, Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, The, 65 Modern Law Review 317, (2002). 
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there is one, is that it attends to a non-ideal situation where the authoritarian state is 
more powerful than peripheral liberal or decent societies. For peace and the good, 
the conception designs an asymmetric constitutional structure in which multiple 
self-governing units as peoples can sustain healthy constitutional relations and 
abstain from violent conflict. The host state should recognise the self-governing 
units’ peoplehood as long as they are well representing individuals qua members of 
society, and the peoples must seek reconciliation with the host state if there are 
sufficient reciprocal conditions, which can persuade them to stay under the same 
constitutional umbrella with the host state. In this world there are many other 
developing countries with a low level of democratisation and human rights 
protection, which are unlikely to become liberal democracies like Western nations 
immediately. For them, liberal nationalists’ union state or European union are 
theoretic and unapproachable. The “constitutional law of peoples” may thus provide 
a new way of thinking about their future. 
This eventually raises a fundamental question: how to assess China and her 
constitutional law? The widespread concern in the West is since China will exceed 
the United States in terms of GDP in one or two generations and recover her 
millenarian lead, is she a threat to the West and thus a model for the Rest? After the 
navigation from one provision to another in Chinese constitutional law, this thesis 
does not predict China will go in that direction. Some traditional comprehensive 
moral doctrines may inspire peoples and persons in several occasions, but the ever 
developing political and reasonable pluralism has determined no singular doctrine 
can monopoly the politics or the constitutional law, no matter it is Confucianism, 
Buddhism, or Marxism. So there is no authentic “Chinese” model to be set up for 
the Rest, at least none in constitutional accommodation of, and integration with, 
peripheral societies. On the other hand if Chinese constitutional reform will be 
informed by the conception of “constitutional law of peoples”, it definitely will be 
no threat to the West either. It aims at upholding a liberal umbrella for Sinitic 
peoples, under which they can enjoy peaceful cohabitation and prosperous 
cooperation.  
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This is in essence a “Western” Kantian idea, but it is irrelevant whether this idea 
derives from a Western philosopher or Mandarin after all. Liberal constitutionalism, 
if we understand it with liberality, can still be used to gradually tame the dragon. 
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